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In March 1957, six European countries embarked upon a 
momentous course which is leading them towards economic inte-
gration and may eventually link them politically: France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community. In 
January 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the Common 
Market, thus increasing the Community to nine members. 
I 
Although the arduous process of integration and the 
concomitant changes in internal relations are the most important 
aspects of this venture for members of the Community, countries 
remaining outside the EEC are more concerned with the external 
policies of the Common Market. A prominent aspect of these ex-
ternal relations is the Association system which describes the 
complex network of association and traae agreements between a 
number of countries and the EEC. Thus, the Association system 
will be taken here in its broadest sense, to include not only 
associated states but also countries which have entered into 
simple trade agreements with the EEC.(1) 
The central theme of this thesis is to consider the 
impact of the Association system of the European Economic Commun-
ity on international trade policies. The basis for Association 
resides in Artic l es 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome.(2) The pur-
pose of these provisions was to deal with the problem of depend-
1 
ent territories of the Six members of the Common Market. In 1957, 
France possessed a large colonial empire, mainly in Africa, while 
(1) See map on p. . x \ I 
(2) In conformity with current usage, the term 'Association' refers 
to the Assoc i ation system of. the European, Economic Community. 
See Annex A f or relevant Art1cles of the Rome Treaty, 1957. 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands also had dependencies in 
various parts of the world. France, in particular, refused to 
? roceed with the EEC negotiations unless some arrangement was 
agreed upon to allow her to maintain the close economic and 
social relationship which she had with her colonies. The full 
application of the terms of the Treaty of Rome to those depend-
encies was rejected by the other members of the Common Market, 
but a compromise was reached in the concept of Association be-
tween the EECand dependencies of the Six. 
The most important aspect of the Association was the 
creation of a free trade area between the EEC and the associates, 
giving preferential access to exports from both groups into the 
markets of the Common Market countries and of the dependencies. 
In addition, flnancial aid was to be provided for economic and 
social projects, through a European Development Fund, to which 
all members of t he EEC were committed to contribute. Under-
lying these economic factors was the political aim of maintain-
ing close links between. the Western world and African countries 
on the brink of independence, especially in view of the fact 
that some EEC members had large investments in those territories. 
2 
In 1963, a new type of Association Was agreed upon 
between the EEC and eighteen independent African countries. Since 
then, the Association has so evolved as to include other types 
of agreements, some establishing a limited form of association and 
others dealing only with commercial relations. Therefore, the 
Association system extends to many other countries besides the 
original associat es. 
The focus of this thesis is Africa. Although the EEC 
has entered into agreements with countries in Europe and other 
parts of the world, most associates are African states, and the 
most important agreement is the Yaounde Convention of 1963 and 
1969, between the Six and the Eighteen.(1) The accession of 
Mauritius has increased the number of full associates to nine-
teen. 
A number of Commonwealth countries have recently become 
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associates of the EEC and the convergence between the Commonwealth 
and the Association is blurring the old division between franco-
phone and anglophone Africa. This trend will be accelerated if 
other Commonwealth countries become associated with the Community 
following Britain's accession to the EEC. 
South Africa's trade relationship with the Community 
has been affected by the enlargement of the EEC. Preferences 
which have benefitted South Africa's exports to Britain since the 
Ottawa agreements of 1932 will be abolished and the South African 
Customs Union might be altered if Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho 
become associates of the Common Market. 
Apart from its effect on Africa, the Association system 
has had an impact on wider aspects of international trade. Since 
its inception, the Association has been criticized by third 
t " (2) b "t d" t 1 " h" ld coun r~es ecause ~ was argue - In er a la - t at ~t wou 
damage the external trade of non-associates, especially develop-
ing countries. It has also been maintained that the terms of the 
Association and trade agreements are in conflict with the rules 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Preferences given 
by the EEC to associates have induced other developing countries 
to obtain tariff concessions in the markets of developed nations. 
(1) As the 'Six' refers to the original Common Market countries, 
the 'Eighteen' is currently used to describe the eighteen ex-
dependencies of the Six, which became associates in 1963. 
(2) Similarly to current publications, the term 'third country' 
is used to mean a country not party to a particular agreement. 
With regard to the Association, third party thus refers to R 
country whir.h ; "" no; +-"h ~ _ - - - - -,-
This has resulted in the establishment of the Generalized Scheme 
of Preferences which has contributed to the failure of the 
principle of non-discrimination of the GATT. 
The controversy which affects several aspects of the 
external relations of the European Economic Community are re-
lated to the basic disagreements between nations on the role 
and function of international trade. Differences of opinion 
in this respect will persist as long as countries differ in 
economic structure, patterns of trade and development. 
Our purpose is therefore to examine the impact of the 
Association on these various aspects of international economics. 
The sector of economic theory most closely related to these 
problems began as a branch of tariff theory - the theory of 
customs unions - investigating the proquction and consumption 
effects of the elimination of tariffs between partners of a 
customs union. It has recently been extended into a theory of 
economic integration which broadens the field of international 
trade theory by consideri.ng effects on growth and on govern-
mental policies. 
A survey of these theories suggests that although the 
basic theory of customs unions was inconclusive as to whether it 
results in gains or losses for the countries concerned, the 
extension of the theory points to a presumption in favour of 
integration, even if these benefits remain immeasurable. Although 
the external trade patterns of Associates can be examined and 
compared with those of other developing countries, the present 
4 
state of economic theory does not allow any prediction on 
whether the Association system will promote the economic and 
social development of the countries concerned. 
The effects of economic integration may be examined 
from four viewpoints: 
a) the individual countries concerned; 
b) the integrated group as a whole; 
c) outside countries; 
d) the world as a whole. 
Most of customs union theory has been concerned prim-
arily with the viewpoint of individual countries (a), but 
occasional reference has been made to the integrated group (b). 
The viewpoint (c) that is to say, the effects of integration on 
other countries, has not attracted much attention except for 
some discussion on their terms of trade and their right to com-
pensation should the establishment of a customs union cause 
damage to their economies. The impact of integration on the 
world as a whole (d) has seldom been discussed and it is certain 
aspects of this problem which is the main CQncern of this thesis. 
Chapter I will deal with theoretical aspects of inter-
n.ational trade and different types of economic integration and 
Chapt~r II will consider the contribution of economists to the 
theory of customs unions and its extension into new fields, in-
cluding non-economic aspects. The Association system will be 
discussed in some detail in Chapter III and the significance of 
the Commonwealth Associates in Chapter IV. An empirical analysis 
5 
of the trade of the EEC with the Associates and the special 
problems of South Africa's trade with the EEC will be examined 
in Chapters V and VI. 
The second part of the thesis will be concerned with 
the impact of the Association on broader aspects of inter-
national economics. A discussion of the GATT's views on the 
preferential aspect of association and trade agreements, and 
on tariff preferences generally (Chapter VII). will be followed 
by an outline of the development of the Generalized Scheme of . 
Preferences and the part played by the Association in this 
respect (Chapter VIII). The GATT has failed to maintain non-
discrimination in international trade (Chapter IX) and this is 
only one of the sources of conflict among the trading nations 
of the world (Chapter X). The Conclusions will be contained in 
Chapter XI. 
It must be stressed that the Association system of 
the European Economic Community is a dynamic part of inter-
national trade and subject to frequent chariges. In view of this 
fact, this thesis will not consider alterations which have 




International trade theories - comparative 
advantage - factor endowment theory - tariff theory -
effects of tariffs on the economy - on terms of trade -
economic integration - different types of integration -
economic co-operation. 
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The European Economic Community has entered into association 
and trade agreements with a number of developing countries, mainly 
in Africa. Although some of these agreements include provisions for 
technical and financial assistance from the Common Market, the main 
reason for these arrangements is to facilitate trade by removing 
tariff barriers between the European Community and those countries. 
Countries have joined the Association in the hope of benefitting 
from increased trade with the EEC. Thus, this move may be looked 
at from two points of view: international trade and economic inte-
gration. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical 
background to an examination of the Association system of the EEC. 
We shall therefore outline international trade theory, then proceed 
to a di scussion of customs unions theory and finally examine 
economic integration as a trade policy. 
A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORIES 
• 
Early theories of international trade were based on the 
labour theory of value and therefore the value of goods was calculated 
in labour costs , man-days or man-years. Adam Smith pointed out in 
8 . 
1776 that trade occurs because of division of labour and special-
ization and that this is brought about by the fact that certain 
countries possess advantages over others. For instance, if country 
A is able to produce commodity X more cheaply - that is, with less 
labour - than country B, whilst country B produces commodity Y more 
efficiently, then an exchange of goods X and Y will ·benefit both 
countries. The law of absolute advantage, as this was called, was 
superseded in 1817 by David Ricardo's law of comparative advantage. 
In his 'Principles of Political Economy' Ricardo showed that it was 
not necessary for a country to have an absolute advantage in the 
production of a commodity in order to benefit from international 
trade. If the country has a comparative advantage in one commodity 
over another, it will benefit from trade with another country with 
an opposite pattern of relative advantages. There is no need to 
reproduce here i n detail Ricardo's famous example of two countries 
producing wine and cloth. Briefly, country A produces both 
commodities with less labour-costs than country B, but while A is 
relatively more efficient in the production of wine than cloth, B 
is relatively better at producing cloth than wine. Both countries 
will benefit by exporting the commodity in which it has a comparative 
advantage and importing the other product. 
Although the Ricardo model comprised only two countries 
and two goods, it was shown later to be applicable to a larger 
number of countries and products. The assumptions were that there 
was only one factor of production (labour), perfect mobility of 
factors within a country but imperfect mobility of factors between 




John Stuart Mill, during the mid-19th century, examined 
possible terms of trade by focussing attention on the demand aspect 
of international trade. He reconsidered Ricardo's example of com-
parative advantage by assuming a given amount of labour and different 
outputs, instead of different labour costs for identical outputs. 
This led Mill to formulate the law of reciprocal demand which indi-
cated that the ratio at which commodities would be exchanged - the 
terms of trade - depends on the strength and elasticity of each 
country's demand for the goods produced by the other country. 
To complete this brief survey of classical theories, 
mention must be made of F.W. Taussig who, in 1927, considered 
interest on capital and the existence of non-competing labour groups 
and their effect on international trade. 
Moving away from a model using one factor of production, 
Haberler (1933) used the concept of opportunity-cost to elaborate 
on the theory of comparative advantage. This showed that the 
resources of a country could be used for the production of either 
A or B, or varyi ng amounts of each, so that the cost of producing 
A could be measured by the amount of B which must be given up in 
order to produce A. Haberler also stressed the fact that countries 
with identical i nputs were able to produce outputs of differing 
amounts. 
The question of differences in efficiency remained un-
answered, however, until Bertil Ohlin, following in the footsteps 
of his teacher Heckscher, put forward the factor-endowments theory 
in 1933. Different commodities require different proportions of 
certain factors of production. Thus countries with relatively large 
areas of land are better suited to land-intensive production and 
countries with large labour resources relative to capital are better 
suited to labour-intensive production. Thus, while Ricardo made 
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technological differences the main reason for trade, Ohlin's model 
showed that trade occurred because of differences in relative 
factor-endowments and therefore, differences in factor prices. 
Ohlin assumed perfect competition, factor mobility within 
a country but factor immobility between countries, no barriers to 
trade, no transport costs and identical technology in all countries. 
These assumptions made Ohlin's model somewhat unrealistic, and gave 
t OO tOO f h ° th ( 1 ) A th ° th rise to cer a~ n cr~ ~c~sms 0 ~s eory. mong ese ~s e 
fact that it is sometimes difficult to decide whether a product is 
capital-intensive or labour-intensive without investigating the 
possibility of factor-substitution, since there is often a range 
within which one factor can be substituted for another factor in 
order to produce a specific commodity. Another criticism is that 
the units of factors of production are not homogeneous. This was 
first pointed out by Taussig with regard to labour, but other 
factors of production are also made up of non-competing groups. 
Some land is suitable for the production of a certain crop and not 
another, and labour may be efficient at a certain type of work but 
not so efficient in other activities. Thus if factors of pro-
duction are defined narrowly and non-competing groups are considered 
as separate factors, 'it turns out that much trade is based on 
absolute advantage, the existence of a factor in one country but not 
° °t t dO , (2) ~n ~ s ra ~ng partner • 
International trade tends to equalise factor prices. This 
occurs since exports tend to raise prices of the plentiful and 
cheaper factor, whereas imports tend to lower prices of goods pro-
duc~d by the scarce and expensive factor of production and hence 
(1) See inter alia, Charles P. Kindleberger, International economics, 
Homewood, . Richard D. Irwin, 1968 (4th ed.), pp. 29-31, and 
David Young, International economics, London, International 
Textbook, 1969, pp. 29-37. 
(2) C.P. Kindleberger, ibid, p.30. 
the price of that factor. However, complete equilibrium will not 
be reached because many other influences and barriers will distort 
the mechanism. 
'The statement that the tendency of trade is ·to 
equalise factor prices internationally, it has been found, 
must be qualified in several respects. The difference in 
quality between productive factors in different countries, 
the possibility of using entirely different technical 
processes, the economies of large-scale production, and 
differences in economic stability and taxation not only 
blur the outlines of the previous analysis, but make it 
uncertain to what extent international trade as a whole 
d t 1 · ft· ,(1) actually ten s 0 equa 1ze ac or pr1ces. 
1.1 
Although Ohlin's model assumed immobility of factors inter-
nationally, he went on to consider the effects of factor movements 
between countries, on factor prices. Thus he showed that there was 
no basic difference in the mechanics of interregional and inter-
national trade. In the European Economic Community, international 
trade becomes more obviously interregional trade as tariff barriers 
to the movement of goods are progressively eliminated. However, 
transport costs and other differences prevent full equalization 
of factor prices and therefore of commodity prices also. 
Modern analyses of international trade have tried to take 
into account a variety of factors which affect costs and prices in 
world trade, not only transport costs, but also internal and ex-
ternal economies, differences and changes in tastes, managerial 
ability, competi t ion or monopoly and differences in technology. As 
it is not our pur pose to give a complete list of recent approaches 
in international trade theory, we shall only mention two of them: 
the technological gap and the 'vent for surplus' theory. 
(1) Bertil Ohlin, Interregional and international trade, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1935, p.113. 
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The technological gap between countries (sometimes called 
the imitation gap) may alter the pattern of international trade. A 
country with a technological advantage becomes the pioneer in the 
production of a certain commodity which it exports to countries less 
advanced in this field. As technology improves all round, however, 
the first country will move towards the production of a technically 
more advanced product whilst the second country will begin to pro-
duce the original commodity, and in some cases eventually exports 
it to the pioneer country. For example, Japan exported transistors, 
an American innovation, to the United States~ Thus because of 
technological di fferences, innovation leads to exports and in due 
course, imitation abroad leads to imports. 
The 'vent for surplus' theory is of special interest to 
developing countries.(1) This approach originates from a point 
made by Adam Smith, but neglected by economists until recently. 
The classical trade theory assumes that ' the resources of a country 
are fully used before trade, and that with trade there is simply a 
r~-allocation of these resources between the different uses. On 
the other hand, the vent for surplus theory acknowledges the fact 
that some resources may be idle before trade, and only drawn into 
production when the opportunity to export arises. 
Among the barriers which distort the free mechanism of 
international trade are those included in the commercial policies 
of nations and which comprise tariffs and hon-tariff barrier~ 
(1) See H. Myint, The 'classical theory' of in'ternational trade 
and the underdeveloped countries, The Economic Journal, ' 
Vol. LXVIII, no.270, June 1958, pp. 317 - 337. 
Although some non-tariff barriers are clear and 
specific (e.g. quantitative restrictions) most others are 
difficult to define and control. These include escape clauses, 
anti-dumping practices, customs valuations" government procure-
ment policies, state-trading, border tax adjustments, and do 
not lend themselves easily to theoretical analysis.(1) Tariffs, 
on the other hand, are the subject of an important section of 
international trade theory, tariff theory, some aspects of 
which are examined below. 
B. TARIFF THEORY 
Tariffs may be analyzed from the point of view of 
their impact on various aspects of the economy. These include 
effects on redistribution, protection, revenue, consumption, 
terms of trade, competition, income and balance-of-payments. (2) 
The first four of these are demonstrated in Figure 2. 
DD and SS are the demand and supply curves of a 
particular product in the importing country. In the absence 
of trade, the price would be at P". With free trade and 
assuming perfect elasticity of supply of foreign goods, the 
price is brought down to P, where OQ is produced locally and QQ3 
is imported. An import tariff PP' will cause the price in the 
importing country to rise to OP', local production increasing to 
OQ1 and imports decreasing to Q1Q2. 
(1) 
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(2) C.P. Kindleberger, International Economics, Homewood, Illinois, 
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Figure 2. Effects of a tariff 
D 
Before tariff, consumers paid OPnQ3' and satisfaction 
gained is illustrated by ODnQ3. Their net satisfaction was 
therefore PDn. After tariff, they pay OP'mQ2' and receive ODmQ2. 
Net satisfaction: P'Dm. The difference (loss) to the consumers 
is therefore PP'mn. An examination of the components of this area 
leadsto the following conclusions. 
Redistribution effect: Producers' receipts have been 
increased by area~, and this represents a transfer from con-
sumers (who pay the higher price) to local producers (who are able 
to charge the higher price). It is sometimes called the transfer 
effect. 
Protective effect: Area ~ represents that part of 
increased receipts which has to be used to pay for increasingly 
inefficient use of resources. Assuming full use of resources 
before the imposition of the tariff, this is a net loss to the 
country. 
Revenue effect: This is illustrated by area ~ which 
is the amount of import duties collected by the government of 
the importing country. It is sometimes assumed to be redistri-
buted to the community in form of lower taxes (or in some other 
form) and would then be another transfer. 
Consumption: Area ~ represents the loss of satis-
faction ·of consumers (due to increased prices), not otherwise 
accounted for. It is, therefore, a net loss to the consumers 
and to the country as a whole. 
Effects of tariffs on ter~s of trade may be similarly 
analyzed. A tariff imposed on imports will tend to raise the 
price of the good in the importing country and lower the price 
of that good in the exporting country, thus improving the terms 
of trade of the country imposing the tariff. 
Figure 3 illustrates the supply and demand of a good 
in A (importing country) and B (exporting country). Under free 
trade, the price in both countries will be P1• 
At PWice P1 , A imports MN (=M'N') and produces P1M 
locally. A tariff T will partly increase the price of the 
imports, reducing the quantity to QR (=Q'R'). This will depress 
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the price in B. Prices will settle at P2 in A and at P3 in B, 
where the difference between P2 and P3 is equal to T. Country A 
will therefore benefit from an improvement in the terms of trade 
with B, due to cheaper imports from B. 
A: importing country B: exporting country 
Figure 3: Effects of tariffs on terms of trade 
The significance of tariffs in international economics 
has altered somewhat in recent years. Their importance as 
obstacles to trade has been reduced for the following reasons:-
a) Since the Kennedy Round of the GATT (1964-67) the 
average tariff on industrial goods (except textiles) has reached 
an all-time low of 12% or below.(1) 
b) Non-tariff barriers have in~reased in importance, not 
because they are new but because their effectiveness in limiting 
imports has become more apparent and it is often easier to use 
them than to raise tariffs. 
(1) Thomas B. Curtis and John Robert Vastine, 'Jr., The Kennedy 
Round and the future of American trade, New York, Praeger, 
1971, p. 227. 
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c) Monetary factors have increased their impact in 
international economics. 
d) Finally, if we consider European trade, the establish-
ment of a free trade area between sixteen nations - the nine EEC 
members and the seven EFTA countries - will contribute to a 
lessening of interest in tariff problems within Western Europe.(1) 
On the other hand, tariffs have maintained their 
impact in two fields: 
a) In multilateral trade negotiations, they are a use-
ful bargaining tool susceptible to quantitative measurement and 
comparison, and hence the GATT Rounds have concentrated on 
reciprocal tariff concessions. 
b) Tariffs lend themselves to theoretical analysis and 
have been the focus of attention in early writings on customs 
union theory, since the elimination of tariffs between a group 
of countries and the establishment of a common external tariff 
on imports from outside, are the two essential characteristics 
of customs unions. 
Customs unions are only one of the many forms of 
economic integration and before examining customs union theory 
in some detail (see Chapter II) it is worthwhile to consider 
economic integration and its evolution, in a broader context. 
(1) - In 1960, there were seven members of EFTA (Britain, Denmark 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal). Finland 
and Iceland increased the membership to nine a few years 
later, but with the withdrawal of Britain and Denmark, 
EFTA once again comprises seven countries. 
C. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS A TRADE POLICY 
Economic integration is a recent development in 
international trade, both as a trade policy and as a field of 
study. 
'The theory of economic integration can be regarded 
as a part of international economics, but it also 
enlarges the field of international trade theory by 
exploring t he impact of a fusion of national markets 
on growth and examining the need for the co-
ordination of economic policies in a union.,(1) 
(1) Evolution of economic integration 
International trade policies vary with time and 
circumstances. The pendulum swung from the protectionism of 
the mercantilist period to the laissez-faire policies of the 
19th Century and back again to restrictionism at the beginning 
of the 20th Century due to the resurgence of nationalism. A 
severe depression and two world wars disrupted the world economy 
and efforts have been made in the last twenty years to return 
to freer trade. 
Endeavours to restore stability in international economic 
relations took place on ' 1 b 1 1 ago a as we 1 as on a regional scale. 
The United Nations, the International Mon'etary F d th 0 un, e rganisation 
(1) Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, Homewood, 
Richard D. Irwin, 1961, p.3. 
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for European Economic Co-operation and the European Recovery 
Programme were all parts of this movement. More closely connected 
to international trade was the International Trade Organisation -
which was never ratified - and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade which has achieved a fair amount of success in trade 
liberalisation since the first conference in Geneva in 1947. 
On a regional scale, the growing realisation that inte-
gration might be beneficial led some countries to investigate the 
possibility of some form of regional integration. There were two 
motives: politically, it was felt that closer links would increase 
the strength of their position among nations, and economically, 
integration was sought because it increases prospects of growth 
by widening the market and improving the scope for economies of 
scale and specialisation. 
Although customs unions existed before the last world 
war, it was only during the fifties and sixties that economic 
integration gathered significant momentum in international trade.(1) 
The practicabili ty of establishing such unions, however, was con-
sidered doubtful by economists of the protectionist era. 
'When one reflects how difficult it often is, even in a 
unified state, to fix upon a tariff, owing to the con-
flict of wi shes and opposition of interests of the various 
parties concerned , and when one remembers what a painful 
process it was to get an agreement between the two halves 
of the old Austria-Hungary, despite the bonds of a common 
monarch and a common army, one is forced to the conclusion 
that, apart from exceptional cases, these problems are 
practically insoluble.' (2) 
(1) The German Zollverein (1834), the South African Customs Union 
(1910), and the Economic Union between Belgium and Luxem-
bourg (1921). . 
(2) international trade with 
London, W. Hodge, 1933, 
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After the war, efforts were made to liberalise trade and 
reduce nationalism. The results of international co-operation, 
however, proved disappointing. The ITO failed, while the evolution 
of the Council of Europe and the OEEC foiled the hopes of those who 
sought greater unity in Europe. On the other hand, arrangements 
between a smaller group of countries - Benelux - were progressing 
favourably. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed, establishing 
the ECSC, between the Six. Soon after this, the European Economic 
Community and then the European Free Trade Association were formed 
in Western Europe, followed by COMECON in the eastern part of the 
continent. The African and Latin American integration schemes ~ook 
shape in the following decade, as also the Association s~stem of 
the EEC. As is well-known, integration in Western Europe took two 
distinct forms: the loose arrangements of EFTA, establishing free 
trade in industrial goods only, and the closer integration of the 
economic union of the Six. The two groups have now been linked 
by a series of trade agreements. Thus economic integration can 
take different forms. 
(2) Different forms of economic integration 
Economic integration is a process combining divided 
national economies into a single economy. The first stages involve 
the removal of discriminatory measures between countries and the 
more advanced steps include the co-ordination of various national 
1 "" "t 1 " " (1) S po 1C1es 1n 0 common po 1C1es. orne countries never proceed 
beyond the first stage while others integrate more fully. There 
are therefore different degrees and forms of economic integration. 
The process may be illustrated as follows: 
(1) These have been called 'negative' and 'positive' integration 
by J. Tinbergen, International economic integration, 
Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1954, p.122. 
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Fig. 4. The process of economic integration 
A free trade area is the simplest form of economic inte-
gration. The countries involved eliminate tariff barriers on the 
movement of goods between themselves but they retain their own 
tariffs against goods from outside the area. Examples of this 
type of integration are the European Free Trade Association and 
the free trade arrangements between the EEC and the Association 6f 
African and Malagasy States, which will be the main topic of dis-
cussion in subsequent chapters. 
A customs union has two characteristics: the elimination 
of tariff barriers on the movement of goods - as in a free trade 
area - and in addition a common external tariff on goods from out-
side the customs union. Thus it can be said that the customs 
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union goes one step further than the free trade area. It establishes 
a common policy which requires agreement from the members of the 
union as to the type and extent of tariffs which will be applied. 
The nearest example, already mentioned, is the customs union betw~en 
South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana which has been in 
existence since 1910. 
In a common market, there is free movement of all factors 
of production, that is, not only of goods, but also labour and 
capital. The EEC is often described as a common market although 
there still exist barriers to the movement of capital in the Community, 
nevertheless some writers prefer to call it an economic union. 
An economic union includes the characteristics of the 
common market but in addition there is co-ordination of national 
economic policies, which may necessitate harmonization of social, 
fiscal and monetary policies. The EEC has harmonized policies in 
agriculture and external commercial relations and is currently 
establishing common policies in other sectors. 
It may be controversial to place the political union at 
the end of the process, and some may prefer to consider this form 
of integration as total economic integration, but complete inte-
gration in all spheres of economic activity presupposes a supra-
national authority ~f such wide powers that it could only operate 
in a political union. 
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Although the above suggests integration as a gradual 
process from one form to another, this pattern is not always followed. 
The EEC proceeded straight away to a customs union without first 
establishing a free trade area. In other words, the Six began to 
harmonize their common external tariff at the same time as elimin-
ating tariff barriers between themselves. On the other hand, the 
Community has established common policies and can therefore be said 
to be an economic union, although - as mentioned above - restrictions 
on the movement of capital persist in some parts of the Community 
and therefore there is no common market in the exact sense of the 
term. 
It may be asked where the monetary union should be placed 
in the integration process and one may be tempted to set it either 
before or after the economic union. However, the South African 
Customs Union is also a monetary union but as there are no plans 
to free the movement of labour it is not a common market; the 
economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg has a common currency, 
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but did not envisage a common agricultural policy until the EEC was 
established; the economic union of the E~C, on the other hand, may 
be a long way from achieving a common currency. In fact, the circum-
stances are such that a monetary union in Europe may well require 
some form of political union because of the far-reaching conse-
quences of a common currency on all aspects of Community activities. 
The French economist Rueff, has said: 'L'Europe se fera par la 
" , ( 1 ) 
monnale. 
(3) Definition of economic integration 
From the point of view of terminology, there are differences 
of opinion as to the exact meaning of economic integration, and this 
has caused a certain ambiguity in discussions on the subject. 
Balassa defines economic integration as a process and as 
a state of affairs. 
'Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed 
to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging 
to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, 
it can be represented by the absence of various forms of 
d " "" t" b t t" 1 ",(2) lscrlmlna lon e ween na 10na economles. 
Balassa further differentiates between economic union and total 
economic integration, where the former combines suppression of 
restrictions on factor mov~ments and some degree of harmonization 
of national policies, whilst the latter is the unification of policies 
and requires a supranational authority whose decisions bind member 
states. This implies that other forms of integration do not need 
supranationalism, but even a customs union may decide to set up a 
council to decide on customs matters, and to give it supranational 
powers. 
(1) "Europe will be united through currency". 
(2) Bela Balassa, The theory of economic integration, ••• p.1. 
Pinder adopts the narrower definition of economic inte-
gration as being the process of reaching the state of union, and 
'economic union as a state in which discrimination has been largely 
removed, and co-ordinated and common policies have been and are 
being applied on a sufficient scale.,(1) 
Pinder's terminology appears to clarify the problem but 
it does not help define the state of affairs which exists when 
countries begin the process of economic integration. Thus we must 
go back to Balassa's definition of economic integration as a pro-
cess and a state of affairs and apply this formula to free trade 
areas, economic unions and other types of integration. There are 
two elements in integration: the process, which begins with a 
declaration of intention by the countries concerned, and the state 
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of affairs which is the result of measures taken to carry out these 
intentions. The Stockholm Convention of 1960 established the 
European Free Trade Association by announcing the intention of the 
'Seven' to establish a free trade area, although the tariff 
barriers were not eliminated until several years later. The Benelux 
countries were regarded as an economic union long before the final 
treaty of 1958 which put the finishing touches on various measures 
taken by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg from 1944 onwards. 
The intention of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome 
of 1957 was undoubtedly to form an economic union, even though a 
full customs union was not achieved until July 1968 and it will be 
many years before there i~ complete economic integration between 
the members. Moreover, there may always be some sector of the 
economy which evades the application of common policies. 
(1) G.R. Denton, (ed.), Economic inte ration in Euro e 
(John Pinder, Problems of European integration ••• : ••• p. 145. 
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Economic integration differs from economic co-operation 
in several respects. Economic co-operation such as is carried out 
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
aims at reducing discrimination and barriers to trade between 
countries by encouraging non-discriminatory policies and the lower-
ing of tariffs. With economic integration, there is to be complete 
suppression of discriminatory rules as well as the formation and 
application of common policies in a much wider area of economic 
activities. Another difference between co-operation and integration 
and one which gives rise to conflict in international relations, is 
that co-operation tends to take place on a global scale whereas 
integration is only practicable on a regional scale. Economic inte-
gration is often referred to as 'regional integration' to emphasize 
this aspect. 
Economic integration implies the removal of barriers 
within a group of countries. This is a move towards free trade. 
At the same time, as it is only within the group that restrictive 
measures are abolished, those outside the area feel discriminated 
against and look upon the integration process as preferential 
arrangements from which they are excluded. Thus integration is a 
combination of free trade and discrimination. It is this dual 
aspect which gives rise to the complexity of customs union theory 
which will be surveyed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
CUSTOMS UNION THEORY 
Pure theory of customs union - Viner - Meade-
Lipsey - Johnson - Shibata - extension of the theory -
Mundell - Cooper and Massell - Johnson - Arndt -
Mikesell - discussion. 
The establishment of Benelux, followed by the formation 
of the European Economic Community, has prompted a growing volume 
of economic theory regarding customs unions. The theory of 
customs union has been defined as 'that branch of tariff theory 
which deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory 
h . t db· ,(1) c anges ~n ra e arr~ers. The pure theory, emanating from 
the early writers, is concerned mainly with the static effects of 
a customs union and its impact on production and consumption. 
More recently, the theory has been extended . to other aspects, the 
dynamic, structural and non-economic factors. 
A. PURE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 
Customs unions had been discussed in earlier writings 
but it was only in 1950 that the first theoretical analyses of 
the problem appeared. Jacob Viner is usually remembered as the 
pioneer of customs union theory, although the writings of 
(1) R.G. Lipsey, The theory of customs unions, The Economic 
Journal, vol. LXX, No.279, September 1960, p. 496. 
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h d th t · (1) Maurice By~ and Herbert Giersc appeare at e same 1me. 
By~ considered the trade-creation versus trade-diversion aspect, 
but in a looser framework than Viner, and Giersch tackled the 
locational aspects of an economic union. Nevertheless, Viner's 
theory remains the basic work on the theory of customs unions 
and consequently will be examined in some detail below. 
(1) J. Viner 
Viner pointed out that customs unions are not necess-
. . 1 t th " t" t (2) arily benef1c1a 0 e par 1c1pan s. After the fo~mation of 
the union, two changes are likely to occur, trade-diver~ion and 
trade-creation, and the overall effect is favourable only if 
there is more trade-creation than trade-diversion. 
Consider three countries A, Band C, and goods X and Y. 
Good X is produced at low-cost in C and at high-cost in B, while 
good Y is produced at low-cost in B and at high cost in A. 
Country A applies non-discriminatory tariffs on all imports. 
Prior to the formation of the customs union, A imports good X 
from C and buys good Y from local producers, because, although 
good Y is produced at lower cost in B, the tariff is such that 
it would be more expensive to import Y from B. 
Countries A and B now enter into a 'customs union and 
abolish tariff s between them, bu~ maintain tariffs on imports 
from C. Given a certain common external tariff and ignoring 
(1) Maurice By~, Unions douani~res et donn~es nationales, 
Economie Appligu~e, January/March 1950, ~p. 121-158. (The 
English translation was published in International Economic 
Papers, No.3, London,Macmillan, 1953, pp. 208-234). 
Herbert Giersch, Economic union between nations and the 
location of industries, Review of Economic Studies, 1949-50, 
vol. XVII(2), No.43, pp. 87-97. 
(2) Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New York, Carnegie 
Endowment for internRtion~' n~~~~ ~a~~ 
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transport costs, A will then buy good X from B because it is 
cheaper than t h e cost of X from C plus tariff. Viner calls 
this trade-diversion. It is held to be harmful because it 
diverts trade from low-cost to high-cost producers. On the other 
hand, A will now also buy good Y from B, because B is a low-cost 
producer of Y and tariffs no longer protect the high-cost pro-
ducers in A. This is called trade-creation. 
( 1 ) 
Let us take a numerical example. Three countries 
A, Band C all produce goods X, Y and Z, but at different costs: 
Country A B C 
Product X 20 units of value 12 
Y 17 12 
Z 10 12 
From these figures, we can see that the lowest-cost 
producer of X is C, that of Y is Band Z is produced at lowest-
cost in A. 
Consider the trade of country A in three cases: 
a) free trade, b) a tariff of 50% on all imports, and c) a 
customs union between A and B, with a common external tariff of 
50% on imports from C. 
a) Free Trade: ' 
With no tariffs to distort trade, A will buy X from C 
(at the cost of 12 units), Y from B (12 units) and Z locally since 
it is cheapest in A (10 units). 
1) Adapted from Dennis Swann, The Economics of the Common Market, 
2nd Edition, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, pp. 34-36. 
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b) Tariff of 50% on all imports: 
Assuming that cost equals price, the figures have 
now altered as follows, from country A's point of view:-
Countr~ A B C 
Product X 20 14+7 = 21 12+6 = 18 
Y 17 12+6 = 18 14+7 = 21 
Z 10 12+6 = 18 16+8 = 24 
In this case, A will still buy X fromC, but will 
purchase both Y and Z locally since the tariff effectively pro-
tects A's production of Y, and Z is produced at lowest-cost in A. 
c) Customs union between A and B: 

















After the formation of the customs union, therefore, 
A will purchase X and Y from country B, and buy Z locally. 
29 
Analysis: If we compare (b) and (c), that is, the 
situation before and after customs union (but ignoring the free 
trade situation for the time being) there has been trade-diversion 
in the case of product X: before union, A bought X from country C, 
because even with tariff, it was cheapest there, but after union, 
A will buy X from partner B, since there is no longer any tariff 
applied to imports from B, and it is now cheaper than to import 
X from C and pay the 50% tariff. This is considered 'bad' from 
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a free trade point of view, because A buys from a high-cost 
producer (B) instead of a low-cost producer (C). 
Trade-creation, on the other hand, has occurred in the 
case of product Y. Before union, A bought Y locally,. but with the 
elimination of tariffs between A and B due to the formation of the 
customs union, it now buys it from partner country B. It is a 
movement from high to low-cost production and therefore considered 
'good' by free traders. 
In t h e case of the third product, Z, neither trade-
creation nor trade-diversion has occurred, since A is the lowest-
cost producer of Z. 
The final result will depend on the extent of the trade-
diversion and t he trade-creation. 
Although Viner's model assumes constant costs of pro-
duction, he goes on to consider whether the customs union will 
benefit from an increase in output and a decrease in unit costs, 
that is, he considers briefly the possibility of gain from large~ 
scale production. He expresses some doubts about this, however, 
as he writes: 
'The general rule appears to be that once an 
industry i s large .enough to make possible optimum scale 
and degree of specialization of production - in plants, 
further expansion of the industry in a national economy 
of constant over-all size is bound to be under conditions 
of increasing unit-costs as output increases, in the 
b f ' t' ,(1) a sence 0 new ~nven ~ons. 
He admits that this may not be true in the case of a customs union 
since this increases the size of the 'national' economy but he 
(1) Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, ••• p. 47. 
stresses that this only holds if the customs union increases the 
inter-member mobility of factors of production. This is why 
further integration is necessary ' to reap the full benefit of 
customs unions, and therefore common markets and economic unions 
are more likely to lead to beenfits from large-scale production 
than customs unions (or free trade areas) since economic unions 
provide for the freedom of movement not only of goods but also 
of factors of production. 
It is relevant to mention here that Viner considered 
illogical the distinction between 100 per cent preferences, as 
in a customs union, and 99 per cent preference as in a prefer-
ential area, and the assumption that the former is 'good' and 
the latter is 'bad'. This will be discussed at a later stage 
(see pages 15 1-1 52). 
Viner concluded his analysis by pointing out that a 
customs union is more likely to be a movement towards free trade 
under certain conditions, the most important of which are as 
follows:-
a) when the area of the customs union is large (because 
this increases the scope for internal division of labour), 
b) when the common external tariff on imports from non-
member countries is lower than the individual tariffs, without 
customs union, 
c) when there is a large degree of competitiveness between 
member countries with respect to protected industries, before 
. ( 1 ) 
un~on, 
(1) This has since been clarified as to mean 'actually highly 
competitive but potentially highly complementary' so that 
there is a larger scope for specialization. (see page 39 ) . 
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d) when differences in unit-costs of protected goods of 
the same type, between member countries, are large, since this 
will increase the possibility of trade-creation. 
Viner's final conclusion was that from the viewpoint 
of the free trader, customs unions are neither good nor bad; it 
all depends on the circumstances of the case. 
Comments. 
Before proceeding to the works of Meade, Lipsey and 
others, the following points may be made. 
Although Viner dealt mainly with the effects of customs 
unions on production and largely ignored consumption, he pointed 
out that a customs union may improve the terms of trade of the 
member countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and that the 
bargaining . power of the union is likely to increase due to the 
larger size of the bargaining unit. These are important aspects 
of customs unions, and it seems therefore inaccurate to say that 
Viner did not explain why customs unions should be formed at all, 
as some authors have maintained.(1) 
Trade-creation is not the sudden appearance of new 
trade, it is trade-diversion of another kind: local or inter-
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regional trade is replaced by international trade within the customs 
union. The beneficial element is the movement from high-cost to 
low-cost production. 
The extent to which trade-creation and trade-diversion 
will occur depends on differences in costs in the countries con-
cerned and the height of the tariffs before and after union. For 
instance, low tariffs may result in no change in the pattern of 
(1) See P. Robson (ed.), International Economic Integration, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, ,1972, p. 14; M.B. Krauss, Ced.), 
The Economics of Integration, London, Allen & Unwin, 1973, 
p. 13. 
33 
trade for some products. Let us go back to the three-country, 
three-product model of page 28, and consider yet another situation 
(d) where the tariff imposed by the customs union on goods from C 













12+1,2 = 13,2 
14+1,4 = 15,4 
16+1,6 = 17,2 
A will now buy X from C, Y from Band Z locally. 
If we compare the situation before and after the customs 
union, i.e. (b) and (d), the customs union has caused no change as 
far as product X is concerned (that is, no trade~diversion) because 
the common external tariff is 10% instead of 50%. It has, however, 
led to trade-creation as regard product Y. The final result is, 
therefore, positive. With a high tariff, (as in our example, 50%) 
the customs union could be positive or negative, depending on 
which effect outweighs the other. 
Trade-creation and trade-diversion occur not only with 
the establishment of customs unions, but also with certain changes 
in tariffs. Consider (a) and (b) onpages ~8-~ Product Y is 
bought from B under free trade, but it is bought locally when a 
tariff of 50% is imposed on all imports into A. There has been a 
kind of trade-diversion, since international trade has been re-
placed by inter-regional trade, but it could be called trade-
suspension, as opposed to trade-creation. It is nevertheless a 
movement from a lower-cost to a higher-cost source of production, 
which defines trade-diversion. 
If A moves from (b) to (a), that is, eliminates all 
tariffs, there will be trade-creation: Y which was purchased 
locally when a tariff protected the producer in A, will now be 
bought from B, the lowest-cost source. 
Finally, let us compare cases (c) and (d), whereby 
the customs union lowers the common external tariff from 50% 
to 10%. Country A bought X from B in the first case, but with 
a lower tariff, purchases X from C. Trade has been diverted 
from B to C. Yet it is a movement from a high to a low-cost 
source of production, which is the essential element of trade-
creation. If we go from (d) to (c), the opposite occurs, that 
is trade is diverted from C to B, but in this case, it is a 
movement from low to high-cost producer. 
We must, therefore, bear in mind that trade-creation 
and trade-diversion refer to changes in the pattern of trade 
which may occur with a variety of changes in commercial policies, 
not only the establishment of customs unions. 
(2) J .E. Meade 
Meade's major contribution to the theory of customs 
unions was the introduction of consumption effects and variable 
t . t th 1· ( 1 ) C . . V· cos s ln 0 e ana YS1S. onslderlng lner's interpretation, 
Meade made the criticism that Viner did not explain how to weigh 
up the economic gains and losses due to trade-creation and trade-
diversion, and he proceeded to measure these, first with constant 
(1) J.E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1955. 
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costs and then with variable costs, taking the Benelux as example. 
Three countries, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
produce steel at the following costs: Germany, $100; Belgium, $150 
and the Netherlands, $250. Let us consider the trade of the 
Netherlands, before and after a customs union with Belgium, (a) 
with a tariff of 100%, and (b) with a tariff of 200%. 
a) Before customs union with Belgium, the Dutch buyer will 
have to pay $200 for German steel, $300 for Belgian steel and $250 
for locally produced steel, assuming that cost equals price and 
ignoring transport costs. He will, therefore, buy German steel. 
After the establishment of a customs union, Belgian steel will 
then become the cheapest and there will be trade-diversion. This 
is considered uneconomic and wasteful because it is a switch from 
the lowest-cost to a higher-cost producer. 
b) If the duty is 200%, the costs before union will be: 
German, $300, Belgian, $450 and Dutch steel, $250 (no duty). The 
Dutch buyer will buy local steel. After forming a customs union 
with Belgium, however, he will buy steel from Belgium, at the cost 
of $150, and this is trade-creation, because it is a move from a 
higher-cost domestic to a lower-cost foreign source of production. 
We may conclude from these examples, that the effect of 
the customs union will be either trade-creation or trade-diversion, 
depending on the height of the tariff, and that a customs union is 
more likely to raise economic welfare when the initial tariffs 
removed by integr ation are high. We have assumed that the tariff 
applied by the Netherlands was the same as the subsequent common 
external tariff of the customs union, but of course, this need 
not always be the case, it could be higher or lower (although the 
rules of the GATT forbid an increase in tariffs due to the form-
ation of customs unions). 
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Meade then asks how one may calculate the economic gains 
and losses from a customs union, which Viner did not elaborate upon. 
One may calculate the value of trade diverted and the 
value of trade created and subtract one from the other. For example, 
suppose that %100 million worth of trade in steel Was diverted from 
low-cost Germany to high-cost Belgium, and %30 million worth of 
trade in cheese has been created between low-cost Netherlands and 
high-cost Belgium. One could subtract one from the other and con-
clude that the net diversion amounts to $70 millions. 
Meade t hen assumes different unit costs: the cost of a 
unit of Belgian steel is 50% higher than German steel, and the cost 
of a unit of Belgian cheese is 200% higher than Dutch cheese. Then, 
trade-diversion is 50% of $100 million = %50 million and trade-
creation is 200% of %30 million = %60 million. In this case, there 
is a net gain. I t is more accurate to multiply each element of 
diverted trade by the rise in unit cost of that trade, similarly 
to multiply the value of each element of created trade by the fall 
in unit-cost of that trade, and subtract one from the other. 
Meade goes on to point out that this procedure is only 
suitable when the elasticity of demand is nil and the elasticity of 
supply is infinity. We shall confine ourselves to an examination 
of the elasticity of demand. 
Consider the above-mentioned diversion of Dutch imports 
of steel from low-cost Germany to high-cost Belgium when the 
Netherlands and Belgium form a customs union. If the demand for 
steel in the Netherlands is fixed, then the only question is where 
and at what cost this steel will be produced. Also, if the cost 
of producing steel is constant regardless of the amount produced, 
then this fixed amount of steel will be produced at one place, at 
one definite and constant cost of production. 
37 
In the first example, suppose that the Netherlands have 
a fixed demand for 1 million tons of steel. Before union, they 
buy this from Germany at a price of $100 + $100 = $200 per ton. 
After union, they will buy it from Belgium at $150 per ton. There-
fore, the demand of 1 million tons costs $150 million. 
This is now complicated if the demand and costs of 
production are not fixed. Suppose that the demand for steel, 
instead of being fixed, depends on the price of steel in the Nether-
lands. Suppose that, as illustrated in Figure ~ , at the price of 
$200 per ton, demand is 1 million tons, but if the price drops to 
$150 per ton (as it would after customs union with Belgium), 
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Figure 5: Changes in Demand 
Then, instead of importing 1 million tons of steel costing $200 
per ton, the Netherlands now import 3 million tons of steel 
costing $150 per ton. Meade questions whether, being trade-
diversion, this is necessarily a change for the worse. To 
answer this question, one would have to consider the value of 
this steel to the Netherlands, its cost of production in Belgium, 
the satisfaction of consumers, etc. 
We should now also consider the value of the additional 
2 million tons of steel to the Dutch buyer:-
The cost of the 2 extra million tons, bought from 
Belgium, is $150 x 2 = $300 million. The value of 1 ton of steel 
in the Netherlands was $200 before customs union, but $150 after 
union. The value of 2 million extra tons of steel is therefore 
between $400 million (2 million x $200) and $300 million 
(2 million x $150), i.e. area a + b in Figure 5. Let us say it 
is worth $350 million. to the Dutch consumers. But it has cost 
Belgian producers $300 million to produce (since the unit-cost is 
$150). Therefore, there is a gain of $50 million of consumers' 
value over producers' costs which offsets the loss of $50 million 
on the trade-diversion, which gain, writes Meade, is overlooked 
by Viner. 
Meade concludes that: 
'A reduction in the import duty levied on the exports 
of a partner country may totally divert existing trade 
from a cheaper outside source; but as it will reduce the 
market price of the product inside the importing partner 
country, there will be an expansion of the total imports 
of that country. And in so far as the initial price 
(including tax) in the importing country exceeded the cost 
of production in the partner country which provides the 
additional supplies, there is some economic gain to be 




The same analysis could be carried out with regard to 
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trade-creation, and results from both trade-creation and diversion 
may be considered under conditions of inelastic supply. 
Meade proposes that a customs union is likely to be 
beneficial under the following conditions:-
a) If the economies of the partner countries are actually 
very competitive but potentially very complementary. This requires 
some explanation: consider two countries, both producing X and Y, 
although country A is better suited to the production of X and B 
to the production of Y. Under protection, however, A will pro-
duce Y at high-cost and B will produce X at high-cost. Their 
economies ·are competitive and similar. If they form a customs 
union, they may now specialise in the product they are best 
suited to produce, thus A will concentrate on the production of 
X and B on the production of Y, and their economies will become 
complementary. 
b) If the initial rates of duty on imports are high, since 
their removal is bound to cause some expansion of their trade. 
c) If each member is the principal supplier to the other 
of the 'products which it exports to the other country, and similarly, 
if each member is the principal market for the other of the products 
which it buys f r om the partner country. 
d) If the proportion of the world's production, consumption 
and trade which is covered by the customs union is large. 
(1) J.E. Meade , The Theory of Customs Unions, 1955, p. 40. 
Meade adds a few other conditions which are not 
essential to our present purpose. 
Similarly to Viner, Meade concludes that one cannot 
generalise on customs unions, because it all depends on the cir-
cumstances of the case. Unllke Viner, however, Meade does take 
position in favour of customs unions 
one can, I think, start with some general 
prejudice in favour of a customs union. It represents 
a reduction in trade barriers which will lead in all 
cases to some primary expansion of trade, and on this 
expansion of trade there will almost always ' be some 
important gain.,(1) 
3) R.G. Lipsey 
Viner's analysis assumed that goods were consumed in 
fixed proportions. This assumption was relaxed by Lipsey in 
1957, (2) by introducing the effects of substitution between 
commodities resulting from changes in prices, and using commodity 
indifference curves. He demonstrated that the welfare of a 
country may be improved by forming a trade-diverting customs 
union, if a positive consumption effect outweighs a negative 
production effect. 
Lipsey's model consists of three countries A, Band C 
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and two products wheat and clothing. Country A consumes wheat and 
clothing; wheat is produced locally and clothing is imported from 
C, the lowest-cost producer. 
The trade of country A is considered in three cases: 
free trade, a tariff on imports of clothing from C, and finally, 
a customs union between A and B. 
(1) J.E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions, 1955, p. 107. 
(2) R.G. Lipsey, The theory of customs unions: Trade diversion 
and welfare, Economica, vol. 24, 1957, pp. 40-46. 
a) Free Trade 
A buys clothing from C since it is produced at lower 
cost than in B. In Figure 6, DE illustrates the given terms of 
trade between A and C. Curve I is an indifference curve of A, 
assuming there is only one consumer in A. Therefore, every 
point on I represents a different combination of wheat and 
clothing, all of which give equal satisfaction to A. The free 
trade position of equilibrium is at G, where I is tangential to 
DE, because it is only at that point that the slope of DE equals 
that of I. 
o 
o Clothing E 
Figure 6: Free Trade 
b) Tariff on imports of clothing. 
Now assume that A levies a tariff on clothing imports 
from both Band C. A will continue to buy from C, assuming that 
the tariff is not prohibitive, but merely raises the price of 
imports. The new terms of trade are shown by DF in Figure 7. 
If the tariff revenue is lost to A, the new equilibrium is at H, 
where a lower indifferenc e curve I' is tangential to DF. 
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Clothing 
Figure 7: Tariff on Imports 
But if one assumes that the tariff revenue is in fact 
redistributed to the consumer (in the form of lower taxation or 
by some other means), then Lipsey points out that the equilibrium 
point will be on DE, that is, on the same income-consumption line 
as before tariff. This is shown in Figure 8, from which it is 
evident that the new equilibrium point will be at K, where an in-





Figure 8: Redistribution of Tariff Revenue 
It should be noted that this point K is arrived at by drawi ng D'F' 
parallel to DF, in such a way that D'F' becomes tangential to an 
indifference curve of A and cuts DE at the same time. At that 
point, it is impossible for A both to trade along D'F' and also 
to reach a higher indifference curve. Comparing the two equili-
brium positions, G before tariff and K after tariff (assuming a 
redistribution of tariff revenue), the tariff has the effect of 
reducing imports of clothing and increasing consumption of wheat. 
c) Customs Union between A and B 
Lipsey then assumes that A forms a trade-diverting 
customs union with B. Without tariff, the price of C'sclothing 
is lower than B's, but with tariffs imposed on imports from C, 
the price of C's clothing plus tariff is higher than the price of 
B's clothing without tariff. Therefore, the terms of trade between 
A and B must lie somewhere between DE and DF. 
This is illustrated by Figure 9, by drawing from D a tan-





Figure 9: Terms of Trade in Customs Union 
44 
The slope of this line DV indicates the terms of trade between 
countries A and B (in a custom union) which leave A as well off as 
when trade was with country C (with tariffs), since both D'F' and 
DV are tangential to indifference curve I". If A obtains terms of 
trade with B which are worse than DE but better than DV, then the 
customs union will increase A's welfare, even though it is trade-
diverting. This is because a terms-of-trade line between DE and DV 
would be tangential to a higher indifference curve. If on the 
other hand, the terms of trade are better than DF but worse than DV, 
there will be a loss of welfare for A because the terms of trade 
line would then become tangential to a lower indifference curve. 
~herefore, as long as the final equilibrium point is in the area 
above I", but below DE, trade carried on with B (at terms of trade 
worse than those shown by DE) will increase A's welfare. Thus 
Lipsey concludes that A might gain by entering into a custom union 
with B, even if this causes trade-diversion from lower to higher 
cost sources of supply, and he also shows that even world welfare 
may be increased by the same process. 
Criticisms of Lipsey's analysis by Cooper and Massell and 
also by Krauss, will be examined below (see pages 52 and 57). 
4) H.G. Johnson 
Johnson's 'Economic theory of customs union' is examined 
here because of the clarity of his analysis of trade_creation and 
t d d
· . (1) ra e- 1verS10n. 
He begins by stressing the complex nature of customs 
union theory by pointing out that: 
(1) H.G. Johnson, The economic theory of customs union, Pakistan 
Economic Journal, vol. X, No.1, March 1960, pp. 14-32. 
Reprinted in H.G. Johnson, Money, Trade and Economic Growth, 
London, Allen & Unwin, 1962, Chapter III. 
'the fact that a customs union is a mixture of freer 
trade and more protection means that it cannot be analyzed 
by established welfare economics theory, which is concerned 
with the conditions for maximum welfare - the optimum 
conditions.,(1) 
The theory of customs union tries to deal with the 
conditions for improving welfare and not for achieving maximum 
welfare. It is in fact an application of the 'theory of second-
best' which can be stated as follows: 
'If in an economy all the optimum conditions for 
welfare maximisation are not fulfilled simultaneously, 
then a change which increases the number of conditions 
fulfilled does not necessarily increase the welfare of 
that economy. The effect on welfare of fulfilling one 
more condition will depend on the circumstances of each 
case.' (2) 
A customs union, writes Johnson, will cause an increase 
in the demand for imports for two reasons; (a) replacement of 
domestic production by partner production of the same good 
45 
(production effect) and (b) increased consumption of partner goods 
in general, due to lower ~rices of imports substituting for domestic 
goods (consumption effect). Both the production and the consumption 
effects constitute trade-creation.(3) 
In Figure 10, DD and SS represent the domestic demand and 
supply curves for a commodity. PQR is the partner supply curve, 
assumed to be constant-cost. If PP' is the tariff imposed on imports 
from the partner before customs union, then P'Q'R' will be the 
(1) H.G. Johnson, Money, Trade and Economic Growth, p.47. 
(2) David Young, International Economics, 2nd Edition, London, 
Intertext Books, 1972, p. 88. 
(3) Some authors consider only the production ' effect as con-
stituting trade-creation, and refer to the consumption 
effect as being 'positive'. 
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partner supply curve with tariff. 
Before customs union, OB' is consumed (OT' is locally 
produced, T'B' is imported from partner). After customs union, con-
sumption increases to OB (OT is from local production, TB is imported). 
o 
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Figure 10: Trade Creation 
The saving of cost on domestic production replaced by imports is 
illustrated by the triangle QQ'M, and the gain in consumers' 
surplus from the substitution of imports for other goods previously 
domestically produced is the triangle R'NR. If we call those two 
areas p and c (production effect and consumption effect) the total 
trade-creation effect is p + c which is = t(TT' + B'B)PP'. Con-
sidering the remaining two areas, P'Q'QP is the transfer of pro-
ducers' surplus to consumers and Q'R'NM is the transfer of tariff 
proceeds to consumers ('loss of revenue'). 
Trade-diversion is a shift in source of imports from 
lower-cost foreign source to higher-cost partner source. In 
( 
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Figure 11, DD is the domestic curve, FTM and F'Q' are the constant-
cost supply curves of the foreign source before and after tariff, 
whilst PRQ and P'Q" are the constant-cost supply curves of the 








Figure 11: Trade Diversion 
D 
When a tariff is applied to both foreign and partner 
imports, the domestic country imports OS' from the foreign country, 
which is lower-cost, the total cost being the area OFTS', since 
it is assumed that the tariff revenue FF'Q'T is a transfer rather 
than a cost or a gain. When the customs union is formed and the 
tariff on the partner country's imports is eliminated, the country 
will import OS from its partner, at a total cost of OPQS. For 
its previous consumption, OS', it now pays OPRS', which is an 
increase of FPRT (area a) over the previous cost. This is the loss 
due to trade-diversion, and it must be weighed against the trade-
creation gain Q'QR, the consumption effect (area b). 
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In his theory of customs union, Johnson further points 
out thatli the assumption of perfectly elastic supply of foreign 
and partner's goods is relaxed, and we consider increasing costs 
of supply, then the following occurs: (a) the foreign supply 
price will fall as trade is diverted from foreign to partner 
country, therefore, the home country will enjoy improved terms 
of trade with the foreign country, and this will reduce the loss 
due to trade-diversion; (b) the partner supply price, on the 
other hand,will increase as trade is diverted and the loss to the 
country per unit of trade diverted is greater than it would have 
been with constant costs. However, part of this loss is a trans-
fer from domestic consumers' surplus to partner producers' surplus 
and therefore not a net loss to the customs union as a whole. 
In a later work, Johnson considers the non-economic 
f t "th f t" f t " (1) Th " "11 b ac ors ln e orma lon 0 cus oms unlons. lS Wl e 
I 
examined in the extension of the theory, below. 
5) H. Shibata 
Before ending this survey of the pure theory of customs 
unions, mention must be made of Shibata's theory of a free trade 
(2) 
area. 
The theories considered so far have been concerned 
exclusively with customs unions. However, other forms of economic 
integration are possible, and among these, the free trade area is 
the most commonly found today, the best example being that offue Euro-
pean .FreeTrade Association, of which Britain was a member until 
joining the EEC. 
(1) H.G. Johnson, An economic theory of protectionism, tariff 
bargaining, and the formation of customs union, Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 73, 1965, pp. 256-283. 
(2) P. Robson (ed.), International Economic Integration, (H. Shibata, 
A theory of free trade areas), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, 
pp. 68-87. 
The free trade area differs from the customs union in 
that each member country retains its own tariff vis-a-vis outside 
countries, and therefore, there is no common external tariff. 
The member countries are less integrated than in customs unions. 
The main problem of free trade areas is 'trade deflection' defined 
as 'the redirection of imports from third countries through the 
partner country with the lowest tariff, with the aim of realizing 
tax advantage by exploiting the rate differentials between the 
b t 
. ,(1) 
mem er coun r1es ••• For example, suppose country A has formed 
a free trade area with countries Band C, their respective tariff 
against imports from outsider country X being 30%, 20% and 10%. 
Instead of importing a product from X directly into A and paying 
a 30% tariff, there may be 'trade deflection', that is, the 
product might be imported into C and pay only 1~~. From C to A 
there is no tariff barrier by definition and therefore, there is 
no further tax to pay. Trade from X to A has been 'deflected' 
through the lowest-tariff country C. To avoid this trade deflection, 
free trade areas have to evolve rules of origin, which may be com-
plicated by the fact that some imports are raw materials, processed 
in one country and sold in another, or semi-processed goods, re-
exported as finished goods in another member of the free trade areao 
The similarity between customs unions and free trade areas 
li~in the fact that in both cases there is an element of free trade 
between partners and of discrimination against outsiders. Shibata 
shows that a free trade area is comparable to a customs union which 
adopts a common external tariff higher than the lowest tariffs 
which existed among mem~ers before union. It is difficult to decide 
(1) P. Robson (ed.) International Economic Integration, (R. Shibata) ••• 
p. 69. 
which of the forms of integration is the best, because the effects 
of both customs unions and free trade areas 
'depend on a large number of unknown parameters and 
variables involved in a large number of demand and 
supply schedules of the commodities thus affected.,(1) 
However, when some economic characteristics are known for each 
prospective member of the groups, the following predictions may 
be made:-
a) A country which is highly specialized and is likely to 
have a number of very low duty items will prefer to join a free 
trade area, whereas a diversified-economy country will be more 
likely to have a number of protective tariffs and will therefore 
tend to form a customs union. 
b) Countries whose economies are complementary will tend 
to form a free trade area, and those whose economies are competi-
tive will form a customs union. 
c) In a free trade area between a country with large 
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productive capacity and one with a small productive capacity, both 
protected by tariffs, the small country may try and influence the 
larger one to maintain its margin of preference vis-a-vis products 
of the smaller country. That is, one country should not reduce its 
tariff on imports from outside countries without consultation with 
the members of the free trade area. This may be difficult to 
achieve, since the terms of a free trade area are usually strictly 
defined to mean elimination of duties between members, while main-
taining freedom of action in other aspects of trade policy. 
In the same way as Viner, who concluded that customs 
(1) P. Robson, International Economic Integration, (H. Shibata), 
p. 83. 
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unions are neither necessarily good nor necessarily bad, 
Shibata's theory does not put forward a case for free trade 
areas as being more likely to promote welfare than customs unions. 
B. THE EXTENSION OF THE THEORY 
The pure theory of customs union remains inconclusive, 
since it fails to prove that customs unions are either beneficial 
or harmful to the members of the union or to the world as a whole. 
Consequently, recent writings have extended the theory into new 
fields of research. 
'Since Lipsey's critically significant 1960 survey 
paper, the theory of customs unions has been refined, 
extended and re-interpreted with a major change in 
theoretical orientation away from the question of the 
economic effects of customs unions to the more funda-
mental one of why they are formed in the first instance.,(1) 
Whereas the basic theory focussed on production and con-
sumption effects, the new areas of study include terms of trade 
effects, comparison of preferential and non-preferential systems 
of tariff protection, non-economic factors, dynamic or structural 
aspects, and integration among developing countries. 
1) R.A. Mundell (1964) 
Among contributors to the extension of the theory, 
Mundell concentrates on the terms of trade effects of customs 
unions.(2) One of the important propositions which emerge from 
(1) Melvyn B. Krauss, Recent developments in customs union theory: 
an interpretive survey, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. X, 
No.2, June 1972 , p. 413. 
(2) R.A. Mundell, Tariff preferences and the terms of trade, Man-
chester School of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 32, 1~ 
pp. 1-13; reprinted in P. Robson (ed.) International Economic 
Integration, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, pp. 143-155. 
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his study is that there exist p a presumption that the terms of 
trade of members of the customs union will improve relative to the 
outside world. This is established by the fact that the balance of 
trade of the union as a whole must improve, while that of each 
country in the rest of the world must deteriorate. This factor 
usually leads out side countries to take actions such as demands 
for compensation or the formation of other forms of economic 
integration (for instance, the formation of EFTA following the 
establishment of the E~C). 
2) C.A. Cooper and B.F. Massell (1965) 
These authors argue(1)that since a non-preferential 
tariff policy can be shown to be superior to customs un~ons as a 
trade-liberalizing device, the reason behind the formation of such 
unions could not be a better allocation of resources, as was 
widely believed. 
Cooper and Massell question the value of Viner's analysis 
as a basis for evaluating customs unions, since it fails to show 
why customs unions are formed. They also criticize Lipsey's assump-
tion that the tar iff revenue collected by the government is re-
turned to consumers, because they feel that the harmful effects of 
finding other sources of revenue must be taken into account. Cooper 
and Massell demonstrate that the effect of a customs union is made 
up of two components, a tariff reduction component and a pure trade 
diversion component. The former is the sole source of gain in 
consumers welfare, accounting for both the production and the con-
sumption effect of trade-creation. Furthermore, they maintain 
(1) C.A. Cooper and B.F. Massell, A new look at customs union 
theory, Economic Journal, vol. 75, 1965, pp. 742-747. 
53 
that compared with an appropriate policy of non-preferential 
protection, a customs union results in pure trade-diversion and 
is therefore inferior. They conclude that the theory of second-
best is not helpful in evaluating the welfare effects of the 
customs union per se; second-best theory is relevant only for 
evaluating the welfare effect of the tariff reduction component. 
Consequently, they consider that the basic theory has neglected 
other potential sources of gain of customs unions, such as im-
provements in terms of trade, dynamic effects, economies of 
scale, more efficient technology and the public good argument 
for protection. 
3) H.G. Johnson (1965 ) 
In the same year, J ohnson outlines a theory which 
attempts to explain the nature of tariff bargaining and the com-
mercial policies adopted by countries.(1) He assumes that govern-
ments seek to maximize the satisfaction enjoyed by the electorate. 
This satisfaction, he points out, comes not only from private con-
sumption of goods and services but also from collective consumption 
provided through the government at the cost of sacrifices of private 
consumption, which was generally ignored by traditional theory. 
Johnson further assumed that there exists a collective preference 
for industrial production, due to factors such as national prestige 
or pressure groups, leading to the dominance of producer interests. 
Johnson writes: 
' ••• contrary to the standard analysis trade-diversion 
as well as trade-creation yields a gain to the partners; 
(1) H.G. Johnson, An economic theory of protectionism, tariff 
bargaining, and the formation of customs unions, Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 73, 1965, pp. 256-283; reprinted in 
P. Robson Ced.) International Economic Integration, Harmonds-
worth, Penguin, 1972, pp. 99-142. 
in fact, trade-diversion is preferable to trade-creatiqn, 
for the preference-granting country, because it entails 
no sacrifice of domestic industrial production. This 
reversal of the usual conclusions is due to the presence 
of the preferences for industrial production ••• ,(1) 
Thuq he brings a new dimension to the theory by accepting 
the relevance of non-economic objectives in governments' trade 
policies. 
4) s.w. Arndt (1968 and 1969) 
In two recent articles, Arndt considers the terms-of-
trade effects of customs unions.(2) (3) Commenting on Cooper 
and Massell's analysis, Arndt points out that their conclusions 
depend upon the assumption that the customs union is small and 
therefore incapable of influencing the terms of trade.(2) He 
stresses as possible gains of a customs union, improved terms of 
trade and improved bargaining power, because the terms-of-trade 
effect of the customs union may be sufficient to lead to a net 
improvement in welfare over a non-preferential tariff situation, 
and the combined economic power of members of the union acting 
as one may accomplish what one country alone might be unable to do. 
Arndt concludes t hat considering the alternative solutions which 
must include the pooling of economic power and reciprocal advantages 
('some form of international collusion') the customs union may be 
the most workable of these arrangements. 
(1) P. Robson (ed.), International Economic Inte~ration, (H.G. 
Johnson, Economic theory of protectionism ••• , p. 131. 
(2) S.W. Arndt, On discriminatory versus non-preferential tariff 
policies, Economic Journal, vol. 78, December 1968, pp. 971-
979. 
(3) S.W. Arndt, Customs union and the theory of tariffs, American 
Economic Review, vol. 59, No.1, March 1969, pp. 108-118. 
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In the second article, (1) Arndt criticizes the three-
country models used by earlier economists, which assume that the 
outside world is made up of one homogeneous unit, because in fact, 
it is composed of a large number of heterogeneous countries with 
various tariffs and trade policies. His conclusions include the 
following important points: (a) it is no longer particularly 
meaningful to argue that the customs union will do one thing or 
another to the terms of trade of other countries, since changes 
will cause gains for some and losses for others; (b) it may be 
rational for a country to press for the formation of a customs 
union yet remain outside, if the union increases the share of the 
market of the outside country; (c) compared to other types of 
tariff policies, customs unions may be superior to non-preferential 
tariff policy. 
5) R.F. Mikesell (1963) 
Finally, the theory of customs unions has been extended 
into the special problem of their applicability to developing 
countries, and an important contribution to this aspect was made 
by Mikesell. (2) He begins by stressing the point that the gains 
from customs unions are more likely to spring from the dynamic than 
the static effec t s: 
'I doubt ••• if the most significant gains from the 
creation of the European Economic Community are to be 
(1) S.W. Arndt, Customs Union and the theory of tariffs, American 
Economic Review, vol. 59, No.1, March 1969, pp. 108-118. 
(2) R.F. Mikesell, The theory of common markets as applied to 
regional arrangements among developing countries, Chapter 9, 
~n R.F. Harr?d and D.C. Hague (e~s.) International Trade Theory 
In a Developlng World, Macmillan, 1963, pp. 205-229. Reprinted 
in P. Robson (ed.), International Economic Integration, Harmonds-
worth, Penguin, 1972, pp. 166-194. 
discovered through a comparison of trade-diverting 
and trade-creating effects on welfare, even if we 
could measure them.' 
( 1 ) 
The important effects of customs unions, Mikesell main-
tains, will be those resulting from the broadening of the market, 
creating opportunities for innovations and changes in investment 
patterns. In other words, the dynamic effects, which because of 
their intangibility, 'often lie outside the economist's analytical 
(2) 
framework'. Mikesell suggests that the analysis should be con-
cerned with the effects on investments in developing countries, 
which will determine trade and production patterns in the long ~ 
run. He also questions the applicability of the generalizations 
of the theory which relate to the complementary, competitiveness 
and trade patterns of the members, to developing countries. He 
concludes that the main problem for these countries is the in-
ability to specialise and that regional trading arrangements such 
as customs unions may provide an opportunity for specialisation 
and increased trade, for broadening the export base of single 
countries and increasing the productivity of the region as a whole. 
C. DISCUSSION 
There is no consensus of opinion in customs union theory, 
except as regards its complexity. The simplicity of Viner's 
analysis led to criticisms as to its usefulness. On the other hand, 
1· v lu ble ft· th . (3) K . t· . n a a a survey 0 cus oms unlon eorles, rauss crl lClses 
(1) P. Robson,(ed.) International Economic Integration, (R.F.Mikesell), 
p. 166. 
(2) P. Robson,(ed.) OPe cit., p. 167. 
(3) Melvyn B. Krauss, Recent developments in customs union theory: 
an interpretive survey, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. X, 
No.2, June 1972, pp. 413-436. 
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Lipsey's analysis of the trade-diverting customs union for two 
reasons: (a) by proving exceptions to Viner's 'law' of customs 
unions, Lipsey implies that Viner's purpose was to formulate such 
a law and that such a formulation represents an acceptable ana-
lytical procedure. 'Both implications are controversial at best' .(1) 
(b) when Viner's assumptions are not used, it is meaningless to 
use the term 'trade-diverting' customs union. 
Krauss doubts the dynamic effects of customs unions and 
economies of scale, as well as the 'public good' argument in 
favour of unions, and he concludes that 'customs unions are best 
. . . t . t t· ,( 2 ) Th . . concelved as non-economlC lns 1 u lons • lS lS an over-
simplification. Integration between countries is a complex process 
which affects the economic, political and social domains of the 
member countries and therefore, preferential arrangements such as 
customs unions and economic unions have both an economic and 
political content. 
It has been said that, as traditional trade theory fails 
to explain why policies other than free trade are followed by 
governments, in the same way, the theory of customs unions has so 
far failed to explain why such unions occur, and that consequently, 
the theory has moved away from the question of whether customs are 
'good' or 'bad' to the problem of the motivation for these arrange-
ments. In fact, economists continue to analyse the effects of 
customs unions - and thereby, explain the reasons for their 
formation - but whereas the basic theory was confined to production 
(1) Melvyn B. Krauss, Recent deyelopments in customs union theory: 
an interpretive survey, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. X, 
No.2, June 1972, ' p. 417. 
(2) Melvyn B. Krauss, OPe cit., p. 430. 
and consumption effects (the static effects), the extension of the 
theory is probing the terms of trade and dynamic effects as well 
as non-economic factors. Countries form customs unions and 
economic unions because they anticipate a number of economic and 
political gains. If the theory of customs union has so far been 
unable to determine the nature of the economic benefits, it is 
because wide areas have not been investigated and some of them 
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may defy all conclusive empirical research. If any conclusion may 
be drawn from the extension of the theory, it is that the dynamic 
effects and the non-economic factors are, in the long-run, more 
important to the countries involved, than the static effects of 
customs unions. 
There is some controversy in current customs union 
literature as to the nature of the dynamic effects, mainly because 
they have not been clearly defined. Some writers, notably Krauss, 
maintain that the term is a misnomer since these effects are sus-
t . bl t th d t t· 1· ( 1) cep leo or 0 ox s a lC ana YSlS. On the other hand, Balassa 
and Mikesell support the view that the term 'dynamic effects' refers 
to changes in the basic structure of the economy, such as the effects 
of a larger market on various factors which are assumed in static 
analysis (for example, technology, efficiency of factors of pro-
duction, internal and external economies of scale). It is evident 
that most of these effects are difficult to assess with present 
tools of economic analysis, but nevertheless they form an integral 
part of the consequences of customs unions and it is therefore diffi-
cult to agree with Krauss. We shan go further and extend the term 
dynamic effects to include the impact of economic integration on trade 
patterns and trade policies of countries outside the customs union. 
(1) Melvyn B.Krauss, Recent developments in customs union theory, 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. X, No.2, June 1972, p.419. 
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The term 'non-economic' is also undefined. Some well-
known effects such as increased bargaining strength of countries 
linked in customs unions, is regarded by some writers as economic 
and by others, as non-economic. 
Quantitative estimates of the gains from economic inte-
gration have been carried out, notably those of Verdoorn, Johnson, 
and more recently, Balassa, but they all give negligible results. 
Verdoorn's calculations of the gains from freer trade yielded a 
O 0 f t · I' (1) d J h . d figure of ,5 per cent 0 na lona lncome an 0 nson arrlve 
. f' f 0 t f t' I ' (2) B I 'at a maXlmum 19ure 0 1, per cen 0 na lona lncome. a assa 
calculated that between the periods 1953-59 and 1959-65 the income 
elasticity of demand in the EEC increased from 1,8 to 2,1 
respect to total (intra- and extra-area) imports.(3) This 
with 
adds 
weight to the recent trend of thought that the static effects are 
less important than the dynamic effects of customs unions and that 
non-economic factors must be kept in mind in any assessment of 
economic integration. 
Comparing free trade areas with customs unions, it has 
been pointed out that Shibata's theory does not conclude that the 
former are more beneficial than the latter. Yet the view has been 
put forward that: 
(1) Verdoorn, unpublished thesis, quoted and used by T. Scitovsky, 
Economic Theory and Western European Integration, Allen and 
Unwin, 1958, pp. 64-78. 
(2) H.G. Johnson, The gains from free trade with Europe: an 
estimate, Manchester School, vol. XXVI, September 1958. (For 
fuller details of the Verdoorn and Johnson estimates, see 
R.G. Lipsey, The theory of customs unions: a general survey. 
The Economic Journal, vol. LXX, No.279, September 1960, 
pp. 509-511. 
(3) Bela Balassa, Trade-creation and trade-diversion in the 
European Common Market, The Economic Journal, vol. 77, 1967, 
pp. 1-21. 
' ••• with the exception of countries with widely 
divergent tariff structures, free trade associations 
are a more efficient way of promoting economic inte-
. ,( 1 ) 
gration than customs unlons. 
This statement appears to be a contradiction in terms, 
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since countries in free trade areas are, by definition, less inte-
grated than if they form a customs union. 
In view of the inconclusiveness of customs union theory, 
one may wonder along what lines further developments will take 
place. John Pinder wrote: 
' ••• customs unions tend to be set up for 'political' 
reasons rather than because of econometricians' fore-
casts of changes in trade, from which it follows that 
economic analysis would be more fruitfully focused on 
the implications for economic policy of the existence 
of customs unions than oh the justification of customs 
unions in terms of forecast changes in the flow of 
t d ' (2) ra e. 
Krauss questions the role of economic research 'when 
it is accepted that the objective of governmental policy is non-
economic in nature'. (3) Either an attempt is made to develop 
analyses whose purpose is to achieve the non-economic objective 
at minimum cost to the community, or an effort is made to find 
out whether the non-economic benefits are worth the net economic 
(1) Victoria Curzon, 'The Essentials of Economic Integration', 
Lessons of EFTA Experience, London, Macmillan, 1974. 
(Harry G. Johnson, Introduction), p. 2. 
(2) G.R. Denton (ed.), Economic Inte ration in 
Pinder, Problems of European integration , 
feld and Nicolson, 1969, p. 148. 
(John 
Weiden-
(3) Melwyn B. Krauss Ced.), The Economics of Integration, London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1973, p. 16. 
costs. Krauss supports the second method. 
Little has been said of the effects of customs unions on 
other countries except for the tentative assumption that they are 
bound to lose as the result of discrimination. Their terms of 
trade with the customs union may deteriorate, but they may benefit 
in other ways. For example, the growth of the economies of the 
Common Market countries resulted in an increase in trade with third 
countries. It is possible that this might have happened in any 
case. Nevertheless, there is no proof of injury to outside countries. 
The principle that compensation must be given to countries who are 
adversely affected by certain arrangements (such as customs unions) 
should logically be extended to damage caused by any aspect of trade 
policy, such as increases in tariffs, non-tariff barriers, import 
control, agricultural protectionism. It may even be extended to 
other aspects of external policy, such as a 'closed-door' immi-
gration policy, if it is found that this is harmful to other countries. 
There is no logical reason to single out economic integration as 
the one policy giving rise to compensation to third countries. 
An important advantage of customs unions over non-prefer-
ential tariff elimination resides in the reciprocity of tariff con-
cessions. Reciprocity is a basic principle of the GATT, and its 
value is highlighted by the hard bargaining which takes place at 
every multilateral trade conference. 
It is often said that customs unions are both a movement 
towards free trade and protection, but this is not entirely correct. 
Protection depends on the height of the common external tariff; if 
it is lower than the tariffs of some of the members before union, 
it cannot be said that the union has moved towards protection. 
It would be more accurate to say that customs unions are a move 
towards free trade and towards discrimination. 
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In the above survey of customs union theory, it is 
noteworthy that the analyses always consider the effects of the 
formation of customs unions, and never the effects of the breaking-
up of a union. Let us assume for a moment that, say, the South 
African Customs Union, comprising the Republic of South Africa, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, imposes a tariff of 25% on 
imports of a particular product which is produced at the cost of 
R50 outside the customs union and R60 in South Africa. A buyer, 
say in Swaziland, will buy the product from the Republic, because 
to import the product from outside the customs union would cost 
R50 + R12,50 = R62,50 (ignoring transport costs). If the customs 
union breaks up and each of the four member States imposes the same 
25% tariff on imports from each other, the Swaziland buyer will 
now buy the product outside the union, since it will still cost 
R62,50, but the product from South Africa will now cost R60 + R15 = 
R75. It could be called trade-diversion, since the trade with one 
country has been diverted to another country, but if we note that 
it is a move from high-cost to low-cost source of production, then 
it is trade-creation (even though the price to the buyer is now 
higher than before the break-up of the customs union). Would it 
be a move for the better? 
If the formation of customs union could be analytically 
proved to be detrimental to economic welfare - and no such proof has 
yet been worked out - then logically the break-up of customs unions 
should be beneficial. 
The argument could be carried further, to consider the 
results of breaking up of other customs areas, for instance, 
putting up tariff barriers between the different provinces of the 
Republic of South Africa, between the States of the United States 
of America, or between England, Wales and Scotland. Customs 
unions enlarge customs areas. It is often forgotten that the 
existence of any customs area - whether or not it follows national 
borders - includes an element of discrimination since inter-
regional trade is given preference over international trade. 
In recent years, economists have turned their attention 
to the special problems of developing countries. . Since their 
usual trade pattern of exporting primary products and importing 
manufactured goods has not greatly contributed to the economic 
development of those regions, some developing countries are 
attempting to form customs unions and free trade areas, in spite 
of the fact that some doubt remains as to the benefits they are 
1 0k 1 t f · 0 0 t to (1) T 1 e y 0 reap rom economlc ln egra ~on. he problem centres 
on the competitiveness or complementarity of the economies. If 
one of the member countries is more developed than the other, the 
advanced region will always be ahead in production and technology. 
Capital will flow to the dynamic area, where the infrastructure 
will improve comparatively more than in the weaker area, and higher 
wages will attract the best labour from the poorer region thus 
depressing it further. 
(1) See Ka~nert, F~ et al, Economic Integration among Developing 
Countrles, Parls, Development Centre of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969. 
'This argument mayor may not be correct. But the 
important thing is to realise that, at the present state 
of the theory and of the evidence on this subject, it 
is impossible to know whether, or in what circumstances, 
t
· - t t ,(1) the argumen 1S correc or no • 
Examples of integration among developing countries are 
the East African Economic Community, the Central African Customs 
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and Economic Union, the Latin American Free Trade Area, the Central 
American Common Market, and the free trade areas which nineteen 
African countries have formed with the European Community. This 
last group is the 'hard core' of the Association system of the EEC 
which will be examined in the next chapter. 
To sum up this overview of customs union theory, one can 
do no better than to quote J.E. Meade, who, after spending a great 
deal of time and effort refining the theory, wrote that if he were 
a citizen of a Benelux country, he would support it strongly even 
if a careful estimate suggested that it was more likely to reduce 
rather than to .raise economic welfare in the narrow sense of the 
term, because: 
'It is becoming a truism that with modern develop-
ments of transport, communications, and technology 
larger social and political units are likely to be more 
viable and self-reliant politically and strategically. 
I am quite certain that there is a need for a greater 
integration of the countries of the free world. Politically 
it would give greater coherence and strength. Economically 
any move towards economic union covering a large number of 
countries would undoubtedly serve to raise standards of 
1
.. , (2) 1v1ng. 
(1) G.R. Denton (ed.), Economic Integration in Europe, (John Pinder, 
Problem of European integration) ••• p. 153. 
(2) J.E. Meade, The Theor~ of Customs Unions, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1955, pp. 11 -115. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ASSOCIATION SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
Basis of the Association - different types of 
agreements - Association under the Treaty of Rome -
Yaounde I and II - special association agreements -
trade agreements - criticisms of the Association 
system. 
The Association system of the European Economic Community 
was established in 1957 to govern relations between the Six and their 
dependencies in the field of trade and co-operation. The legal basis 
for this relationship can be found in article 131 of the Treaty of 
Rome which reads: 'The purpose of this Association shall be to pro-
mote the economic and social development of the countries and terri-
tories and to establish close economic relations between them and 
the Community as a whole~(1)Since then, the Association has altered 
in nature, size and complexity. 
As this thesis is concerned with the impact of the Assoc-
iation on international trade policies, the nature and evolution of 
this system must first be outlined. The purpose of this chapter is 
therefore to explain the Association system and the different types 
of agreements involved, and to examine the reaction of non-members 
and the various criticisms which have been aimed at the Association 
since its inception. 
It is important, at the outset, to differentiate between 
three types of agreements which are in force at the moment:-
(1) See Annex A for relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 
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(A) The most important and most widely-known type of agree-
ment is the Yaounde agreement which established the Association of 
African and Malagasy States (AAMS). This includes eighteen ex-
dependencies of members of the EEC and was joined in 1972 by 
Mauritius. These countries are often called the Yaounde Associates, 
as the Convention was signed at Yaounde, in the Cameroon. This may 
be regarded as 'full' Association. 
(B) A special type of Association was created under Article 
238 of the Rome Treaty : 'The Community may conclude with a third 
country, a union of States or an international organisation, agree-
ments creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and 
obligations, joint actions and special procedures'. These agree-
ments are sui generis, some of them leading up to future membership, 
as in the case of Greece and Turkey, whilst others only envisage 
a limited Association, as is the case for the East African terri-
tories since the Arusha agreement of 1969. This is sometimes 
called 'special' or 'partial' association. 
(C) Lastly, the EEC has entered into purely commercial agree-
ments with certain countries, mostly in the Mediterranean area, 
but also recently with members of the European Free Trade Assoc-
iation which did not join the Common Market. It is not always 
easy to distinguish between special association agreements and 
trade agreements. Some writers may prefer to omit trade agree-
ments from a review of the Association system, but they are included 
here because, in spite of the fact that countries which enter into 
trade agreements with the EEC are not associates, the links they 
form with the Community are of a similar nature to those formed 
by special association agreements. Before examining the most import-
ant agreements, fig.12 below illustrates the Association system as 
it stands at the time of writing. 
A. YAOUNDE AGREEMENTS (full association) 
1) Association under Part IV of the Treaty of 
Rome with dependencies of Fra~ce, Italy, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. ,1) 
2) Association of African and Malagasy States 
(AAMS): Yaounde Convention I. 
3) AAMS renewed: Yaounde Convention II. 
Signatories of Yaounde I and 11:-
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Zaire, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta. 
Mauritius joined the Yaounde associates in 
B. SPECIAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS. (sui generis) 









(b) Africa: Nigeria: (Lagos Convention) 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania: 
(Arusha Convention) 
C. TRADE AGREEMENTS 







2) EFTA countries: 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Portugal, 
























1972 - 1973 
1971 
1973 
Fig.12. The association system as at 1st September, 1973. 
(1) See Annex B for full list of 1957 associates. 
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A. YAOUNDE AGREEMENTS 
These agreements lead to the most comprehensive type 
of association, but without prospect of eventual membership to the 
Common Market, since according to Article 237 of the Treaty of 
Rome, only European countries may join the Community. The number 
of countries involved in 1957 decreased slightly when the first 
arrangement was replaced by the Yaounde Convention of 1963, 
renewed in 1969. Thus the Association progressed through three 
stages: 1) Association under the Treaty of Rome, 1957 - 1963; 
2) Association of African and Malagasy States created by the 
Yaounde Convention, 1963 - 1969; 3) The Second Yaounde Con-
vention, since 1969. An examination of each stage will explain the 
nature of the relationship between the EEC and the Yaounde associates. 
1) Association under the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 
The basis of this association is outlined in Part IV of 
the Rome Treaty, Articles 131 to 136.(1) The purpose of the 
Association is to promote the social and economic development of 
those territories which were dependencies of EEC members, and to esta-
blish close economic relationship between those countries and the 
Community. The Association system contains two main elements, 
namely, rules regulating trade between the EEC and associates, and 
financial aid. The territories concerned were listed in Annex IV 
of the Treaty of Rome. They included French and Dutch dependencies, 
the Belgian Congo, the Trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi and Italian 
. (2) 
Somallland. 
The background to the inclusion of Articles 131 - 136 in 
the Treaty of Rome was as follows. When the Six decided to form 
(1) See Annex A. 
(2) See Annex B for list of territories associated under Part IV 
of the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 
the EEC, those members who still had dependencies asked that a 
solution be found to avoid breaking the links between the Metro-
politan countries and those dependencies, a severance which could 
have had detrimental effects on both sides. France suggested ex-
tending the economic union to colonies but this was rejected, 
especially by Germany. It must be remembered that Germany had 
lost her colonies at the end of the first World War and this may 
69 
have influenced her views. France, however, took the position that 
she would not join the EEC unless some arrangement was made with 
regard to those territories. Although France was the most interest ed 
party, due to the size of her colonial empire, one must not under-
estimate the interest of Belgium and Italy in the matter. After a 
great deal of discussion and negotiations which at times threatened 
the creation of the EEC, the Association arrangements were accepted 
by all members. 
The main features of the 1957 Association were:-
(a) Financial aid to the associates, through the establishment 
of a European Developme~t Fund. 
(b) Gradual abolition of tariffs between the EEC and the associates, 
and between the associates themselves, except where international 
obligations prevented this, but with authoriZation to levy customs 
duties in certain circumstances, such as for the protection of 
infant industries. 
(c) Absence of discrimination between members of the EEC with regard 
to the ~pplication of these duties. 
(d) Freedom of moveme,nt for workers between the associated terri-
tories and the EEC. 
(e) Right of establishment of nationals and companies of EEC 
members in those territories. 
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There were a few exceptions to the preferential system 
thus established. For instance, Germany was allowed a duty-free 
quota for the import of bananas from non-associates, while Italy 
and the Benelux countries were granted a similar quota on unroasted 
coffee. 
The 1957 Association set up a free trade area between the 
Six and their dependencies. A customs union already existed between 
France and her colonies, but not between Belgium and the Congo, 
because the Congo Basin Treaties of 1885 and 1890 precluded dis-
" "t" " t tt (1) Th "h "t d d crlmlna lon In cus oms rna ers. e maln c ange In ro uce 
by the Rome Treaty, Part IV, was the extension of this Common 
Market to other members of the EEC. From 1957 onwards, all members 
of the Community began to abolish tarif~s on goods from those 
territories, thus giving exports from associates preferential treat-
ment over exports from non-associates. 
The Association system set up by the EEC Was criticized 
from the start by a number of third countries (that is, countries 
which are not party to an arrangement with the EEC). 'The creation 
of this preferential system evoked loud protests in the GATT from 
Latin American and other African countries such as Ghana who claimed 
that this preference would seriously harm their exports to the 
(2) 
member states.' This particular aspect will be examined in 
Chapter V, the problem of the GATT rules will be the subject of 
Chapter VI I, and other criticisms of the Association will be con-
sidered on pages 84 - 87. It must be stressed here, however, that 
the preferential regime between France and her overseas territories, 
and between the Benelux countrie~ and their dependencies, Was 
allowed under the GATT. Article 1(2) of the General Agreement 
(1) See J. Matthews, Free trade and the Congo Basin Treaties, 
South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, no.4, December 
1959, pp. 293 - 300. 
(2) Werner Feld, The European Common Market and the World, New 
Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 1967, p.115. 
specifically allows long-standing preferences such as these (see 
Annexes A, Band C of the Agreement). It is only the extension of 
these preferential arrangements to other members of the EEC which 
was vulnerable under the GATT rules. 
2) First Yaounde Convention, 1963 
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Soon after 1960, most of the African territories associated 
with the Common Market gained independence. Since new African states 
could not be bound by the Treaty of Rome, which had been signed only 
by the Six, a new arrangement was required. The issue was complicated 
by the prospect of British entry into the EEC, because Britain wanted 
to establish a link between the Community and the Commonwealth 
~ountries, possibly an extension of the Association, at least to 
African countries. Moreover, differences of opinion were apparent 
between members of the EEC as to the form of the prospective Assoc-
iation. By January 1963, however, without waiting for the result 
of the British negotiations, an agreement was reached between the 
Six and eighteen of the 1957 associates and a Convention was 
signed at Yaounde, Cameroon, in July 1963, establishing the Assoc-
iation of African and Malagasy States (AAMS). The eighteen were: 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Zaire, 
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta.(1) Guinea 
refused to join the AAMS. 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome remained effective and 
deals with relations between the EEC and the remaining dependencies 
of France and the Netherlands: New Caledonia, French Polynesia, 
Wallis and Futuna, the Comores Islands, French Territory of the 
Afars and Issas, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the French Southern and 
(1) Somalia includes Italian and British Somaliland; French 
Somali land is now the French territory of the Afars and Issas. 
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Antarctic territories, Surinam and Netherlands Antilles. The 
Association between the EEC and Netherlands New Guinea ended in 
1963, when this country became part of Indonesia. The 1957 
Association does not apply to the French overseas departments of 
Guiana, Martinique , Guadeloupe and Reunion. 
Although the Yaounde Association had the same broad 
purpose as the earl ier arrangement, na~ely trade expansion, financial 
aid and the right of establishment, there were several differences 
between the two systems: 
(a) Whereas t he 1957 Association was signed by the Six on 
behalf of their dependencies, the Yaounde Convention was agreed 
upon by the Common Market countries and eighteen associates. Thus, 
the earlier system was an arrangement by Metropolitan c9untries 
dealing with their colonies, while the 1963 Convention was freely 
agreed upon by newly-independent African states. The point has 
sometimes been raised as to whether those developing countries were 
in fact free to adhere to the Associatidn established at Yaounde, 
since they were economically dependent on the continuation of this 
arrangement. But although the eighteen may have needed special 
links with the EEC, they were at liberty, legally and constitution-
ally, to sign the Convention or remain out of the new scheme, as 
illustrated by the fact that Guinea, once a French colony, decided 
to withdraw from t he group of the 1957 associates, and has remained 
outs~de the Association. 
(b) The Treaty of Rome, Part IV, provided for the abolition 
of customs duties between t he Six and the eighteen, and also between 
the associates, thus establishing one large free trade area. The 
Yaounde Convention, on the other hand, established eighteen free 
trade areas, between the EEC and each of the eighteen associates.(1) 
(1) There were a few exceptions. Agricultural products competing 
with the EEC products receive preferential treatment instead 
of free entry into the Community. Due to international 
nhli~~+inn~ _ ~~~~~ ~n~ Tn~n ~n ~n+ ~~_o __ a~ _ ______ ~_ ~~" 
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The reason for this, is that inter-associate trade is outside the 
scope of the Convention. The associates are free to organi s e their 
trade with each other, and with third countries, as each of them 
thinks fit. Article 8 of the Convention of Association states that 
'this Convention shall not preclude the maintenance or · establish-
ment of customs unions or free-trade areas among Associated States', 
and Article 9 reads 'this Convention shall not preclude the main-
tenance or establishment of customs unions or free-trade areas 
between one or more Associated States and one or more third 
countries insofar as they neither are nor prove to be incompatible 
with the principles and provisions of the said Convention'. So 
far, five associates have formed an economic union: l'Union 
Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) created in 
1964 between the Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad and 
Cameroon, but none have attempted integration with non-associates. 
The fact that the Yaounde Convention of 1963 established 
eighteen free trade areas instead of one, as in the case of the 
earlier Association, is considered by spme writers as a backward 
step. In the sense that the large free trade area has broken up 
into eighteen free trade areas, it is further away from the ideal of 
trade liberalisation. On the other hand, the 1957 Association was 
decided upon by six countries - the EEC - whereas the Yaounde Con-
vention was signed by twenty-four nations and therefore should be 
accepted as a step forward in international economic co-operation. 
(c) Whereas the EEC institutions administered the 1957 
Association, Article 39 of the Yaounde Convention provided for an 
Association Council assisted by an Association Committee, a 
Parliamentary Conference and a Court of Arbitration. 
The salient features of these institutions are as follows: 
The Association Council is composed, 'on the one hand, of the 
members of the Council of the EEC and members of the Commission 
of the EEC, and on the other hand, of one member of the Govern-
ment of each Associated State 1 (Article 40). 
'The Association Council shall express itself by mutual 
agreement between the Community on the one hand and the 
Associated States on the other. The Community ••• and the 
Associated States ••• shall each by means of an internal 
Protocol determine their procedure for arriving at their 
respective positions' (Article 43). 
This means that each side has only one vote, and that all decisions 
must therefore be reached by unanimity. The main functions of the 
Council are consul tation, deliberation and supervision over the 
implementation of the Convention. It is assisted by an Association 
Committee, which has assumed considerable significance since the 
Council only meets once a year. (1) 
The Parl iamentary Conference consists of an equal number 
of delegates from the European Assembly and from the parliaments 
of the associated states, but as in the case of the European 
Assembly, its powers are very limited. It meets once a year. 
The Court of Arbitration judges disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and can make 
binding decisions if prior amicable settlement by the Council has 
failed. It is composed of five members: a President, appointed 
by the Council, and 'four judges chosen from among persons whose 
independence and competence can be fully guaranteed' (Articles 
51 and 52). 
(1) Werner Feld, The European Common Market and the world, 
...... , p. 115. 
(d) Apart from the above changes, the Yaounde Convention 
differed from the 1957 Association on a few other minor points. 
On the other hand, escape clauses were retained such as in Article 
13, which allows one or more associated states to take measures 
such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions, 'if serious dis-
turbances occur in one sector of the economy or jeopardize its 
external financial stability', and in Article 3 which permits 
associates to retain or even introduce customs duties which 
'correspond to their development needs or their industrializ~tion 
requirements or which are intended to contribute to their budget'. 
3) Second Yaounde Convention, 1969 
Some doubts were expressed in various quarters as to 
whether the Yaounde Convention would be renewed after its ex-
piration in 1969. Besides differences of opinion between EEC 
members as to the content of the future Convention, especially 
between France and Germany, there was evidence of pressure on the 
EEC, from non-associated countries, mainly Latin America, not to 
renew the Convention. The group of '77', of the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was actively trying 
to establish the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) whereby 
developed countries would give preferential treatment to manu-
factured goods from developing nations, and this was felt by some 
( 1 ) to be an alternative to the Association preferential system. 
However, the associates pressed for the renewal of the Convention, 
and this was carried out at Yaounde in July 1969. 
In terms of this Convention, certain provisions on 
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financial aid were altered, the Six increasing the European Develop-
(1) See Chapter VIII. The group of '77' is made up of active 
developing countries, within the framework of UNCTAD, and 
actually comprises 96 countries. 
ment Fund's resources from $ 730 million for the 1964 - 69 period, 
to $ 918 million for the next five years. However, the African 
associates had hoped for a bigger increase and expressed dissatis-
faction. In order to reduce the discriminatory effects of the 
agreement on the trade of non-associates, the common external 
tariff of the EEC was lowered for some products, e.g. coffee, 
cocoa beans, palm oil. This reduction in the margin of preferences 
upset the associates, but it was a compromise, between the con-
flicting demands of the two groups: the associates wanting to 
perpetuate preferential treatment, and third countries wishing to 
minimize it. 
Extension of the Yaounde Association to Mauritius. Article . 
58 of the Yaounde Convention provides for accession to the Assoc-
iation, of 'States which have an economic structure and production 
comparable to those Associated States'. Mauritius is the first 
country to have become associated under this provision. By an agree-
ment signed in May 1972, the EEC will grant Mauritius duty-free 
access for most of her exports to the Community, as far as industrial 
goods are concerned. Farm produce will receive preferential treat-
ment but sugar is temporarily excepted. This is because Mauritius 
sugar benefits from a guaranteed outlet to the U.K. under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and this will continue until 1975. 
The EEC will then negotiate new arrangements for sugar for those 
associated developing countries whose economies are highly dependent 
on sugar ~xports. On the other hand, Mauritius will grant EEC goods 
the same treatm~nt as she grants the Commonwealth~ by the end of 
1974. This agreement brings the number of Yaounde associates to 
nineteen. Mauritius is the first Commonwealth country to become 
'full associate' (although it must be remembered that ex-British 
Somaliland, as part of Somalia, was associated in 1963). Other 
Commonwealth members have entered into association agreements sui 
generis. 
B. SPECIAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
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In the last decade, the Community has entered into a 
variety of Association agreements with non-member countries. The 
Treaty of Rome provides for these agreements in Article 238: 'The 
EEC may conclude with a non~member state, a union between states or 
an international organisation, agreements creating an association 
characterised by reciprocal rights and obligations, communal actions 
and particular procedures'. 
The terms of these arrangements vary. Most of them 
establish preferential entry into the EEC, for exports from associates 
and the so-called 'reverse preferences', that is, preferential entry 
into the associated countries, for exports from the EEC. Several 
associates receive financial aid, others do not. Agreements are 
signed for a specific period, usually three to six years. They are 
renewable and revokable according to a procedure laid down in each 
agreement. A brief outline of the most important of these agreements 
will suffice to illustrate their diversity. 'Special' associates 
are situated in two main areas: the Mediterranean region and Africa. 
1. Mediterranean region 
Most countries bordering the Mediterranean have entered 
into agreements with the EEG, Albania, Syria and Libya being ex-
ceptions to the rule. Algeria is negotiating. Some of these arrange-
ments have established an association with the Community, whilst 
others have been simple trade agreements, which will be discussed 
below. 
Among the association agreements sui generis, a distinction 
must be drawn between those entered into with a view of eventual 
membership of the EEC and those which do not envisage this possi-
bility. Only the agreements with Greece and Turkey aim at full 
membership of the Community. 
Greece and Turkey. As the Association agreements with 
these two countries are similar, they can be examined together. 
Greece became an associate in 1961, and Turkey in 1963~ Article 2 
of each agreement states that the long-range objective is 
'to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of 
the commercial and economic relations between the con-
tracting parties with full consideration of the need to 
ensure the accelerated development of the economy of 
(Greece, Turkey) as well as the elevation of the level 
of employment and of the living standards of the (Greek, 
Turkish) people'. 
To achieve this, the intermediate objectives are a customs union 
between the EEC and each country and the harmonization of economic 
policies, while the long-term aim is full membership.(1) The 
establishment of the customs union will not take place according 
to the same time-table since the states of the economies of Greece 
and Turkey differ. 
In the agreement with Greece, it was decided that customs 
duties would be abolished over a 12-year period except for a few 
items which needed protection, in which case the period would ex-
tend to 22 years. Turkey, with a lower level of developmentt was 
to go through a 'preparatory' period during the first five years, 
when the Community would give preferential tariff quotas to Turkish 
exports of tobacco, dried grapes and a few other commodities re-
presenting about 40% of Turkey's exports to the EEC. This would 
be followed by the 'transition' period, during which Turkey and 
\ 
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the EEC ~ould move towards a customs union. At the time of writing, 
Turkey is entering the transition stage. While. the agreement with 
(1) On this subject, see Werner Feld, The European Common Market 
and the world, •••• pp. 59-69. 
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Turkey progressed according to plan, the arrangement with Greece 
suffered a setback with the 1967 coup d'Etat. 
The institutions provided for under these agreements are 
similar to those of the Yaounde Association, as outlined in the 
previous discussion. Councils of the Association, composed of 
members of the EEC organs and of members of the Greek or Turkish 
governments, have an element of supranationality, and may take 
decisions binding on all partners. These Councils have established 
Association Committees to ensure the smooth operation of the agree-
ments. In addition, Parliamentary Association Committees have been 
set up as advisory bodies composed of an equal number of deputies 
from the European Assembly and from the Greek or the Turkish Parlia-
mente 
Morocco and Tunisia. The Maghreb(1) countries have had 
historical ties with Spain, France and Italy for many centuries. 
Subsequently, Morocco and Tunisia became French Protectorates, 
while Algeria b€came part of France. The former countries acquired 
independence in 1956, and Algeria in 1962, after an eight-year war. 
Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia were signed in 1969, 
establishing 'partial' association, in the sense that they do not 
contain provisions for financial aid and for the free movement of 
labour. The Six have undertaken to remove customs duties and 
quotas on most industrial exports and ~o grant preferences on agri-
cultural products from these countries. The main problem of this 
Association is the competitive aspect of their farm products. Not 
only do their exports of fruit, vegetables and wine compete with 
French and Italian goods, but Maghreb oranges also compete with those 
from the Lebanon and Israel, with whom the EEC entered into trade 
agreements in 1964. 
(1) 'Maghreb' is an Arab word meaning 'west', and the term is used 
to describe t he western part of the Arab-speaking world, that 
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Algeria. Political differences have hampered association 
with Algeria. Algeria was originally due to participate in the 
Community's negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia, but its declaration 
of war on Israel in 1967 provoked a veto from the Netherlands.(1) 
More recently, · this veto has been lifted, and negotiations are pro-
ceeding. In the meantime, Algerian wine enters the Community with 
a 40% reduction of the Common External Tariff. 
Malta. An association agreement providing for customs 
union between the EEC and Malta was signed in 1970, mainly for 
industrial products. As Malta benefits from the Commonwealth 
Preferential system, she will have to give the Community treatment 
at least as favourable as she gives to the United Kingdom, by the 
end of the first five years. The Prime Minister of Malta has 
recently asked for a revision of the agreement to include financial 
aid and agriculture. 
Cyprus. The association agreement with Cyprus was signed 
in 1972, and came into effect in February 1973. The agreement aims 
at removing virtually all trade barriers between Cyprus and the 
Nine, over a period of 9i years. The EEC makes an immediate tariff 
cut of 70% on industrial goods, (except petrolium products), while 
Cyprus reduces her tariffs by 35% over 4 years. The main problem 
was sherry exports to Britain and Ireland: Cyprus will be given 
two years' grace before full application of the commoi agricultural 
1 . (2) po ~cy. 
2. Africa. 
Nigeria. In 1966, the Lagos Convention was signed by the 
EEC and Nigeria. This was a turning point in the development of the 
(1) European Community, September 1970, p.13 
(2) European Community, February 1973, p.26. 
Association system . For the first time, a country without political 
or historical ties with the Common Market entered into association 
with the Community . Moreover, this was a Commonwealth, English-
speaking country. The main reason behind this move was the sub-
stantial trade which Nigeria carried out with some members of the 
EEC. Nevertheless, it was a bold step for a Commonwealth country 
to take, especially after the breakdown of the first British 
negotiations for entry.(1) _ The significance of the Association 
with Commonwealth countries will be examined in Chapter IV. 
Similarly to other association agreements sui generis, 
the terms of the Lagos Convention are more limited than those of 
Yaounde. Institutional links are kept to a minimum, and Nigeria 
did not ask for financial aid. 
4Nigeria's rejection of assistance from the EEC overseas 
Fund or of any financial co-operation with the Community 
(although she accepted aid from the member states on a 
bilateral basis) served to demonstrate that an association 
agreement could cover the trade needs of a developing 
country without tying the country to multilateral aid and, 
(2) 
therefore, multipolitical press~re.' 
The EEC gave duty-free entry quotas to Nigeria's most 
important exports (palm products, cocoa, tropical timber and 
groundnut oil), whereas the Yaounde associates were given unlimited 
free entry into the Common Market. In return, Nigeria dropped 
customs duties on 26 items from the Six, which accounted for only 
4% of her total imports. 
The Lagos Convention never came into effect, however, due 
to the civil war which ravaged Nigeria later that year. The possi-
bility exists of a renewal of the agreement, however, following 
Britain's entry into the Common Market. (See Chapter IV). 
(1) For deta~ls on Nigeria's position, see P.N.C. Okigbo, 
Africa and the Common Market, London, Longmans, 1967 
(2) P.N.C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market, ••••• , p.132. 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Following in the footsteps of 
Nigeria, these three East African countries became associates of 
the EEC by the Arusha Convention of 1968, renewed in 1969, at the 
same time as Yaounde II. The Arusha agreement provided for sub-
stantial liberalization of EEC imports from Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, and duty-free quotas. for coffee, cloves and tinned pine-
apples. In return, the associates granted preferences of between 
2% and 9% on a group of about 59 EEC products. 
C. TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Besides association agreements, the EEC has signed a 
number of trade agreements with third countries, mainly in the 
Mediterranean area. This is to cover cases where countries wish 
to make some commercial arrangement with the EEC, but prefer not 
to become too closely linked with the Community. 
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Iran. In October 1963, Iran entered into a trade agree-
ment with the EEC, in order to protect the exports of a number of 
products to the Common Market, especially rugs, raisins, dried 
apricots and sturgeon caviar. The agreement covers tariff reductions 
of 10% to 20% and other concessions. (Greece, associated since 1961, 
was upset by the concession regarding raisins, which compete with 
Greek exports). A Joint Committee consisting of EEC and Iranian 
officials, was established to attend to the implementation of the 
agreement. 
Israel. For several years, Israel has been seeking a 
formal relationship with the EEC, but negotiations have been slow 
and difficult for economic and political reasons. Inter alia, 
Israel exports compete with Italian products, especially ~itrus 
fruit. A trade agreement dating from 1964 was renegotiated in 
1970, but in the meantime Israel has applied for associate status, 
and the Six have vi ewed their talks with this country as part of 
the Community's relations with the Middle East. 
Lebanon. A trade agreement between the Lebanon and the 
EEC was signed in May 1965. Tariff reductions were not included, 
but the agreement concentrated on the mutual extension of most-
favoured-treatment, including non-tariff obstacles and technical 
assistance. In 1972, a preferential agreement was signed, covering 
58% of Lebanon's industrial exports to the Community and almost 
40% of its farm exports. As in the Israeli agreement, a Joint 
Committee has been provided for, to supervise the running of the 
agreement. 
Yugoslavia. A three-year, non-preferential trade agree-
ment was signed in 1970. This is the first agreement between the 
EEC and an East European country. 
Spain. Although Spain has expressed interest in the 
Association, there has been opposition from the Benelux countries, 
towards anything that could be construed as giving political approval 
to the Spanish government. As a compromise, a trade agreement be-
tween Spain and the EEC was signed in 1970, liberalizing trade on 
both sides for a period of six years. This will benefit over 95% 
of Spain's industrial exports and 62% of its agricultural exports 
to the Six, and 6 1% of the Community's total exports to Spain.(1) 
Egypt and the EEC signed their first five-year trade 
agreement in December 1972. It provides for a tariff cut of 55% 
by the EEC on imports from Egypt, but quotas restrictions will 
remain on petroleum and cotton products. There will also be 
significant concessions in the agricultural sector. In return, 
(1) See European Community, September 1970, p.10. 
84 
Egypt will grant tariff concessions on industrial imports from the 
EEC. 
Argentina. In November 1971, the Common Market signed 
a trade agreement with Argentina, the first Latin American country 
to establish formal links with the Community. The three-year, non-
preferential treaty reduces .restrictions on imports to the EEC of 
beef and veal (Argentina's main products) and encourages exports 
of manufactures from both sides. The agreement also sets up a 
joint commission for consultation on commercial and economic matters. 
This agreement will act as a model for agreements with other Latin 
A · t t (1) mer1can s a es. 
Uruguay. A non-preferential trade agreement was signed 
this year (1973), for a period of 3 years. 
EFTA countries. Until recently, most members of the 
Association system were developing countries. A new development 
is the formation of a free trade area w~th those members of EFTA 
which did not join the EEC. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, 
Austria, Portugal and Iceland have all entered into trade agree-
ments with the enl arged Community to avoid raising tariffs between 
EFTA countries and the new EEC members, Britain and Denmark. Apart 
from a few sensit i ve products such as paper, the new arrangements will 
create free trade in industrial products between sixteen countries 
of Europe. 
D. CRITICISMS OF THE ASSOCIATION SYSTEM 
Many countries reacted adversely to the establishment 
of the Association system, both in 1957 and since the Yaounde Con-
vention of 1963. The reasons varied. In some cases, criticisms 
(1) See European Community, December 1971, p.6. 
came from developing nations which feared that their trade with 
the EEC would suffer due to their exclusion from the preferential 
treatment given to associates. More general criticisms were that 
the Association divides Africa into two groups, associates and non-
associates, and that since it creates a new preferential area, it 
infringes the rules of the GATT. Moreover, it was alleged that the 
Association is a form of neo-colonialism, while some writers have 
attacked the system because it has failed to develop the associated 
countries~ Some of these criticisms will be considered in detail, 
others more briefly. 
The most serious allegation is undoubtedly that the 
Association will cause damage to the external trade of non-
associates, while exports of associates to the EEC will benefit 
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from the trade arrangements with the Community. Obviously, associates 
hoped that a free trade area with the .EEC would expand their exports 
to the Community, but it was generally assumed that this would occur 
without a reduction of the trade between the EEC and other develop-
ing countries, but .simply because of economic growth in the Commun-
ity. In Chapter V, trade figures of associates and non-associates 
will be compared to assess the validity of this argument. 
It is true that Africa may be divided into associates 
and non-associat~s but this is certainly not a new division. Since 
the 'scramble for Africa' in the 19th century, Africa has been 
divided, mainly into French-speaking and English-speaking Africa, 
and more recently into Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. 
As will be shown in Chapter IV, the Association system is not an 
exclusive group and several Commonwealth nations have already become 
associated with the Common Market, thus merging the two preferential 
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systems. This trend will be reinforced if other Commonwealth 
countries join the Association system, due to Britain's entry 
into the EEC. 
The conflict between association and trade agreements, 
and the rules of the GATT is a lasting problem. The basic cause 
of the conflict may be attributed to the duality of regional 
arrangements: freer trade between the parties involved, discrimin-
ation against third parties. Most agreements are based on the 
principle of free trade areas. In some cases, they form a customs 
union (e.g. Spain, Malta). The EEC stresses the fact that, as 
members of free trade areas, associates are free to impose tariffs 
of their own choice on third parties. On the other hand, the GATT 
refers to most agreements as being preferential in character, and 
giving rise to the notorius 'reverse preferences'. This problem 
will be examined in detail in Chapter VII. 
The last two criticisms mentioned above will be considered 
briefly. If the term 'neo-colonialism' is taken in a broad sense, 
to mean a certain economic dependence on the EEC, on the part of 
associates, then the allegation may be defended. On the other hand, 
if 'neo-colonialism' is defined as the perpetuation of colonial 
links, there is no evidence of this in the arrangements between the 
EEC and those independent states which have joined the Association' 
system. The institutions set up by the Yaounde Convention give 
equal status to both sides. 'To regard association as a mani-
festation of collective neo-colonialism in its pejorative aspects, 
wholly misinterprets both its conception and functions.' (1) 
Finally, the Association system was never meant to be a 
magic formula to solve the development problems of the associates. 
(1) Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett: The second 
Yaounde Convention in perspective, International Relations, 
vol. III, no . 9, May 1970, p. 686. 
Trade and aid arrangements between those countries and the European 
Community may help, but it is well-known that development problems 
are enormous and may remain unsolved, at least in the foreseeahle 
future. 
This review of association and trade agreements illustrates 
the diversity of the system which includes ex-dependencies of the 
Six, some Commonwealth countries, and other nations with no historical 
ties with the Community. Changes may occur if the negotiations be-
tween the enlarged EEC and other Commonwealth countries succeed. 
Thus the Association system of the EEC has an important impact on 
Commonwealth trade relationships in Africa, as will be shown in 
the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ASSOCIATION-COMMONWEALTH CONVERGENCE 
Comparison between the Association and the 
Commonwealth - similarities - differences - signifi-
cance of Commonwealth associates - Nigeria - East 
Africa - Malta and Cyprus - Mauritius - the 'associables'. 
The Association system of the EEC was planned to deal 
with the relationship between Common Market countries and their 
dependencies but i t has evolved into a series of agreements be-
tween the Community and a number of independent nations. Most 
of these countries are ex-dependencies of the Six whilst a grow-
ing number are Commonwealth countries, mainly in Africa. 
Commonwealth associates - countries which are both 
members of the Commonwealth and associates of the EEC - provide 
a link between two preferential systems. The purpose of this 
chapter is to consider the view that, in Africa, the Association 
system and the Commonwealth are converging and therefore .that the 
Association has a n important impact on the trade policies of 
Commonwealth African nations. Contributory factors of this trend 
are the similarities of the two systems and recent changes in the 
pattern of trade of Commonwealth countries in Africa. 
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A comparison between the Association and the Commonwealth 
preferential system will be followed by a consideration of the assoc-
iation agreements between the EEC and certain Commonwealth countries. 
A. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
Although there are political as well as economic ele-
ments in both organisations, the main purpose of this discussion 
is to consider the trade characteristics of the two systems. 
The Association system was described in the previous 
chapter. Although the development of the Commonwealth is well-
known, it will be useful to recall the main lines of its evolution. 
• 
As British colonies gradually attained independence, a 
'Commonwealth of Nations' replaced the British Empire. The first 
territories invol ved were the so-called 'White Dominions', Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland.(1) Dominion 
status was given formal recognition by the Statute of Westminster 
in 1931, but the term 'Dominion' fell into disuse after the Second 
World War, because of its implication of subordination. Most of 
the other colonies have since acquired freedom, and have become 
members of the Commonwealth, perpetuating the 'Crown Link' by 
recognising the British Monarch as their own. This bond weakened 
when some members of the Commonwealth became Republics, but they 
recognise the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth and as a symbol 
of the free association of its members. 
The Commonwealth is not, strictly speaking, a formal 
organisation, but rather a loose association of independent states. 
However, as the term 'Association' is used here to mean the assoc-
iation with the EEC, the term 'organisation' will be applied to 
the Commonwealth. 
Thus we see in the evolution of the British Empire into 
the Commonwealth, a gradual weakening of the bonds which originally 
(1) South Africa and Ireland have since left the Commonwealth. 
linked the members of the Empire, but also a recognition of the 
persistence of common ties. These ties are difficult to define, 
but they are found 'in every sphere - political, economic and 
cultural. These are the results of history and of a shared 
( 1 ) 
association over the years'. 
The links between members of the Commonwealth are due 
to a variety of factors, such as a common language, similar tra-
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ditions in administration and education, similar legal conceptions, 
migrations of people from one Commonwealth country to another, 
common interest in sport, and above all, strong commercial ties, 
due to years of close trade relations and to the establishment 
of a preferential system. This last characteristic is the most 
tangible of these bonds. 
The solidarity which exists between members of the 
Commonwealth is sometimes said to be due to the 'Sterling Area'. 
But this is a result, rather than a cause, of the Commonwealth 
bonds. Moreover, the Sterling Area is not identical to the 
Commonwealth since it includes non-Commonwealth countries such 
as Ireland and Iceland, whereas Canada is a Commonwealth State in 
the dollar zone. 
The economic aspect of the Commonwealth is characterized 
by the system of Commonwealth Preference - sometimes called by its 
original name, Imperial Preference - which has sustained the strong 
commercial links between members. This sytem was established at 
the Ottawa Conference of 1932, when a number of bilateral trade 
agreements were signed between pairs of Commonwealth States. Accord-
ing to these agreements, preferential tariffs were to be applied 
to imports from the signatories. Not all Commonwealth countries 
(1) The future of the Commonwealth: A British view. The Report 
of a conference held ••• at the invitation of the Common-
wealth Relations Office ••• London, H.M.S.O., 1963. p.4. 
j 
were involved, and some countries received preferences from, but 
did not grant them to Britain. 
1. Similarities. 
Seven points of resemblance may be distinguished and 
they are as follows:-
(a) The origin of both the Association and the Commonwealth 
is the colonial s i tuation which existed between some members of 
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the EEC and their dependencies, and between Britain and her depend-
encies. Most Bri t ish ex-colonies decided to remain in the Common-
wealth after gaining independence, perpetuating the cultural and 
historical links forged by years of contact. Similarly, links 
persist between France and her former colonies, between . Belgium 
and Zaire, etc. A common language, commercial ties and similar 
conceptions of law and education exist in both groups of countries. 
(b) Accession to the Commonwealth and to the Association is 
decided freely by independent nations, in spite of the economic 
dependence of developing nations on their ex-Metropolitan area. 
In the same way as most ex-British colonies admitted the value of 
the continuation of their links with the Commonwealth and decided 
to remain within the group, so the Yaounde countries postulated 
that Association with the Common Market would be advantageous to 
their economies, and entered into an agreement with the Community. 
(c) The main element common to both Association and Common-
wealth, is trade. The most importarit provision of the Yaounde 
Convention is the establishment of a free trade area between the 
EEC and the associates, giving reciprocal preferential treatment 
to exports from both groups. Similarly, the principal advantages 
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of the Commonwealth link are the preferential tariffs applied to 
goods from Commonwealth countries. In both cases, preferences 
strengthen commercial ties. 
(d) There is an element of reciprocity in both systems. 
Although the benefits given by the Common Market to products 
from associated countries outweigh the benefits given by these 
to the EEC, the element of reciprocity preserves the bilateral 
aspect of the contract. Generally, Commonwealth preferences are 
also reciprocal, except when debarred by pre-existing commit-
ments such as the Congo Basin Treaties, mentioned below (p.99). , 
(e) In both cases, preferences. have been diluted over 
the years. Commonwealth preference margins have been narrowed 
by successive ·GATT negotiations which reduced tariffs on imports 
from non-Commonwealth countries.(1) In the same way, new Assoc-
iation agreements reduced the preferential advantages of the first 
group of associates, namely the Yaounde countries, even though 
none of the later agreements were as beneficial to the trade of 
the associates as the Yaounde Convention. The benefits of both 
the Commonwealth preferential system and the EEC Association will 
be further reduced by the Generalised Scheme of Preferences. This 
development will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
(f) Articles 15 - 28, of the Yaounde Convention, deal with 
financial and technical co-operation, through the European Develop-
ment Fund and the European Investment Bank of the EEC. Developing 
Commonwealth states receive considerable aid from Britain. 
(1) Specific tariffs are consistently reduced by inflation. 
(g) As mentioned in the last chapter, it is sometimes 
alleged that the Association system of the EEC has divided 
Africa in two, by separating associates from non-associates. 
This criticism does not stand up to scrutiny, because prior to 
the establishment of the Association, Africa was already divided 
into Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. The root of 
this goes back to the 19th Century, when the 'partition of Africa' 
carved the continent into Empires for Britain, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Italy and Portugal, Germany leaving the field after the 
first World War. The largest groups were the British and French 
colonies, which evolved into English-speaking and French-speaking 
Africa. Both the Commonwealth and the Association have emphasized 
certain differences, but they have not created them. 
The above-mentioned points have indicated the close 
resemblance of the Commonwealth preferential system and the EEC 
Association system. It is therefore surprising to recall that 
several members of the Commonwealth were severely critical of the 
Association in the early years of its formation, for instance, 
Ghana.(1) 
There are however, a few differences between the two 
organisations which must be mentioned to complete the comparison. 
2 . Differences. 
There are four major differences between the Asso~iation 
and the Commonwealth: 
(a) There is a marked diversity between the economies of 
Commonwealth states. Some are still developing, such as most of 
(1) G.R. Denton (ed.), Economic inte ration in 
Cosgrove, The EEC and developing countries 
1969, p.131. 
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the African members, whilst others, such as Canada are pre-
dominantly developed countries. Some territories are mid-way 
between the two, for instance, India. By contrast, all the 
Yaounde countries are developing areas, and most of them are at 
a very similar stage of economic development. However, if we 
limit the comparison to Africa, the similarity persists, since 
Commonwealth African countries are at a level of development 
comparable to that of the Yaounde associates. 
(b) Article 58 of the Yaounde Convention of 1963 deals with 
'the request for association with the Community made by a State 
which has an economic structure and production comparable to those 
of the Associated States ••• ' Thus the door is left open for other 
developing countries to enter into Association with the EEC. This 
is not the case for the Commonwealth. Although no Convention was 
signed regarding membership of the Commonwealth, and therefore no 
rules were laid down, it is generally accepted that only ex-
members of the British Empire are eligible for the status of 
Commonwealth member, and hence, for the benefits of Commonwealth 
preferences. The conclusion can thus be drawn that the Assoc-
iation is open to third countries, whilst the Commonwealth is an 
exclusive group. 
(c) As mentioned previously, the Yaounde Convention set up 
a number of insti t utions to watch over the application of the pro-
visions of the agreement. In contrast, the only outward evidence 
of Commonwealth consultation is the occurrence of periodic meet-
ings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the existence of a 
Commonwealth Relations Office now incorporated in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, London. Thus the Association is a more formal 
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type of organisation than the Commonwealth. 
(d) Chronologically, the Commonwealth is a much olde r 
structure than the Association. The formal start of the Common-
wealth can be attributed to the Statute of Westminster in 1931, 
although some Dominions became independent at a much earlier date. 
On the other hand , the principle o~ Association dates from 1957, 
when the Treaty of Rome was s i gned by the Six, and was formally 
agreed to by the associates in 1963. 
This di f ference in time of the initiation of the two 
systems is particularly important in relation to GATT. When the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed in 1947, it 
exempted from the principle of non-discrimination 'certain pre-
ferences of long-standing,.(1) This met the special problem of 
existing preferential arrangements of the Commonwealth, the French 
Union and a few others, which the countries involved did not want 
to abolish. Thus the Commonwealth pref~rential system is legal 
under GATT, whereas the Association preferences have evoked con-
siderable criticism from the Contracting Parties, since they 
created a new preferential area. This aspect will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter VII. 
Despite these differences, the EEC Association and the 
Commonwealth preferential system resemble each other in nature, 
origin and purpose. These fundamental similarities have contri-
buted to the growing amalgamation of the two organisations. 
B. CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION AND THE COMMONWEALTH. 
The nature of the Association-Commonwealth convergence 
is illustrated by Commonwealth associates, that is, Commonwealth 
(1) See Annex D, article 1 of the GATT. 
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countries which have signed the association agreements with the 
EEC without leaving the Commonwealth, namely Nigeria, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Malta, Cyprus and Mauritius. It is of interest 
to examine certain aspects of these agreements. 
Nigeria. Although the Lagos Convention of 1966 was not 
put into effect because of the Nigerian civil war of that year, 
this agreement has great significance in terms of the principles 
involved. It represents the first association agreement negotiated 
between an anglophone Commonwealth country and the EEC, in spite 
of objections raised by other members of the Commonwealth and 
attacks on the Association system, such as that of Dr. Nkrumah 
'We have said and will continue to say, that the Common Market is 
an imperialist device for the collective exploitation of the less 
developed countries of Africa by the protagonists of neo-colonialism. 
It must be avoided like the plague'. (1) 
I 
Nigeria's move was a bold one. It was a departure from 
a previous non-discriminatory policy, because although Nigeria 
benefitted from preferences in the British Market, she did not give 
preferences to imports from Britain or other Commonwealth countries. 
The origin of this 'open door' policy is the Anglo-French Convention 
of 1898, which defined British and French spheres of influence in 
West Africa and which gave equal commercial rights to both countries 
in Nigeria. Although the Treaty lapsed in 1937, Britain did not 
introduce preferences in Nigeria. 
Nigeria's decision to enter into an Association agree-
ment with the EEC was not taken lightly. There were two main reasons. 
The , first was the negotiations between Britain and the Common Market , 
with all the repercussions which British membership of the EEC would 
(1) Ghana Parliamentary Debates, 25 September 1962. 
have on Commonwealth trade. 
'Between 1958 and 1962, the first serious attempt to build 
a link between the two blocs (Francophone and Anglophone 
Africa) stemmed from Britain's application to join the 
Community. The negotiations that followed had serious 
implications f or Commonwealth African countries and for 
the future development of intra-African trade,.(1) 
97 
If at this time, Br itain had succeeded in joining the EEC, Nigeria's 
exports to Britain would have had to meet the common external tariff 
of the Community, losing her preferential treatment in UK markets. 
By signing an association agreement giving Nigeria certain tariff 
reductions in the EEC, Nigeria's representatives were compensating 
for this eventuality, even though the preferences thus established 
were not equal to preferences lost in Britain. 
The other reason was a change in the external trade pattern 
of Nigeria (see table 1.) 

































Sources: Nigerian Trade Summaries: Commonwealth Economic Committee _ 
Commonwealth Trade 1964. U.K. Board of Trade. Reproduced 
in P. Uri, (ed.) From Commonwealth to Common Market, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p.14p. 
(1) Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market, Lo~don, Longmans, 1967, 
p.70. 
'Expressed as percentages, Nigeria's exports to the EEC 
increased only very slightly from 34.7 per cent of total 
exports in 1959 to 36.4 per cent in 1964. But exports to 
the United Kingdom fell from over 50 per cent to just 
( 1 ) 
under 40 per cent of total exports.' 
Imports into Nigeria increased in absolute terms from the EEC, 
and decreased from the U.K., in spite of an overall increase of 
total imports. These trade figures explain why Nigeria felt it 
necessary to come t o terms with the Common Market. 
Having recognised the advisability of some arrangement 
with the EEC, Nigeria was faced with three choices, accession to 
the Yaounde Convention in accordance with Article 58, an assoc-
iation agreement sui generis, or a commercial agreement. 
Nig&ria opted for an association agreement sui generis, 
and negotiations were followed by the signing of the Lagos Con-
vention in July 1966. This was the first step in the creation of 
a bridge between the Commonwealth and the Association. 
'The Nigerian link between French-speaking and English-
speaking Africa is important, symbolically and (to a 
lesser extent) in practical terms of the degree of communi-
cation between the major ex-colonial areas of the continent. 
If Nigeria's accession does no more than break the neo-
colonial barrier in the earlier attitudes of the Common-
wealth African governments, it will have done a great 
deal.' (2) 
(1) Pierre Uri (ed.), From Commonwealth to Common Market, 
Dennis Austin, Britain, Commonwealth Africa and the EEC, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p.146. 
(2) Pierre Uri (ed.), From Commonwealth to Common Market, 
....... p.158. 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Following the precedent 
,established by Nigeria, it was easier for the three East African 
territories to become associates. The Arusha Convention of 1968 
was also a departure from a non-discriminatory policy. These 
countries received preferential treatm~nt in British markets but 
did not grant reciprocal preferences to British goods. The reason 
for this was the Congo Basin Treaties of 1885 and 1890, which 
established the 'Open Door Policy' in the 'Conventional Basin of 
the Congo' which extends over the East African states.(1) Having 
acquired independence, however, the East African nations were 
legally free to alter their commercial policies, since they could 
not be bound by agreements taken on their behalf by European 
countries. It was , however, understandably irksome for Britain 
to see first Nigeria, then East Africa, give to the EEC a prefer-
ential treatment which Britain had never received. But Britain 
was not in a position to complain since she was herself contem-
plating entry into the Common Market. 
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Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda formed the East African Common 
Market in 1967, but so far, 
'practically none of the requirements of a true common 
market is fulfilled. Yet, the East African Common Market 
must not be j udged as it stands to-day but be seen as it 
will develop in the long run when the transfer tax and 
other hampering devices have fulfilled their function of 
removing existing industrial imbalances." (2) 
Talks between. the EEC and East African states started in 
1963, but almost collapsed in 1966 over disagreement on coffee quotas 
(1) See J. Matthews, Fr.ee Trade and the cong,ci Basin Treaties, S. A. 
Journal of Economics, vo1.27, no.4 ', Dee:ember 1959, pp.293-300. 
(2) Ingrid Doimi di Delupis, The East African Community and Common 
Market, London, Longman, 1970. p. 160. . 
The transfer tax is summarized as follows: 'A State which has 
a trade deficit in its total trade with the other two Partner 
States may impose transfer tax ~n manufactured goods originating 
from the two other States.' ibid,p,.83. 
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and the notion of 'reciprocal preferences'. Ho~ever, negotiations 
were reopened, and a final agreement was signed in July 1968. This 
particular Convention was not ratified but was renewed in 1969, and 
is now in operation (Arusha Convention). 
The reasons underlying the association agreement between 
the EEC and East Africa are similar to those of the Nigerian agree-
ment, namely the need to protect these countries' external trade, 
not only from the consequences of a possible British membership of 
the Common Market, but also from the results of existing association 
agreements with countries producing goods similar to those of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
It is interesting to note that, since the enlargement of 
the Community, Britain will receive preferential treatment from 
Nigeria and East Africa, for the first time. 
Malta and Cyprus. The Association agreement between 
Malta and the EEC (1970) and the agreement with Cyprus (1972.) were 
mentioned in the last chapter. As these countries gave preferential 
treatment to Britain as members of the Commonwealth, these agree-
ments will simply extend these preferences to other members of the 
enlarged Community. 
Mauritius. The seventh Commonwealth country to become 
associated with the Common Market is the island of Mauritius. 
Similarly to the agreements with Malta and Cyprus, this arrange-
ment will eventually give EEC goods the same preferential treat-
ment given to Commonwealth members. The difference is that Mauritius 
adhered to the Yaounde Convention instead of entering into a sui 
generis agreement. The links between the EEC and Mauritius will 
thus be closer than between the Community and the other Common-
wealth associates. 
The 'associables'. During the negotiations concerning 
Britain's entry into the EEC, it was decided to offer developing 
Commonwealth nations some form of relationship with the enlarged 
Community. These countries, which have become known as 'the 
associables', are Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swazi-
land, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, Western Samoa and Fiji.(1) 
These sixteen nations have three choices: an association 
such as under the Yaounde agreement, a special or partial assoc-
iation such as the Arusha arrangement, or a trade agreement. 
Negotiations are being carried out at the time of writing, and 
it is not yet known what the outcome will be. Some 'associables', 
such as Nigeria, fear that the Association will lead to a sub-
ordinate status for the associates. Others reject the proposition 
of giving preferences to the EEC, which would be the result of a 
free trade area between the 'associables' and the Community. As 
for a trade agreement, the GATT rule which expects concessions in 
tariff matters to be extended to all members of the GATT, is a 
drawback. Moreover, the political implications of closer links 
with the EEC are complicating the issue, and several countries 
uphold the Generalized Scheme of Preferences as being preferable 
to the trade provisions of an association agreement. 
Nevertheless, it is probably that some arrangement will 
link those Commonwealth developing countries to the enlarged 
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Community, even though the form it will take is as yet ,unformulated. 
The Association system has therefore a considerable impact on the 
trade policies of developing Commonwealth countries. 
(1) The Economist, London. 31 March 1973. p.52. 
CHAPTER V 
TRADE BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE ASSOCIATES 
Fear of trade loss by non-associates trade 
between the EEC and associates - comparison with 
selected African countries with developing 
countries in other parts of the world. 
We have seen that the establishment of the EEC Assoc-
iation system aroused criticism from both developed and developing 
countries.(1) One of the most important arguments put forward at 
the time was that the Association would cause trade diversion from 
non-associates to associates and would therefore damage the ex-
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ternal trade of developing countries not parties to the agreements. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the impact of 
the Association system on the trade of the associated countries and 
to assess the value of the argument that the trade of non-associates 
would consequently suffer. The discussion of EEC trade with associates 
will be conducted under three headings: comparison with non-associated 
African countries, comparison with developing countries in other 
parts of the world, and finally, EEC trade with associates as a per-
centage of world trade. 
Statistics were selected from two sources. Figures com-
paring EEC trade with associates and with other African countries 
were unfortunately only available up to 1969. The following section, 
how~ver, - and the most important one - comparing EEC trade with 
associates and with developing countries in other parts of the world 
go up to 1971. 
(1) See pp. 84 - 87 . 
103 
A. COMPARISON WITH SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 
Tables 2 to 5 show trade figures for the period 1958 to 
1969, except where otherwise indicated. Trade between the EEC and 
the AAMS is compared to the trade between the EEC and Commonwealth 
African countries of similar economic structure. For further 
interest, the trade of three developed countrie~ - Britain, the 
United States and Japan - with those same territories is also shown. 
In addition to the trade of the AAMS as a group, the figures for 
two members of this group have been added, namely Zaire (formerly 
Congo-Kinshasa) and Madagascar (the Malagasy Republic). 
Figures for EEC trade in 1970 are mentioned in the tables, 
but not used for comparison purposes, because no 1970 figures were 
available from the same source, for the other countries. The three 
East African territories are not considered as associates in these 
tables, since the Arusha Convention between the EEC and Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda Was not put into effect until 1971. 
Caution must be exercised when considering percentage 
increases and decreases, because in some cases the changes recorded 
do not always occur at a regular rate for the period under review. 
For instance, EEC imports from Mad'agascar dropped from about 70 
million dollars in 1958 to 48 miilion in 1967, then slowly recovered 
to approximately 64 million in 1970. However, if the years 1959 
and 1970 had been selected, they would have shown an increase (from 
56 to 64 million dollars) instead of a decrease of 24% as shown in 
table 2. To take another example, British exports to Ghana increased 
from 97 to 138 million dollars between 1958 and 1961, then dropped 
to 88 million in 1969. Thus a comparison between the years 1961 and 
1969 would have shown a much greater decrease than the 9,8% shown 
in table 5. In most other cases, however, the changes calculated 




EEC imports from associates and other African areas are 
shown in table 2. In the period ' 1958 - 1969, purchases rose by 
87,8% from the AAMS as a whole; they increased by 127,6% from Zaire 
but decreased by 24% from Madagascar. Figures for EEC imports from 
Commonwealth African countries show uneven results: an increase of 
170,6% from Nigeri a and very little change as far as Ghana and East 
African countries are concerned. 
Trade f i gures for the United Kingdom show that although -
in absolute terms - Britain imports more from East Africa than 
from the AAMS, the percentage increase was much greater for the 
AAMS than for Commonwealth African countries. The largest increase 
in imports by the United States was from Nigeria (217,3%) and 
Japan's imports increased by large amounts from all selected 
countries and especially from Ghana and Zaire. 
(2) Exports 
For the period 1958 - 1969, EEC exports to the AAMS 
increased by 56,9%, a smaller increase than in the case of EEC 
imports from those countries. (However, we shall see in tables 6 
and 7 that for the period 1958 - 1971, EEC exports to the AAMS have 
increased by a greater percentage than EEC imports from the AAMS). 
In absolute terms, EEC exports to associates were about 1 116 million 
dollars during 1969 whereas imports from the AAMS into the EEC 
totalled 1 717 million dollars during that year. 
EEC exports to non-associated African countries, East 
Africa and Nigeria~increased by 141,9% and 114,7% respectively, con-
siderably more than for either Zaire or Madagascar. 
TABLE 2 
Impor ts from associated countries 
A.A.M.S. Zaire 
Into EEC 
1958 914 397 279 217 
1969 1 717 639 635 413 
1970 1 862 335 710 186 
change () 
(1958-69) 1 
+ 803 242 + 356 196 
% + 87,8 + 127,6 
UK 
1958 24 500 9 500 
1969 130 779 54 801 
change + 106 279 + 45 301 
% + 433,8 + 476,9 
USA 
1958 152 400 95 500 
1969 173 113 34 900 
change + 20 713 60 600 
% + 13,6 63,5 
JAPAN 
1958 11 596 726 
1969 77 354 33 227 
change + 65 758 + 32 501 
% + 567,1 + 4476,7 

















+ 3 640 
+ 121,3 
(1) The 1970 figure is included for information. The % change, 
however, is calculated for the period 1958-69, because at 
the time of writing, no later figure was available for the 
other countries. Similarly for tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Source (tables 2 - 5): Informations statistiques sur l'evolution 
des eChanges commerciaux des E.A.M.A., des Etats asspcies de 
l'Afrique de l'est et des pays du Commonwealth de structure com-
parable. Commission des Communautes europeennes, Direction 
generale de l'aide au developpement. Bruxelles, Juin 1971. 




Imports from African Commonwealth countries (in $ 1 000) 
East Africa 
( 1 ) 
Ghana Nigeria 
Into EEC 
1958 79 252( 1961) 97 351 114 329 
1969 84 992 94 552 309 415 
1970 96 740 87 751 499 002 
change + 5 740 - 2 799 + 195 086 
(1958-69) 
% + 7,2 2,9 + 170,6 
UK 
1958 114 542(1963) 64 900 223 700 
1969 161 077 103 922 ' 250 760 
change + 46 535 + 39 022 + 27 060 
% + 40,6 + 60,1 + 12,1 
USA 
1958 84 754 (1964) 63 100 22 300 
1969 78 027 68 524 70 756 
change 6 727 + 5 424 + 48 456 
% 7,9 + 8,6 + 217,3 
JAPAN 
1958 13 482 ( 1962 ) 800 3 300 
1969 45 433 41 734 12 948 
change + 31 951 + 40 934 + 9 648 
% + 237,0 + 5116,'8 + 292,4 
(1) Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. 
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TABLE 4 
Exports to associated countries (in % 1 000) 
A.A.M.S. Zaire Madagascar 
From EEC 
1958 711 828 178 846 75 698 
1969 1 116 913 "214 618 105 602 
1970 1 264 933 263 370 117 137 
change + 405 085 + 35 772 + 29 904 
(1958-69) 
% + 56,9 + 20 + 39,5 
UK 
1958 46 900 24 100 2 100 
1969 74 074 26 943 2 266 
change + 27 174 + 2 843 + "" 166 
% + 57,9 + 11,8 + 7,9 
USA 
1958 68 600 39 200 2 800 
1969 123 781 42 817 11 915 
change + 55 181 + 3 617 + 9 115 
% + 80,4 + 9,2 + 325,5 
JAPAN 
1958 6 100 :3 100 2 200 
1969 77 934 38 394 6 194 
change + 71 834 + 35 294 + 3 994 
% + 1 177,6 + 1 138,5 + 181,5 
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TABLE 5 
Exports to African Commonwealth countries (in % 1 000) 
East Africa Ghana Nigeria 
From EEC 
1958 48 733 (1961) 38 700 72 275 
1969 117 869 65 176 155 174 
1970 148 173 80 975 224 895 
change + 69 136 + 26 476 + 82 899 
(1958-69) 
% + 141,9 + 68,4 + 114,7 
UK 
1958 126 289 (1963) 97 700 190 100 
1969 185 211 88 164 173 519 
change + 58 922 9 536 16 581 
% + 46,7 9,8 8,7 
USA 
1958 21 989 (1964) 10 500 23 200 
1969 32 539 62 068 72 118 
change + 10 550 + 51 568 + 48 918 
% + 48,0 + 491,1 + 210,9 
JAPAN 
1958 43 105 (1962) 16 900 48 800 
1969 57 254 22 734 28 620 
change + 14 149 + 5 834 - 20 180 
% + 32,8 + 34,5 41,4 
Considering the trade figures for the selected developed 
countries, Britain's exports to the AAMS increased by 57,9% and 
decreased by 9,8% and 8,7% for Ghana and Nigeria respectively, al-
though this may be a temporary setback as mentioned above. Japan's 
exports to AAMS increased considerably but exports to Nigeria 
decreased by 41,4%. 
It appears therefore, that the establishment of the 
Association system did not significantly alter patterns of trade 
in African countries in the first eleven years of the Association. 
B. COMPARISON WITH OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Tables 6 and 7 show figures of EEC trade with the AAMS 
compared with EEC trade with other developing countries, ' not only 
in Africa but also in other parts of the world. The period under 
review is 1958 - 1971. 
(1) Imports 
Figures i n table 6 show that between 1958 and 1971, EEC 
imports from the AAMS d: d not keep pace with imports from develop-
ing areas as a whole (79,2% compared with 158,9%).(1) This is 
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also less than the increase in total imports for that period (328,2%). 
It is of interest to note that the largest increase in 
imports from deve l oping areas originate from 'other African countries'. 
The cause of this is that EEC imports of oil from Libya increased 
the total EEC imports from that group, from 8 to 1 784 million 
dollars between 1958 and 1971. In 1971, Libyan exports accounted 
for more than hal f of the total of 'other Africa~ countries'. 
(1 ) See also Fig .13 , ~. 1 11. 
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TABLE 6 
















































+ 3 071 
+ 1 823 
+ 3 827 
+ 1 012 
+ 10 844 
+ 32 974 
+ 42 327 












(1) Since the 1972 values are expressed in a different unit of 
account (fine gold) which alters the conversion rate for 
different countries, and the composition of the groups of 
countries has also been altered, the . 1971 values are the 
latest suitable figures for comparison purposes. 
(2) Overseas dependencies and associates of the EEC (under 
Part IV of the Rome Treaty); including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles since 1.1.63; excluding Western New Guinea 
since 1.1.63. 
(3) Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. 
Source: Foreign Trade; monthly statistics, Office Statistique 
des Communautes Europeennes, Centre Louvigny, Luxembourg. 





























F o 13 EEC imports from developing countries 19. ~: 
other than AAMS and overseas terri t ories 
(xl0 8 $) 
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7.5~~----~--~----~--~----~----~--~ 68 70 1972 1958 60 62 64 66 
Fig.13a: EEC imports from AAMS 
Source: (For Figs. 13a & 13b). Foreign Trade, monthly statistics, 
•••••• , 1972, no.2, p.12. 
(2) Exports 
Table 7 shows that between 1958 - 1971, EEC exports to 
the AAMS almost doubled, but increased by 251% to other African 
countries and by 110,5% to developing areas generally. This is 
less than the total increase in exports (338,5%), and also less 
than for the small group of 'Overseas territories' (342,3%). 
The only decrease is for EEC exports to North African 
countries. This is due to a sharp drop in exports to Algeria -
from 1 130 to 585 million dollars between 1960 and 1963, recover-
ing to 788 by 1971 - following the emigration of large numbers 
of Europeans from Algeria in 1962-3. 
It is of interest to calculate the AAMS trade as a 
percentage of trade with developing countries generally, on the 
basis of figures in tables 6 and 7. In 1958, EEC imports from 
the AAMS were 13,4% of the total imports from devoloping areas, 
and by 1971, they had dropped to 9,3% of the total. The 
decrease is smaller for exports to the AAMS: in 1958, EEC ex-
ports to AAMS were 11,6% of all exports to developing areas, 
and in 1971, 10,9%. 
Moreover, it has been calculated that for the period 
1958 - 1971, EEC imports from the AAMS have grown at a rate of 
6,2% a year, which is lower than the EEC imports from all develop-
ing countries (7,7%) during the same period; but if oil is ex-
cluded, the average annual rate of expansion of EEC imports 
from the AAMS (6,2%) is slightly higher than that of EEC imports 
from all developing countries (5,5%).(1) 
(1) Memorandum of the Commission to the Council on the future 
relations between the Community, the present AASM states and 
the countries in Africa ••• Luxembourg, 4th April 1973. 
Commission of the European Communities. COM(73) 500/fin. 

















































+ 1 403 
+ 1 689 
+ 1 474 
+ 1 093 
+ 6 769 
+ 34 732 












Foreign Trade, Monthly Statistics, ibid., p.14. 
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TABLE 8 













































(1) Total intra-EEC and extra-EEC 
Source: As for ,tables 2 - 5. 

































C. COMPARISON WITH WORLD TRADE 
Table 8 shows EEC trade with the associated African 
and Malagasy states as a percentage of world trade, compared to 
trade figures for other developed countries. The latest figures 
available are for 1969. 
(1) Imports 
The results are disappointing for the AAMS: as a per-
centage of world trade, purchases from the AAMS have decreased 
for the EEC and the United States. They have increased minimally 
for Britain and Japan. 
(2) Exports 
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Although sales to the AAMS have increased in absolute 
terms, as a percentage of world trade they have decreased for three 
of the selected areas. This shows that the purchasing power of 
the AAMS has not kept pace with the purchasing power of the reS L 
of the world. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This review of EEC trade with developing countries 
indicates that in the first eleven years of the Association system 
there has been no significant trade-diversion from non-associates 
to associates. The fear of trade loss by non-associates is there-
fore unfounded for the period under review. On the other hand, 
it is understandable that the associates are disappointed by the 
results of the trade arrangements of the system. 
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At first sight, it would appear that this proves the 
\ 
validity of customs union theory which lays down that the benefits 
of economic integration are likely to be greater (i) if the 
economies of the partner countries are actually very competitive 
but potentially very complementary, and (ii) if the amount of 
trade between them represents a large proportion of their total 
( 1 ) 
external trade. 
Neither of these propositions hold in the case of the 
Association system. The products of the EEC and of the associates 
are complementary, not competitive, except in a few cases such as 
fruit, which is excluded from the preferential arrangements. Hence, 
the elimination of tariffs is unlikely to create new areas of 
specialisation. The proportion of trade between the two groups 
compared to their total world trade differs; in other words, 
the bulk of the associates' trade is with the EEC but the share of 
the EEC trade with associates is small compared with the total 
external trade of the Common Market. 
It would seem therefore, that according to theory, the 
actual conditions of the Association system are unlikely to lead 
to benefits for the countries involved. It would be unwise how-
ever, to draw such a conclusion, for the following reasons:-
1) Before the establishment of the Association, the assoc-
iates were already in a preferential arrangement with their Metro-
politan countries, and in fact, the preferences they received were 
greater than those given subsequently by the Common Market. For 
example, in the case of France and her overseas areas, who form 
(1) See Page 39. 
the main group of associates, the French customs tariff was higher 
than the common external tariff applied by the EEC after inte-
gration.(1) The associates did not move from a position of free 
trade to a regional arrangement with th~ EEC but from . one prefer-
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ential agreement to another. The difference was that the associates 
exchanged a higher degree of preference in the French market for a 
lower degree of preference in the wider EEC market. 
2) To suggest that if the conditions mentioned above, (i) 
and (ii), are not present, the countries concerned should not 
integrate, is tantamount to suggesting that the EEC and the ex-
colonies of some of the members would benefit by applying to each 
other the same tariffs as they apply to others. This would be 
difficult to accept, when developing countries allover the world 
are asking developed countries to grant them tariff concessions. 
Where associates need to impose customs duties in special circum-
stances, for rev enue or protection purposes, the agreements allow 
them to do so. 
The theory of customs unions, as the name implies, con-
centrates on effects of customs unions, where a common external 
tariff is applied, and only marginally on the effects of free trade 
areas, where the members are free to impose whatever tariffs they 
wish on imports from third countries. Most a9sociation and trade 
(1) Weighted averages: all items: French tariff (1957): 8,1. 
EEC tariff (1960): 4,8. 
Weighted averages: preference items: French tariff (1957r. 8,7. 
EEC tariff (1960): 5,1. 
P. Robson (ed.) International Economic Integration, CR. Lawrence, 
Primary products, preferences and economic welfare: the EEC and 
Africa), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, p. 366, Table 1. 
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agreements establish free trade areas and not customs unions. 
4) Contributions to the extension of customs union theory 
to developing countries do not really apply to the Association 
system since they usually investigate integration amongst develop-
ing countries and not between developed and developing areas. 
Some of the associates have integrated among themselves (the East 
African associates, the UDEAC countries), but these arrangements 
do not form part of the Association and are, therefore, outside 
the scope of this study. 
It follows that the customs union theory does not explain 
the lack of change in the trade patterns of associates,and the 
question does arise as to what is the cause of this situation. 
Four factors contributing to this situation are: 
The Association is fairly recent and trade liberalisation 
between the European Community and associates was only completed in 
1968. Thus it may still be too early to notice any significant 
effect. 
2) Only one-third of the exports of associates are eligible 
for preferential treatment in the EEC, since the following products 
enter the Common Market free of tariff, whatever their country of 
origin: calcium phosphate, gum arabic, ores, crude oil, rubber, 
raw hides and skins, wood, cotton, sisal, copper, tin, cobalt, tea, 
d d 1 · f't (1) see s an 0 eag1nous rU1 s. 
(1) Commission of the European Communities, COM(73) 500/fin. Luxem-
burg, 4th April 1973. Memorandum ••• on the future relations 
, between the Community, the present AASM states and the countries 
in Africa .:. p. 10. 
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The margin of preference given to products from 
associates has been gradually reduced by world-wide lowering of 
tariffs in conferences of the GATT. 
4 ) Tariff preferences amount to a price advantage, and are 
not sufficient for an improvement in trade unless they are com-
bined with an increase in production of suitable goods. Unfortun~ 
ately, the AAMS - and many other developing countries - still ex-
port mainly primary products of low price-elasticity of demand • . 
In an analysis of EEC trade with associates(1), 
R. Lawrence concludes that the association arrangements have not 
had a significant effect on world trade patterns, and he point s 
out that two aspects of the EEC's policies have contributed to 
this outcome: the reduced preference for some important associate 
exports (compared to before 1963) and the substitution of capital 
flows for price-support schemes. 
It is also worth mentioning that, although Lawrence 
refers to the fact that the associates exchanged a higher degree 
of preference with their ex-Metropolis for a lower preference in 
the larger EEC, he does not explain that the choice facing the 
associates was not the old arrangement or the new one, but rather 
Association or isolation. The Treaty of Rome did not permit the 
continuation of preferential arrangements with individual members 
of the Common Market. 
One must agree with Lawrence that the trade of the 
associates has not greatly improved, and has likewise not caused 
(1) R. Lawrpnce: 'Primary products, preference and economic welfare: 
The EEC and Africa,' from P. Kenen and R. Lawrence (eds.), The 
Open Economy, Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 240-260.---
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damage to the EEC trade with non-associates. Nevertheless, the 
Association has led to two important changes:-
The trade of associates with the EEC as a whole has not 
altered, but the trade with individual members of the Community 
has changed. Members of the EEC who in the past had no special 
relations with associates have increased their imports from them 
at a higher rate than the other members, and similarly, members 
without special relations with associates increased their exports 
to them at a higher annual rate. This is indicated in Table 9. 
f 
TABLE 9 
Annual growth rate of trade between 
EEC countries and associates (1958-1971) (1) 
Imports from associates Exports to associates 
Netherlands 10,7% 11,2% 
Germany 11,2% 11,9% 
Italy 12,6% 14,7% 
France 3,1% 5,1% 
Belgium-Luxemburg 6,8% 4,6% 
This shows that the Association, by enlarging the 
preferential area linked with the associates, has caused an import-
ant geographical diversification of both imports and exports of 
(1~ EEC. Commission of the European Communities, COM(73) 500/fin. 
Luxemburg, 4th April 1973. Memorandum ••• on the future 
relations ••• p. 11. 
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associated countries, which in itself must be considered as a 
benefit to those countries. Thus, the only noticeable trade-
diversion - though not strictly in the Vinerian sense of the term -
has been from ex-Metropolitan countries to other EEC members, and 
not from non-associates to associates. 
2) The other change brought about by the Association system 
has been the reaction of other countries to this development, 
which has expressed itself in changes in trade policies, involving 
a search for similar arrangements with other developed areas, a 
demand for Generalized Preferences and a rejection of the non-
discrimination rule of the GATT. These aspects will be . discussed 
in later chapters of this thesis. 
It is sometimes alleged that the Association was formed 
for the benefit of the EEC. However, there is no evidence that 
the Common Market has greatly benefitted from the system by ex-
panding exports to the AAMS. The increase in exports to the 
associates (96,8%) has been less than the increase in exports to 
developing countries as a whole (110,5%). It is true, however, 
that the increase in EEC exports to associates is higher than the 
increase of EEC i mports from AAMS for the same period (~9,2%), but 
this may be due to a higher growth rate in the EEC compared to the 
AAMS (see Tables 6 and 7). 
In a recent article studying the effects of the Assoc-
iation on EEC trade, it is concluded that 
'The association arrangement seems to have resulted 
in trade-diversion, particularly against non-associated 
less-developed countries whose export products are 
competitive with those of the Associated African 
. , ( 1 ) 
countr~es. 
and not 
However, this conclusion is based on trade percentages 
on absolute figures, (2) and therefore, only shows that in 
some cases, the share of non-associates' exports to the EEC has 
declined compared to the share of associates' exports to the EEC. 
This is not trade-diversion in the Vinerian sense. To illustrate 
this point, suppose countries A and B each export 100 units of 
goods to X. Thus, their share of X's total imports is 50% each. 
Now suppose that in the following ten-year period, A's exports 
increase to 200 units, whilst B's exports remain at 100 units. 
B's share is now 1/3, whilst A's share has risen to 2/3 of the 
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total. However, none of B's trade has been diverted, since X still 
imports 100 units from B. The only change has been an increase in 
A's exports to X, and consequently one cannot conclude that this 
has been trade-diversion from B to A. 
Finally, it should be remembered that among writings ex-
tending the field of customs union theory to factors other than 
production and consumption effects, there is a gradual acceptance 
that customs unions and similar arrangements are entered into, not 
only for economic reasons but also for non-economic reasons. This 
is the background of the Association system which attempts to main-
tain existing links between ex-dolonies and European countries. 
(1) Alassane D. Ouattara, Trade effects of the Association of African 
countries wi t h the European Economic Community, International 
- Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, vol. XX, July 1973, No.2, pp.499-
543. (This article contains valuable statistical data, but un-
fortunately only up to 1968). 
(2) Alassane D. Ouattara, Trade effects ••••• p. 512, Table 5. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPACT OF THE ASSOCIATION SYSTEM ON SOUTH AFRICA 
Changes in South Africa's pattern of trade - , effects 
of British entry into the EEC - on Common Market countries -
on the Commonwealth - on the Republic of South Africa -
prospect of an agreement between South Africa and the EEC -
the South African Customs Union. 
In Chapters III and IV, it was shown that the Association 
system of the European Economic Community has had an important im-
pact on African trade policies. All francophone countries (except 
Guinea) are associates of the Common Market, several anglophone 
nations have become partial associates and the remaining Common-
wealth African ~ountries are negotiating towards some form of 
relationship with the Community, following the entry of Britain 
into the EEC. 
To complete this survey of the effect of the Association 
system on Africa, it is important to consider the most developed 
area of this continent, the Republic of South Africa. The 
Association affects the commercial policies of South Africa in two 
ways: first, it offers the possibility 9f an agreement between the 
Republic and the enlarged Community, which would mitigate the 
detrimental effects of the loss of tariff preferences due to 
Britain's entry into the Common Market, and second, it acts upon 
the South African Customs Union which includes three 'associable' 
C lth t · (1) ommonwea coun rles. 
(1) Countries which have been offered association with the 
enlarged Community. 
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These aspects will be considered in the context of South 
Africa's trade with Britain and the EEC. This chapter will be 
divided into four parts: an examination of changes in the pattern 
of South Africa's external trade with Britain and the Community, 
the effects of Britain's entry into the Common Market, prospect 
of an agreement between South Africa and the EEC and finally, the 
impact of the Association on the South African Customs Union. 
A. CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA'S PATTERN OF TRADE 
Table 10 shows South Africa's trade with the EEC, United 
Kingdom, United States and Japan, as percentages of the Republic's 
total trade. The years 1958 and 1969 represent trade before and 
after the establishment of the Common Market since the Six took ten 
and a half years to abolish tariffs between themselves. 
TABLE 10 

































































































Source: Department of Statistics, Republic of South Africa, 
South African Statistics, Pretoria. 
(1) 'South Africa' includes South-West Africa, Botswana, Swaziland 
and Lesotho. 
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A comparison between the respective percentages of the 
EEC and Britain between 1958 and 1972 shows the following changes. 
For both imports anQ exports, the share of the EEC has increased 
and that of Britain, which has always been South Africa's main 
trading partner, has dropped. Furthermore, a different picture 
emerges from imports compared with exports. There has been a 
greater change for imports: South Africa's imports from the EEC 
increased by 6,7% and imports from Britain decreased by 12,8%. , 
Changes in exports are much less significant (except for Japan): 
South Africa's exports to the EEC increased by 2,5% during the 
period under review, while South Africa's exports to Britain de-
creased by 3,8%. Thus, although in 1972, South Africa still ex-
ported more to Britain than to the Six, she imported more from the 
EEC than from Britain. 
Considering the figures for Japan and the United States, 
it is interesting to note that South Africa's trade (both imports 
and exports) increased proportionately far more with Japan than 
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with the other areas, while the share of the United States remained 
substantially the same. 
Although table 10 shows trade percentage with the EEC as 
a whole, Germany is the main trading partner of South Africa, 
among the Six. In 1971, Germany absorbed almost half of South 
Africa's exports to the Common Market (265 out of a total of 549 
million dollars) and more than half of South Africa's imports from 
the EEC come from Western Germany (574 out of a total of 1044 
million dollars).(1) 
Regarding the establishment of the Common Market 011 South 
Africa's trade, her exports to the EEC shows a slight increase which 
may expand in time. The enlargement of the Community, however, will 
(1) European Economic Community, European Statistical office 
Foreign Trade Statistics, Brussels, 1972, no.2, pp. 34 a~d 36. 
have a dual effect on the trade of the Republic, and the net result 
will depend on the strength of these divergent trends. South 
Africa's exports to the Common Market may increase further, if the 
economy of the Community continues to expand. The enlargement of 
the group has turned it into the most populated trading group in 
the world. In 1970, the population of the Nine members totalled 
253 millions, compared to the USSR (243 millions) and the United 
States (205 millions).(1) On the other hand, British membership 
of the EEC may lead to a reduction in South Africa's exports to 
Britain, because South Africa will lose the tariff preferences 
from which her exports have benefitted in the past. This aspect 
will nov be considered in detail. 
B. EFFECTS OF BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE EEC 
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On 1st January, 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark became 
members of the European Community. As part of the process of 
economic integration, the EEC and these countries will abolish all 
tariffs between them and the new members will apply the common 
external tariff (CET) of the EEC on imports from outside the 
Community. 
Britain's entry will affect all her trading partners. 
It will abolish British tariffs on goods from EEC members, reduce 
them in so~e cases on goods from non-EEC countries (where the 
British most-favoured-nation rate is higher than the CET) but 
it will increase tariffs on imports from the Commonwealth, since 
Britain is moving out of the Commonwealth preferential system. 
These aspects will now be considered in some detail. 
The transitional phase is planned to last from 1973 to 
1977, during which tariffs will be adjusted between Britain and 
Extracted from Basic Statistics of the Community, Luxembourg, 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1971. 
other countries as follows:-
1) EEC countries 
Tariffs will be abolished between Britain and the EEC 
according to the following time-table: 
1.4.73 cut of 20% total adjustment: 20% 
1.1.74 cut of 20% total adjustment: 40% 
1.1.75 cut of 20% total adjustment: 60% 
1.1.76 cut of 20% total adjustment: 80% 
1.7.77 cut of 20% total adjustment: 100% 
2) Non-EEC countries 
Britain will adjust her tariffs to the level of the EEC 
common external tariff towards all third countries. With a few 
exceptions, this will be done according to the following time-
table: 
1.1.74 adjustment of 40% total adjustment: 40% 
1.1.75 adjustment of 20% total adjustment: 60% 
1.1.76 adjustment of 20% total adjustment: 80% 
1.7.77 adjustment of 20% total adjustment: 100% 
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The direction of these adjustments will differ according 
to the level of the British tariff towards each third country prior 
to enlargement. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between 
Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, and between EFTA and 
non-EFTA countries. The South African situation will be examined 
separately. 
(a) , Commonwealth countries: 
In most cases, these countries have benefitted from 
preferential treatment for their exports since the Ottawa con-
ference of 1932. By entering the Common Market, Britain has ex-
chartged Commonwealth preference for Community preference and several 
tariffs will have to be increased from the preferential level to the 
external tariff. 
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The problem of Commonwealth preferences was among the 
more serious difficulties which had to be solved at the time of 
the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC. Special 
arrangements were made in the case of New Zealand butter and 
Caribbean sugar. Developing Commonwealth nations with an economy 
similar to those of the EEC associates have been offered association 
or trade agreements, and negotiations are currently taking place 
between the EEC and the so-called 'associables,.(1) Trading 
arrangements are to be made with India and Pakistan and special 
treatment will be given to products of importance to Ceylon and 
Hong Kong. (e.g. a nil duty on tea imports).(2) Australia and 
Canada will have to adjust t heir trade to the new situation, as they 
were not developing countries in need of special arrangements. 
It is probable that better terms would have been given 
to Commonwealth countries if Britain had joined the EEC in 1957. 
The association system began as a means to accommodate the special 
relationship between France and its dependencies, and similar steps 
could have dealt with the Commonwealth problem. It is not the 
first time, however, that Commonwealth countries have been at a 
disadvantage due to changes in the external commercial policies of 
Britain. The establishment of the European Free Trade Association 
in 1960 resulted in some cases in the Commonwealth product remain-
ing subject to an import duty - even at a preferential rate -
whereas the EFTA product could enter free.(3) 
(b) Non-Commonwealth countries: 
Among these, EFTA countries were likely to lose their 
duty-free entry into Britain unless some arrangements could be made. 
(1) See p.101. 
(2) Dennis SWann, The economics of the Common Market, second edition, 
London, Penguin Modern Economics Texts, 1972, p.184. 
(3) Commonwealth preference R.5155/69, London, British Information 
Service, 1969, p.14. 
Bilateral agreements between the EEC and those EFTA countries not 
entering the Common Market have resulted in a 16-nation free trade 
( 1 ) 
zone. 
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Non-Commonwealth countries which are not EFTA members will 
benefit from British entry whenever the rate of the common external 
tariff of the EEC is lower than the British most-favoured-nation 
rate, and will face increased tariffs when the opposite is the case. 
(c) South Africa: 
Although a non-Commonwealth country, the Republic is in 
a similar position to that of Australia and Canada. The bilateral 
agreement between Britain and South Africa, signed at Ottawa in 
1932, was not conditional on membership of the Commonwealth and 
therefore was not affected by South Africa leaving the Common-
wealth in 1961. Thus the Republic continued to benefit from British 
preferential tari f fs and reciprocally, to grant .British goods re-
duction from the most-favoured-nation rate. Britain's entry into 
the EEC led to the abrogation of the 1932 agreement earlier this 
year, and South Af rica's exports to Britain will gradually face the 
higher CET. The f irst rise in tariffs will take place on 1st 
January 1974 and by 1st July 1977, the full CET will have to be met. 
Misgivings have been expressed about the possible effects 
of British entry into the Common Market on the South African export 
sector. It is not the purpose of this work to examine this problem 
in detail or to suggest means of marketing and export promotion 
which should be undertaken to minimize the disadvantages of the new 
. t t' (2) H Sl . ua lon. owever, the Sollowing points must be made. 
(1) , European Community, September 1972, p.11. See also p.186-8 of 
this thesis. 
(2) See inter alia, J.J. Williams, The com etitive situation for 
South Africa . South.African Forein Trade Organisation SAFTO) , 
1971, and C.J.A. Wrlght, The probable effects of Britain's 
entry into the EEC on the economy of South Africa, The South 
African Banker, vol. 70, no.2, May 1973, pp. 123-130. 
1)0 
Together with other countries - Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Japan and New Zealand - South Africa is at present negotiating under 
Article XXIV (section 6) of the GATT, for compensation for trade 
losses resulting from the enlargement of the EEC. This rule pro-
vides for compensation for third countries which have lost trading 
advantages due to the creation or enlargement of customs unions 
and other forms of economic integration, which is allowed under 
Article XXIV of t he GATT. These compensations usually take the 
form of tariff concessions, but not necessarily in the same product 
as those affected by the change. At the time of writing, no 
details are yet available on the progress of South Africa's request. 
Any evaluation of the effects of British entry on South 
African exports must differentiate between industrial and agri-
cultural exports. Industrial tariffs of the EEC are generally 
lower than those of most other developed areas. A compari~on of 
industrial tariffs after the Kennedy Round of the GATT (1964-1967) 












Thus, although South African industrial exports will face 
higher ta~iffs than previously, these are still relatively low. 
The prospect is different with regard to South Africa's 
agricultural exports to Britain. Agriculture in the Common Market 
is protected by the common agricultural policy (CAP) which results 
in the application of levies on imports, in order to bring the prices 
(1) H.G. Johnson (ed.), New trade strategy for ·the world economy, 
London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1969, p.206. These are 'nominal' 
rates. It has been shown that 'effective' rates of protection 
are often hi gher than the 'nominal' rate. See John Pincus, 
TradeS aid and development, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967, 
pp. 1 9-190 . 
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of imports to the level of domestic imports. In some cases, agri-
cultural imports have to pay the common external tariff as well. 
The CAP supports high food prices within the Community, to enable 
persons engaged in the agricultural sector to earn incomes com-
parable to those in other sectors of the economy. 
The South African industries most likely to suffer a set-
back when Britain increases tariffs to the CET level, are fruit, 
vegetables and wine. Next to diamonds, this group is the main e.xport 
to the United Kingdom. Various steps can be taken to minimize the 
drawbacks, apart from requests for compensation through the GATT, 
mentioned above. Regarding the wine industry, South Afri6an products 
can avoid paying the full amount of the CET by conforming to the 
EEC rules of origin ('appellation originee,).(1) Fresh fruit and 
vegetables may be able to benefit from seasonal advantages and it 
must be remembered that the Republic has an established market for 
oranges in the Community. Greater efficiency in local industries 
and improved marketing and advertising may help these industries 
to retain their present place in the British market. 
South Africa may benefit in the long-run from the probable 
improvement in the British economy due to its membership of the EEC. 
It is hoped that demand will increase and that British importers 
will not alter their trade pattern for some time. By then, the 
Republic may also have expanded its markets in other areas. 
The abrogation of the bilateral agreement between South 
Africa and Britain also affects South African tariffs. The Republic 
is now free to apply most-favoured-nation rates to imports from the 
Uni~ed Kingdom, unless these are 'bound' under the GATT rules. It 
is not clear, as yet, which goods will be subjected to these increased 
(1) 'This requires specific reference to quality a.nd -guaranteed 
~enuineness of product ~n respect of area, vintage, etc. 
rates. South Africa may use this possibility of tariff adjustment 
as a bargaining tool in future negotiations; for instance, she may 
offer to maintain a tariff at its present level, if, in exchange, 
the EEC offers a comparable tariff concession. 
Finally, the adverse effects of Britain's entry into the 
EEC on South African trade must not be exaggerated. The Reynders 
Commission reported that it was of the opinion that 
'South African producers should ••• generally have no 
insurmountab l e difficulty in competing effectively with 
other countri es in the enlarged EEC provided optimum 
attention is given to such aspects as research, manage-
, (1) 
ment, processing and infrastructural facilities 
As ment i oned earlier the Association affects the Republic 
in two ways: the prospect of an agreement between South Africa 
and the EEC, and t he effect on the South African Customs Union. 
These aspects will be considered in turn. 
C. PROSPECT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EEC.(2) 
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Since South Africa will lose her preferences in the British 
market when Britain applies the common external tariff of the EEC, 
it is of interest to investigate the possibility of an association,! 
or trade agreement between South Africa and the EEC.(3) 
South Africa is neither a developing country nor a 
Commonwealth member. Therefore, she has not been offered special 
arrangements such as was the case for Commonwealth African countries. 
(1) Republic of South Africa, Re ort of the Commission of In uir 
into the export trade of the Republic of South Africa, RP 
Government Printer, Pretoria, 1972, p.89. " 
(2) See J. Matthews, Prospect of an association agreement between 
~outh Africa and the European Economic Community, South African 
Journal of Economics, vol. 38, no.2, Jun~ 1970, pp. 152-162. 
(3) As far as the writer is aware, no information is available on 
the progress of South Africa's negotiations at the Brussels 
headquarters of the EEC. 
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The Yaounde Association is opened to countries 'which 
have an economic structure and production comparable to those of 
the Associated States' (Article 58). Obviously, the Republic's 
industrial development places her in a different category and sqe 
does not qualify for full association. 
Special association such as offered by Article 238 of 
the Rome Treaty offers more scope, since it does not limit the 
possibility of such an arrangement to developing countries, although 
so far, most partial associates are developing countries. It was 
shown, in Chapter II that the Association system of the EEC has 
grown far beyond the original institution which was established 
primarily to deal with problems of the depend~n~ies of EEC members. 
It now extends to countries with no historical ties with members of 
the Community, and includes a variety of special association agree-
ments as well as trade agreements. In addition, the enlargement 
of the EEC has led to arrangements with countries of the Common-
wealth not eligible for association (see p.128) whilst agreements 
with Israel, Argentina and current negotiations with other nations 
such as India show that the road is open for arrangements with 
semi-developed areas or to use a term of the Reynders Commission, 
'middle-zone' countries.(1) 
Although the possibility of an association agreement 
between South Africa and the EEC cannot be excluded, the real 
problem lies in the political sphere. Most countries are prepared 
to trade with South Africa, but they are reluctant to enter into a 
closer relationship, because of the Republic's policy of apart-
(1) -'South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand claim them-
selves to be 'middle-zone' countries, i.e. neither fully 
industrialised nor developing countries, on the grounds that 
they are still heavily dependent on exports of primary products 
while importing manufactures for purposes of industrialisation.' 
(Re ort of the Commission of In uir into the ex ort trade of 
the Republic of South Africa, ••••••• p. 0 
heid. African associates, in particular, object strongly to any 
suggestions that an arrangement could be worked out with South 
Africa. In this respect, the case of Spain and Portugal is of 
special interest. For many years, an agreement with those countries / 
seemed impossible due to their undemocratic political systems. Yet, 
in 1970, a trade agreement was signed with Spain, establishing a 
customs union with the EEC, and as Portugal is a member of EFTA, 
she qualified for those trade arrangements which the EEC made with 
EFTA members following the enlargement of the Community. Thus it 
must be pointed out that political opinions change and that the 
possibility of an association agreement must not be rejected out 
of hand. 
Nevertheless, a trade agreement between South Africa and 
the EEC appears to be the most feasible solution. The Republic may 
prefer this arrangement to a closer relationship such as an 
association agreement. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
under the rules of the GATT, any tariff concession must be extended 
to all members of the GATT on a most-favoured-nation basis. The 
Republic could ask for better terms for exports of fruit, vegetables 
and wine, and offer in exchange tariff concessions on imports of 
industrial goods from the EEC. South Africa could make use of the 
bargaining tool mentioned above (see p.~~ and offer to maintain 
the preferential tariffs applied to British goods and extend these, 
or some of them, to similar products from the whole Community, since 
the abrogatio~ of the bilateral agreement with Britain leaves South 
Africa free to adjust those tariffs to the most-favoured-nation 
rat~. Presumably, this move would obtain British support within 
the EEC, as British exporters would not wish to lose those favour-
able terms in the South African market. 
D. THE SOUTH AFRI CAN CUSTOMS UNION 
Since 1910, a customs union has existed between South 
Africa and the three neighbouring territories, now the independent 
states of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho (BSL). The customs 
revenue is divided according to a specific formula, providing a 
substantial source of revenue to the smaller territories. It is 
also a monetary union, since BSL use South African currency. 
As members of the Commonwealth and developing countries, 
BSL are offered a full association with the enlarged Community, a 
partial form of association or a trade agreement (see p.1~1). Any 
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of these arrangements would affect the South African Customs Union. 
The establishment of a free trade area with the EEC, or a trade 
agreement would have to be done with South African approval, since 
it would mean changes in the common external tariff of the customs 
union. Rules of origin would have to be laid down to avoid the 
import of EEC goods into South Africa through the other members of 
the customs union and decisions would have to be taken to deal with 
the problem of re-export by BSL. This is unlikely to be a serious 
problem however, as Lesotho and Botswana are land-locked countries; 
only Swaziland offers that possibility, through the port of Lourenlo 
Marques. 
South African co-operation in this respect might earn 
goodwill in trade negotiations with the EEC. It is also possible 
that BSL might be the 'Trojan horse' and lead the whole Customs 
Union into the Association system of the EEC, in the same way as 
EFTA paved the way for Portugal. 
Conclusions. 
South Africa's pattern of trade is changing. Although 
Britain remains the main buyer of South African goods, South Africa's 
trade is increasing with the EEC and decreasing with Britain, and 
therefore the Republic might have sought a trade agreement with 
the Community even if Britain had not entered the EEC. The 
inclusion of Britain into the Common Market has increased South 
Africa's chances of concluding an arrangement. At the same time, 
the loss of preferences in the British market might cause some 
damage to exports from the Republic but these fears have been 
overemphasized and 'the Community does not preclude individual 
negotiations with aggrieved parties who can show that enlargement 
harms their trade,.(1) A trade agreement between South Africa 
and the enlarged EEC would bring her into the Association system. 
The South African Customs Union will be directly affected 
by the Association system if the three Commonwealth countries which 
are also members of the customs union enter into an association or 
trade agreement wi th the European Economic Community. 
The impact of the Association system of the EEC on inter-
national trade pol icies in Africa is therefore likely to increase 
in the future, no t only for developing Commonwealth countries but 
also for the Republic of South Africa. 
(1) European Community, February 1973, p.12. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 
AND PREFERENCES 
Early views of the GATT on preferences - the principle 
of non-discrimination - the principle of reciprocity -
preferential agreements since 1947 - EEC association and 
trade agreements - reverse preferences - theoretical aspects _ 
recent evolution of the GATT's views on preferences. 
The first part of this thesis examined the Association 
system of the EEC and the impact of this development on Africa. We 
shall now consider the influence of the Association system on more 
general aspects of international economic relations. 
This chapter will discuss . the position of the GATT to-
wards tariff preferences and more specifically, towards the 
preference embodied in the EEC association and trade agreements, 
which have caused, and are still causing, considerable controversy. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 
1947 by 23 countries, was meant to be an interim measure in the 
formation of a more ambitious plan, the International Trade 
Organisation. However, the Unites States failed to ratify the 
Havana Oha~ter of the ITO and the scheme was abandoned, leaving 
the GATT as the only viable undertaking. 
The main purpose of the General Agreement, which con-
sists of a set of rules for international trade, is to liberalise 
trade by a progressive reduction of tariffs. The GATT acts by 
pressure and persuasion since it has no power of coercion on its 
members. In the last twenty-five years, sixty countries have 
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joined the GATT, bringing the total number of Contracting Parties 
to eighty-three, whilst a few others have acceded provisionally. 
The GATT headquarters and general secretariat are situated in 
Geneva, Switzerland, where most of the 'rounds' of negotiations 
take place, the latest being the Kennedy round. 
Article I of the GATT explicitly rejects preferences 
by declaring that 'trade shall be conducted in a non-discrimina-
tory manner, on the general basis of equality of treatment for 
all Contracting Parties,.(1) Although exceptions have been allowed, 
the GATT has on many occasions reaffirmed its belief in its un-
conditional most-favoured-nation clause, but has been unable to 
prevent an increase of preferential arrangements. 
The GATT considers two types of preferences in tariff 
matters. One is unilateral, and when tariff concessions are made, 
the rule is that the preference should be extended to all Con-
tracting Parties. Mutual preferences, on the other hand, are 
those inherent in the formation of free trade areas or customs 
unions and are only allowed by the GATT according to the conditions 
laid down in Article XXIV. One of the conditions is that the reci-
pro cal elimination of tariffs will involve 'substantially all the 
t d ' b t b f th f t d t· ( 2 ) ra e e ween mem ers 0 e ree ra e area or cus oms un~on. 
A consideration of the benefits which tariff preferences 
may have on the economies of developing countries and on world 
welfare a'S a whole, is beyond the scope of this chapter.(3) We 
are only concerned here with the conflict between the Association 
system and the principles of the GATT, and with the impact of this 
con~lict on the rules of the GATT. 
(1) and (2) See Annex D for relevant Articles of the GATT. 
(3) The advantages and disadvantages of Generalized Preferences 
(given by developed countries to manufactured exports from 
developing countries) will be examined in Chapter VIII. 
This chapter will therefore outline the views of the 
GATT at the signing of the General Agreement in 1947, preferential 
agreements which have taken place since then, the specific problem 
of preferences contained in EEC association and trade agreements 
and finally, some comments on possible changes in the GATT rules 
on this matter. 
A. EARLY VIEWS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
During the discussions leading to the establishment of 
the GATT, two conflicting attitudes towards preferences became 
evident, as shown in the viewpoints of the United States and 
Britain. This duality still exists today among the international 
commercial policies of the GATT members. 
The viewpoint of the United States, which was the prime 
mover of the GATT, was that preferences should be discarded and 
that trade should be conducted in a · non-discriminatory manner. 
'The United States had made elimination · of all preferences a major 
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principle of its policy for the post-war organisation of world trade. 
The chief goal of the U.S. policy was elimination of the Imperial 
preference system established at the Ottawa Conference of 1932.,(1) 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had no wish to 
dismantle the system of Commonwealth preferences, which had formed 
part of the British commercial policy for many years. Most countries 
appeared to align themselves with one or the other viewpoint, not 
on theoretical grounds, but according to whether they were part of 
a regional arrangement or not. The Scandinavian countries, which 
at that time did not belong to any economic regional group, sided 
with the U.S. point of view, whereas France, as part of the Franc 
zone whos~ preferential arrangements go back to 1928, agreed with 
Britain for the .retention of .these preferences. 
(1) Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT law and international economic 
or~nization, Chicago, Un~versity of Chicago Press, 1970, 
D. 2. 
1) The principle of non-discrimination 
The results of the duality of positions on preferences 
was embodied in Article I which reads: 
1. 'With respect of customs duties, any advantage granted 
by any Contracting Party shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating 
from all other Contracting Parties.' 
2. 'The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall 
not require the elimination of any preferences which 
fall within the following descriptions:' 
There followed a list of existing preferences, listed in 
adjoining annexes. These included the Commonwealth preferences, 
those of the French Union, Benelux, etc. These were allowed to 
remain provided that the margin of preference did not increase. 
Thus the first article of the GATT embodied the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination and the exceptions. It may also be 
said that Article I included both the theory and the practice, or 
the ideal and the reality. 'The effect of \seeking to outlaw prefer-
ences was, ironically enough, to write a permanent exemption into 
the General Agreement for most existing preferential systems.,(1) 
It is of interest to note that among the exceptions to 
the rule were the preferential arrangements between the U.S. and 
Cuba, and between the U.S. and the Philippines, although the U.S. 
had an official non-discriminatory commercial policy. 
By exempting existing preferences from the rule of non-
discrimination, the General Agreement undermined the principle 
of equality of treatment for all Contracting Parties. Further-
more, by differentiating between preferences existing in -1947, 
and those which may be set up later, accepting the first and for-
bidding the others, the Agreement became the defender of the 
(1) Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT law ••••••••••••. , p.42. 
status quo in commercial policies. This was especially a handicap 
for countries which acquired independence in the years following 
the establishment of the GATT, a great number of which became 
parties to the General Agreement. Those countries which did not 
already belong to a preferential area, and wished to do so, found 
that this was prohibited by Article I of the GATT. 
The view that existing preferences should be allowed to 
remain, but that new ones should be discouraged, is vulnerable to 
criticism. If preferences are detrimental to international trade, 
then those existing in 1947 should have been gradually dismantled 
over a reasonable period of time. 
The exemption for existing preferences is not the only 
exception to the rule of non-discrimination. It will be shown 
in Chapter VIII that there are other reasons for the weakness of 
tne GATT's first principle. The only other exception relevant 
here is Article XXIV, because this was invoked by the EEC in order 
to enter into association agreements with other countries. 
2) The principle of reciprocity 
One of the main rules of the GATT is that concessions 
in tariff and other customs matters should be carried out on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. (Article XXVIII bis). 
This means that contracting parties need only make concessions 
when they are" offered similar concessions by other members. The 
expression 'mutually advantageous' is not explicit, and the fact 
that reciprocity is not defined in the General Agreement leaves 
the way open for a variety of interpretations. 
Although the principle of reciprocity was generally 
acceptable when the Contracting Parties were mostly developed 
countries, it soon became evident that it needed revision, when 
the number of developing members of the GATT increased considerably. 
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This was done in 1965, when a new chapter was added to the Agreement, 
to provide for the special requirements of developing members. In 
this new section of the GATT, Article XXXVI reads: 'The developed 
Contracting Parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made 
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to the trade of less-developed Contracting Parties.' Thus 
the GATT rejects 'reverse preferences' from developing to developed 
countries, because they are thought to be inconsistent with the 
development needs of those countries. This aspect was one of the 
reasons for the criticism levelled at some of the EEC Association 
agreements with developing countries, as discussed below (see p.145). 
B. PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS SINCE 1947.(1) 
Before examining the case of the Association system of 
the European Economic Community, and the infringement of the GATT 
rules which it is alleged to entail, it is of interest to mention 
briefly four preferential agreements which were condoned by the 
GATT, through the granting of a waiver:-
As early as 1948, the United States asked the GATT 
permission to give preferential treatment to imports from Pacific 
islands under United States Trusteeship.(2) The reason offered 
was that these islands had been under Japanese mandate and had 
received preferential treatment from Japan, and that duty-free 
access to the United States market would compensate the islands 
for the loss of the Japanese preferences and thus help their ex-
port earnings and their economic development. Although Japan had 
reverse preferences in these Pacific islands, the United States 
(1) For more details; see Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in 
International trade the olic issues, 1945 - 1965, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 19 ,Chapter VII. 
(2) The Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands, except Guam. 
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did not seek this. The request was granted in the form of a waiver 
of the United States' non-discriminatory commitments. There was 
some fear that thi s would create a dangerous precedent, however, and 
the Contracting Parties reserved the right to review the situation 
if injury to the t rade of other members ensued from the preferences. 
It appears that no such request has been made so far, probably 
because the preferences covered only a small portion of trade, 
namely coconut oil and copra. 
2 ) The second preferential arrangement allowed by the GATT 
was that between Italy and Libya in 1951. A waiver was granted to 
Italy so that she could continue to give preferential treatment to 
a number of products from Libya. This could be regarded as a tech-
nical matter, however, because Libya had received preferential 
treatment from Italy as a Colony. The change in status brought 
about by its independence made it necessary for Italy to ask the 
GATT for a waiver which was duly granted ~nder certain conditions. 
In 1953, Australia asked for a waiver of its most-
favoured-nation obligations in order to grant duty-free entry to 
goods from the territory of Papua-New Guinea. Reverse preferences 
were not to be applied, although the possibility of incorporating 
the area in question into the Asutralian customs territory was 
investigated and rejected. Contracting Parties were worried about 
the fact that the goods subject to preferential treatment were not 
listed. The main reason for the Australian request was once again 
that this would help the economic development of Papua-New Guinea 
and the waiver was granted. 
The consequences of these first three preferential agree-
ments condoned by the GATT, was a certain awareness of the need for 
a change in the GATT rule in order to provide a guiding principle 
for similar cases in the future. In 1954, the United Kingdom pro-
posed that a new rule be added to the Agreement to enable metro-
politan countries to give preferential treatment to a dependent 
territory without breaking the GATT rules. This could be done by 
regarding the territory as being in the same customs area as the 
Metropolitan country. The Contracting Parties rejected the British 
proposal, for the following reasons. First, there was the concern 
of another breach of the non-discriminatory rule, and of the prin-
ciple that no new preferences should be allowed. This concern was 
felt by developed countries which at that time enjoyed no prefer-
ences but which were soon to form the European Free Trade Association , 
inter alia Switzerland and Sweden. Secondly, some members feared 
that this new proposal would threaten their own exports if they did 
not seek preferences for themselves. Thirdly, there was a fear that 
it would perpetuate the dependence of the territory on the metro-
politan country. 
The search for a formula to give preferential treatment 
to exports from developing countries was to lead, nine years later, 
to the 'Brasseur plan', which suggested the first steps of the 
Generalized Scheme of Preferences. This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
4) A more recent breach of the non-discrimination rule and 
perhaps the most surprising because it emanated from countries who 
are both highly developed and who were the most prominent defenders 
of the GATT rule, was the United States - Can~dian Automotive Product s 
agreem~nt of 1965. According to this arrangement, tariffs on most 
automotive vehicles and original equipment parts were to be elimin-
ated between the two countries. Canada planned to extend this tariff 
cut to imports from other countries, but the United States had no 
intention to do likewise.(1) 
(1) For more details see Kenneth W. Dam. The GATT law •••••• pp. 48-50, 
and Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade, ••••• 
pp. 356-8. 
C. PREFERENCES IN THE EEC ASSOCIATION AND TRADE AGREEMENTS. 
From the beginning of the European Economic Community, 
allegations have been made that rules of the GATT were being in-
fringed. The calculation of the common external tariff was critic-
ised by a Working Party of the GATT because the EEC had decided on 
an arithmetical average of the tariffs of France, Germany, Italy 
and Benelux; this system increased tariffs in some cases, and 
lowered them in others. Although the customs union was permitted 
by Article XXIV, it was held that the method of calculation contra-
vened the rule that 'the duties shall not on the whole be higher 
or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties prior 
to the formation of such union.,(1) The arithmetic average had 
the great advantage of being a simple method and in spite of repre-
sentations by the GATT members, the EEC refused to discuss the best 
method of calculation, because they maintained that Article XXIV 
did not demand any special method, and that their method was appro-
priate. The underlying reason for this refusal was probably the 
feeling that unless a definite start was made with the customs 
union, there was a danger of having every step of the process of 
integration discussed and delayed by the GATT. 
Although the economic union planned by the Six was allowed 
under Article XXIV, even if the legality of the method of calculation 
of the common tariff was open to doubt, the Association system was 
the target of more serious criticism. 
The evolution of the Association of African and Malagasy 
States was traced from Part IV of the Treaty of Rome to the Yaounde 
Con~entions of 1963 and 1969, in Chapter III. The preferences between 
France and her dependencies, Belgium and the Congo, and so on, are 
listed in the annexes to the General Agreement and were permitted 
(1) See Annex D for full text of Article XXIV, sections 4-8. 
since they existed prior to 1947. Objections to the Association 
began, however, when the EEC decided to extend these preferences 
to other members of the Common Market. Technically, this move 
constituted the establishment of new preferences. However, the 
EEC maintained that the Association was creating a new ' free trade 
area including the Six and the Eighteen, and that this was legal 
under Article XXIV, which reads: 
'The provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent 
the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area.' 
Several conditions govern the application of this rule, 
among which is the proviso that customs union or free-trade areas 
shall abolish duties and other trade restrictions 'on substantially 
all the trade in products originating in such territories'. 
Article 133(3) of the Treaty of . Rome allows associated 
countries to levy customs duties in certain circumstances, such as 
when needed for the protection of infant industries, or for revenue 
purposes. Contracting Parties of the GATT maintained that this 
provision prevented the Association from being a true free-trade 
area, since it did not eliminate tariffs on 'substantially all 
the trade between the parties', and therefore contravened Article 
XXIV of the GATT. 
This objection ignores the fact that the exception 
contained in Article 133(3) is purely in the interests of the 
associates which are all developing countries. It does not nullify 
the intention to create a free-trade area any more than the omission 
of agricultural goods from the arrangements of the European Free 
Trade Association prevents this regional group from being generally 
accepted as a genuine free-trade area. 
In 1957-8, a Working Party of the GATT considered the 
terms of the EEC Association, but no final decision was taken ex-
cept that the Six concluded that 'if at any time, contrary to their 
expectations, damage to the interest of third parties could be 
proved, the EEC would take steps to mitigate it.,(1) 
By 1965, the GATT had enunciated a new rule regarding the 
principle of reciprocity, that developed countries were not to ex-
pect reciprocity from developing countries with regard to tariff 
. (~) conceSSlons. On these grounds, the GATT and UNCTAD members, 
and especially developing non-associated members, challenged the 
right of the EEC to ask for reciprocity in association agreements 
with developing countries, that is, to ask for the notorious 
'reverse' preferences. EEC spokesmen, however, maintain that there 
are no reverse preferences, only free trade areas and customs 
unions. 
A free t rade area implies reciprocity in tari~f concessions, 
and therefore, an anomaly appears to exist in the rules of the GATT. 
Preferential arrangements are allowed only if they lead to the 
formation of customs unions or free trade areas, but on the other 
hand, developed countries should not expect reciprocity from develop-
ing countries. Yet without reciprocity, customs unions and free 
trade areas cannot be formed. Thus, the GATT would appear to ignore, 
or object to, the possibility of customs unions or free trade areas 
betw'een developed and developing countries. 
When the EEC signed the Lagos Convention with Nigeria in 
1966, and the Arusha Convention with East Africa in 1968, similar 
allegations of infringements of the GATT rules were made. With 
regard to the principle of reciprocity in the Lagos agreement, the 
(1) W.G. Barnes, Europe and the developing world, PEP European Series 
no. 2, London, Chatham House, 1967, p.13. 
(2) See Annex D, Article XXXVI, 8. 
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Nigerian negotiators considered the problem as follows. Nigeria 
wanted an agreement similar to that of the Yaounde Convention, but 
less comprehensive. This included reciprocity in trade concessions 
since it established a free trade area. But Nigeria could not offer 
complete reciprocity in tariff matters and eventually it was decided 
that the Nigerian preferences offered to the EEC would be nominal. 
Following this decision, allegations were made that the 
free-trade area was fictitious because the concessions offered by 
Nigeria related to a small portion of Nigeria's trade. But a 
Nigerian spokesman concluded thqt 'where a preference is created, 
it is a consequence of, not a condition for, creating a free-trade 
area, nor can the magnitude of the preference created invalidate 
the existence of a free-trade area,.(1) 
The same arguments have been applied to the Arusha 
Convention, : although the preferences given by East Africa to the 
EEC are somewhat more extensive than in the Lagos Convention. 
It is difficult to defend the legality of such association 
agreements as the Lagos and Arusha Convention, under the GATT rules, 
although the more comprehensive agreement of the Yaounde Convention 
may pass the test of Article XXIV. On the other hand, the following 
aspects must be considered before condemning these agreements. 
Under a free trade area, there is no common external 
tariff and therefore associates are free to apply tariffs of their 
choice to third countries. Thus they could, if they wish, extend 
the same tariff concessions which they apply to imports from the 
EEC, to other members of the GATT. 
Benefits received by the African countries outweigh those 
received by the EEC. This is why doubts regarding the legality of 
these arrangements have not discouraged a number of other nations 
(1) P.N.C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market, London, Longmans, 
1967, p.130. 
from seeking agreements with the EEC and some of these countries 
are currently negotiating for that purpose. 
Arrangements such as the Arusha Convention could l ead to 
more comprehensive ones, and therefore could be considered as 
'interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or 
free trade area'. (Article XXIV, 5). 
With regard to trade agreements with the European Community, 
the early arrangements were non-preferential. In the agreement with 
Iran in 1963, for instance, the reduction in the common external 
tariff of the EEC was extended to other GATT parties, but the pro-
ducts involved were of interest mainly to Iran: hand-knotted 
woollen carpets, etc. This was also the case with the first agree-
ment between the EEC and the Lebanon in 1964. The more recent 
agreement with Lebanon is preferential and therefore against the 
GATT rules. The trade agreement with Spain, however, is a customs 
union (or leading up to a customs union) and does not extend to 
other countries the tariff reductions between Spain and the EEC. 
The offi cial view of the GATT on this matter is not 
unanimous. Generally, the more recent association and trade agree-
ments are deplored. ' ••• what is most questionable is the creation 
of preferential trade links between a few developed and one, or a 
few, developing countries here and there through new discriminatory 
agreements for whi ch no historical justification can be claimed.,(1) 
Detailed examinat i on of certain agreements however, has brought out 
three tendencies among the GATT members.(2) Some of the Contracting 
Parties are of the opinion that the agreements are not inconsistent 
witrr the GATT rules, since the declared objective of the parties, 
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Press Release, Address 
given by Mr. Long, Director-General of the GATT, 26th January 
1970, GATT/105l, p.3. 
(2) AAMS, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain and Israel - with the EEC. 
the provisions of the agreements and their content are consistent 
with the letter and spirit of Article XXIV. Other countrie s feel 
the agreements are not consistent with the GATT rules because there 
is no plan to show how the associations would achieve a full free 
trade area or customs union. Finally, some countries make no 
categorical statement on the compatibility of the agreements with 
the GATT rules.(1) 
The reasons for this divergence of views are often found 
in the circumstances of the countries expressing these views. For 
example, it was felt that 
'if Britain becomes a member of the European Economic 
Community, there would appear to be no reason, from the 
point of view of her own interests or those of the develop-
ing members of the Commonwealth, why she should not support 
the continuation of association •••• If, on the other hand, 
Britain does not become a member of the European Economic 
Community, association and other special arrangements ••• 
{ 
are likely to prove disadvantageous both to her and to 
the developing countries of the Commonwealth, ••• 
therefore, it would be in Britain's interest as well as 




As will be shown i n Chapter X, sources of conflict in international 
trade are frequently due to differences in tariff structure, size 
of internal market and special interests. 
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT activities in 
1970/71, Geneva, 1972, p. 51. 
(2) , W.G. Barnes, Europe and the Developing World, ••• p. 46. 
D. THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
Customs union theory has considered specifically the 
problem of full preference (as in a customs union) versus partial 
preference (as i n a preferential agreement). 
Jacob Viner points out the illogicality of considering 
100% preference as good and 99% preference as bad. On the legal 
side, if it is t he degree of preference which makes it contrary to 
most-favoured-nation obligations, and if customs unions can be 
regarded as compatible with these obligations, then preferential 
agreements, involving a lesser degree of preference, must be even 
more so. 
'The moral is that on both the economic and legal 
side the problem is too complex to be settled by simple 
maxims. A 50% preference is economically either less 
desirable or more desirable than a 100% preference 
according only as preference at all is under the cir-
cumstances desirable or undesirable.' (1) 
Nevertheless, Viner singles out one area where partial 
preference may be worse than customs unions: the removal of tariff 
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barriers in a customs union is non-selective, and must lead to both 
trade-creating and trade-diverting effects. In the case of prefer-
ential agreements, however, they are usually selective, and it is 
possible and even probable that the preferences selected will be of 
the trade-diverting kind. 
More recent theories of customs unions suggest that a 
partial reduction of duties on imports from partners is more likely 
(1) Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, New York, Carnegie Endow-
ment for Int ernational Peace, 1950, p. 50. 
to increase welfare than a complete removal of restrictions within 
the area.(1) The reason for this is that the first reduction of 
duties within tqe preferential area contribute to more gain from 
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trade expansion than each subsequent reduction. On the other hand, 
the loss from trade diversion will continue as the degree of 
preference increases. 
This generalization is questioned by Mikesell because 
'we are not concerned simply with the readjustment 
of existing trade patterns, but rather with alternative 
principles f or the direction of investment which will 
establish the trade and production patterns a decade or 
so hence.' 
(2) 
There is, therefore, no consensus of opinion as to 
whether a full or partial preferential system is more beneficial, 
in spite of the fact that the GATT accepts the former in Article 
24 of the Agreement and disapproves of the latter. This was 
probably due to t he fear that to allow all preferential systems 
would have opened the door to the bilateralism which plagued 
international trade in the inter-war period. A minor point -
but of significance to small countries - is that the adminis-
tration of a cust oms union may be more straight-forward than 
selective preferences. 
The problem of deciding which type of preference is 
better, stems from the dual aspect of economic integration, a 
(1) J.E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions ••• 1955, pp. 56 ff.; 
R.G. Lipsey , The theory of customs unions: a general survey, 
The Economic Journal, vol. LXX, No.279, September 1960, pp. 506 ff.; 
H.G. Johnson, Money, Trade and Economic Growth, ••• 1962, p. 45. 
(2) P. Robson (ed.) International Economic Integration, (R.F. Mikesell, 
The theory of common markets as applied to regional arrangements 
among developing countries) ••• p. 176. 
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movement towards free trade and simultaneous increase in dis-
crimination. This also explains wide differences of attitudes 
towards the Association. Some GATT parties regard the Association 
agreements as di scriminatory arrangements resulting in the so-
called 'rever~e preferences'. The offical view of EEC is expressed 
as follows: 
'The Commission proposes that in respect of trade 
matters the Association should be based on the principle 
of the free trade area. The acceptance by the associated 
states of t he mutual free trade area principle does not 
entail any obligation for them to grant preferences to 
the Community. They retain complete tariff autonomy in 
their relat ions with third countries, and complete 
freedom to negotiate on such matters.,(1) 
The Association has also been regarded as 'a unique form 
of development co-operation in that it combines trade and aid under 
the supervision of special institutions,.(2) 
E. RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE GATT'S VIEW ON PREFERENCES 
Since the beginnings of the GATT in 1947, the attitude 
of the Contract i ng Parties have undergone a certain change with 
regard to tariff preferences. We have seen that Article I of the 
General Agreement condemned new preferences but condoned existing 
ones. At the same time, the principle of reciprocity in trade 
(1) Commission of the EEC. Memorandum of the Commission to the 
Council on the future relations ••• Luxemburg, 1973, p. 5. 
(2) Ph. P. Everts (ed.) The Euro ean Communit in the World, 
_ (R. Cohen, Europe and developing ' countries , Rotterdam, 
University Press, 1972, p. 124. 
matters was upheld. 
By 1965, when Part IV was added to the GATT, it was 
agreed that developing countries should not be asked to reciprocate 
tariff concessions made by developed countries. This was an accept-
ance that, in certain cases, preferential treatment is justified. 
This was reaffirmed in 1971 when a waiver was granted for the 
establishment of Generalized Preferences in order to promote 
. . l' t' . d 1 . (1) 1ndustr1a 1sa 10n 1n eve op1ng areas. 
Thus the main reason for this change in the position of 
the GATT on preferences was the wish to assist developing countries. 
There are two other factors, however, which may lead to further 
alteration in the GATT regulations, the position of the United 
States in world trade and the movement towards economic integration. 
Although the United States is still the major trader when 
considered as an individual nation, exports from the EEC as a unit, 
now exceeds those of the States.(2) Japan is also rapidly becoming 
one of the giants in world trade. The forthcoming multilateral 
trade talks will be conducted on this new basis, which may affect 
the GATT regulations since the General Agreement is not an immutable 
treaty. 
'The GATT was founded when the United States was on a 
pinnacle of pre-eminence. The GATT's rules, of which 
the most important are reciprocity and non-discrimination, 
basically enshrined American preconceptions. Now, in 
trade terms, the balance of power has shifted. It would 
be surprising if the ground rules, or at least the inter-
pretation of them, did not change.,(3) 
(1) ' See Chapter VIII. 
(2) In 1970, the United States' total exports were 43 226 million 
dollars, whilst the exports of Six totalled 45 210 million 
dollars (extra-EEC). The difference will increase with the 
enlargement of the Community. 
(Source: EE~ Foreign Trade, Monthly statistics, Brussels). 
(3) The Economist, February 28th, 1970, p.65. 
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In addition, the United States drastically affected its position 
in the GATT when it imposed a surcharge of 10% on all imports in 
August 1971. This was a sudden and unprecedent move on the part 
of the most important founder of the GATT, and although under-
standable at the time, due to imperative needs of the United States 
economy, nevertheless it shook the whole concept of the GATT more 
than any other breach of the General Agreement. 
The recent trend towards regional integration may also 
act upon the GATT's views on preferences. A growing number of 
countries are forming free trade areas and common markets in various 
parts of the world, and several nations are entering into trade 
agreements with the EEC. The latest 3rouP of agreements are those 
between the EFTA countries and the enlarged Community, which 
established free trade in Western Europe for industrial goods only. 
It is doubtful whether this constitutes 'substantially all the 
trade' between the countries involved.(1) 
To conclude, association and trade agreements between the 
EEC and several countries are discriminatory and therefore against 
the philosophy of the GATT, but since these arrangements are in-
creasing in number, and they result in some trade liberalisation, 
there is a strong possibility that this development will lead to 
a change in the GATT's views on preferences. 




Origin - Brasseur plan - United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development - Punta del Este speech - the 
case for and against generalized preferences - reactions 
from developed and developing countries - types of 
schemes -effects on donor country - assessment. 
Th~ granting of preferences by some countries to a few 
others has generally been looked upon with distrust and criticism 
by those not involved in the arrangements. In spite of this, the 
extension of the Association system of the EEC has had an impact 
on the attitude of the GATT towards tariff preferences, as was 
shown in the previous chapter. This trend has been reinforced by 
a more recent type of preferences, called the Generalized Scheme 
( 1 ) 
of Preferences (GSP). 
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It has been felt for some time that developing countries 
should be assisted in their efforts to develop their economy. They 
need to expand their exports in order to purchase imports of con-
sumer and capital goods. So far, most of their exports have been 
primary products. As returns on these goods are characterized by 
great instability, some developing countries have been trying to 
diversify their economies and to export semi-manufactured and 
manufactured goods. In developed countries, tariffs on primary 
products are usually nil or low, but tariffs on manufactured goods 
are higher. Moreover, manufactured goods from developing countries 
have to compete with goods from other industrialised nations. 
(1) Sometimes called the Generalized System of Preferences. 
Therefore it has b'een maintained that assistance should be given -
by all developed nations - in the form of preferential tariffs for 
imports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from all 
developing countries. Although the least developed nations are 
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not likely to benefit a great deal from the GSP since their indus-
trial potential is low, the more advanced among developing countries -
for example, Latin American countries - may stand to gain from 
generalized preferences, especially in the field of semi-processed 
agricultural products. 
Thus the GSP is meant to redress the balance between 
developed and developing countries. In particular, it is hoped 
that it will help the problem of infant industry in the third 
world, since preferential tariffs in the markets of developed 
countries might provide the necessary encouragement to the industries 
of developing areas, most of which are still at a very early stage 
of economic development. Local markets in developing countries are 
unlikely to absorb the optimum output of those industries for some 
time, and markets abroad are therefore needed for the development 
of those areas. 
The original plan was for all developed countries to 
give preferential treatment to exports from all developing countries. 
That is why it is called 'generalized' preferences, in opposition 
to the Association or the Commonwealth preferential systems, which 
apply only between some developed and some developing countries. 
As will be shown in this chapter, the plan which was finally accepted 
was for each developed country to apply its own GSP to all develop-
ing countries. 
The Association system of the EEC has played a part in 
the establishment of the GSP. Although the first requests for 
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tariff preferences for manufactured goods from developing countries 
pre-date the Treaty of Rome of 1957, these requests intensified 
when the Association took shape, because many developing countries 
did not share in the benefits given by the Community to the associates. 
Thus the impact of the Association system has been to accelerate 
the global acceptance of the GSP. 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origin and 
development of generalized preferences and the part played by the 
Association system, to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
the GSP and the GATT position in this matter, and finally to out-
line problems of implementation. 
A. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERALIZED PREFERENCES 
1) The early years 
The first attempt to include a system of preferences in 
a legal code of international trade occurred in 1947, during the 
negotiations of the ill-fated International Trade Organisation (ITO). 
In the Havana Charter, which was meant to lay down a set o£ rules 
for trade between nations, Article XV reads: 
'The Members recognise that special circumstances, 
including the need for economic development or recon-
struction, may justify new preferential agreements between 
two or more countries in the interest of the programmes of 
economic development or reconstruction of one or more of 
them.' 
There followed certain well-defined conditions and safe-
guards. Although Article XV of the Charter was seeking the accept-
ance of new preferential agreements for some countries, Articles XVI 
and XVII tried to establish a general most-favoured-nation treat-
ment and an elimination of preferences. However, the Havana Charter 
was not ratified and the ITO Was abandoned. We have seen that the 
GATT accepted existing preferences but disallowed new preferences. 
In the years following the signing of the GATT in 1947, 
the gap between developed and developing countries became a matter 
of concern for all , and ways and means of reducing this gap were 
sought. Thus, as the industrialised parts of the world began to 
accept the responsibility of helping the third world, the concept 
of generalized preferences gained ground. 
Additional support was given by special preferential 
arrangements entered into by certain countries, such as the 1948 
agreement between the United States and some Pacific islands, 
between Italy and Lybia in 1951 and between Australia and Papua-
r New Guinea in 1953.(1) These agreements could have paved the way 
for a more flexible approach to the problem of preferences for 
developing countries, but GATT was still wary of an extension of 
new preferences, and it rejected the 1954 proposal from Britain 
to allow preferential agreements between any developed country 
and a dependent territory, as well as the suggestion from Chile, 
in the same year, to include Article XV of the Havana Charter in 
the General Agreement. The reason put forward for this refusal 
was once again the predominance of the principle of non-discrimi-
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nation. Moreover, it was feared that this move 'would make certain 
developing countries permanently dependent on preferential treat-
ment from their Metropolis, and that the interests of those 
nations not included in such agreements would be impaired. 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, it 
became evident that a large number of developing countries would 
benefit from the newly-established EEC Association system. This 
spurred other developing countries, especially in Latin America, 
to renew their pressure for a revision of the GATT rules and for 
(1) See pp. 142-4. 
special treatment of their exports. A report of a GATT Committee 
in 1959 concluded : 
'The Committee noted that some less-developed countries 
have the investment and the technological resources for the 
processing of raw materials and are able to produce efficient-
ly some manufactured goods. The Committee recommends that 
Contracting Parties, particularly industrialized countries, 
should urgently consider lowering barriers to the develop-
ment of the export of such goods and should in their economic 
policies take into account the urgent need of less-developed 
countries to increase their export earnings and should so 
far as possible avoid hindrance to the import of such goods 
f h t
· ,(1) 
rom suc coun rles. 
In 1962, this was followed by a Programme of Action pro-
posed by less-developed countries at the Twentieth Session of the 
GATT. Inter alia, the following suggestions were made: 
(a) 'Duty-free entry into the industrialized countries 
shall be granted to tropical products by 31st December 1963; 
(b) industrialized countries .shall agree to the elim-
ination of customs tariffs on the primary products important 
in the trade of less-developed countries; 
(c) industrialized countries should also prepare 
urgently a schedule for the reduction and elimination of 
tariff barriers to exports or semi-processed and processed 
products from less-developed countries providing for a 
reduction of at least 50 per cent of the present duties 
over the next three years.' 
(2) 
A GATT Working Party was set up to study the problem of 
preferences, and the United Nations Secretariat was also asked to 
make a study of the matter for the Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, due to take place in 1964. During this preparation; con-
fli~ting interests emerged both among developed and developing 
countries. This aspect will be examined below. 
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents, Eighth Supplement, Geneva, 1960, p.140. 
(2) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents, Eleventh Supplement, Geneva, 1963, 
~~ ?n~_?nh 
2) The Brasseur Plan. A step towards the GSP was taken in May 
1963, when M. Brasseur, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Technical Assistance, proposed a plan for generalized preferences, 
at the GATT Ministerial Meeting of May 1963. It was a system of 
selective, temporary and degressive preferences, which in fact 
form the basis of the GSP recently implemented by the EEC. It 
was hoped that most developed countries would take part, but it 
was not essential for all countries to do so. In the Brasseur plan, 
as it became known, the developed countries would not expect 
reciprocity for preferences granted. Efficiency of production and 
sales methods in developing countries would be stimulated by the 
fact that preferences would be temporary and degressive,and would 
be discontinued when the infant industries entered the competitive 
stage. The preferences would also be selective for three reasons: 
(a) no government , accountable to the public, could undertake to 
give automatic preferences to all developing countries, for all 
manufactured goods; (b) special care could be taken, with select-
ive preferences, of the needs of the least developed countries; 
and (c) the selective approach constituted a safeguard against 
competition of goods produced under so-called abnormal conditions, 
such as cheap labour, etc. The GSP would be the result of negotia-
tions initiated by developing countries. 
The Brasseur plan was acceptable to the EEC, since it 
allowed the maintenance of existing preferences to associates, 
but it was not formally approved by the Six at that time, because 
of divergence of opinion; for example, although France supported 
the ~elective approach, Germany preferred a general system of 
preferences. Several other countries, among both developed and 
developing countries, disliked the idea of selective preferences. 
3) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1964. 
The first Conference for Trade and Development, held 
under the auspices of the United Nations in New York, Was a dis-
appointment for the protagonists of GSP. Generalized preferences 
were discussed at length and the principle of GSP was accepted by 
69 in favour, with 8 against and 23 abstentions. Unfortunately, 
the United States voted against it, and no developed country would 
proceed without American support. The other votes against genera-
lized preferences were cast by Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway and Poland, some because they upheld the 
principle of non-discrimination, others for reasons unrelated to 
the scheme. The abstentions were mainly due to the vagueness of 
the proposals, whereas the Soviet countries abstained because of 
references to countries with 'centrally planned economies'. 
Nevertheless, in the Final Act of the Conference, the 
great majority of countries agreed with the principle of 'assist-
ing the industrial development of developing countries by the ex-
tension of preferences in their favour' and asked the United 
Nations Secretary-General to arrange for a committee of Govern-
ment representatives to consider the matter 'with a view to 
working out the best method of implementing such preferences on 
the basis of non-reciprocity from the developing countries'. 
Although the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development did not achieve a great deal from the point of 
view of the GSP, it helped the developing world in other ways. 
It was the first time that developing countries spoke 
with a collective voice, and soon after the conference, UNCTAD was 
established as a permanent organ of the United Nations, under 
(1) In February 1965 the Soviet Union informed the United Nations 
that it had abolished customs duties on all goods imported 
from the less-developed countries. (The New York Times, 
February 5th, 1965, p.39). 
the General Assembly resolution 1995 (XIX) on December 30th, 1964. 
The resolution defined the principal functions and membership of 
the Conference and its permanent organ, the Trade and Development 
Board. On the recommendation of the Board, the General Assembly 
decided on December 20th, 1965, to establish the headquarters of 
the secretariat in Geneva and a liaison office at the United 
Nations in New York. At its first session, the Board laid down 
the terms of reference of four Committees: on Commodities, 
Manufactures, Invisibles and Financing related to trade, and 
Shipping. These Committees meet each year and have created a 
number of subsidiary bodies to deal with particular problems coming 
under their terms of reference. 'The main impact of UNCTAD comes 
from its recommendations which emanate mainly from developing 
countries and which, in general, crystallize issues they wish to 
have resolved so as to promote their economic and social advance-
t ' (1) men • 
4) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. During the early 
sixties the GATT members were considering the special problems of 
developing countri es, and the ways in which their trade could ex-
pando It was real ized that not only should the developing nations 
receive better pri ces for their primary products, but every effort 
should be made to encourage the production and export of semi-
manufactured and manufactured goods. Thus, two changes were 
sought in the rules of the GATT, (a) reciprocity in tariff con-
cessions should not be expected from developing countries " and 
(b) tariff preferences should be granted t o exports from 
~ 
developing countri es, and not extended to all members of the GATT 
on a most-favoured-nation .b~~is. 
( 1 ) Edgar Jones, The Fund and UNCTAD, Finance and Development, 
vol. 8, no.3 , September 1971 , p.29. 
In November 1964, the Contracting Parties to the GATT 
in their Second Special Session approved - for submission to their 
governments - the text of a new Part IV to the General Agreement, 
containing special provisions to help the trade and development of 
the less-developed countries. The Final Act was signed on 8th 
February 1965 and indicated an important change in the GATT towards 
the acceptance of special treatment of less-developed countries.(1) 
However, tariff concessions given by developed countries 
were still to follow the most-favoured-nation principle, and it is 
this rule which became the target of attacks from developing 
countries. They felt that a tariff concession offered to all 
members of the GATT would work to the disadvantage of the less-
developed countries, who would be unable to compete against more 
advanced producers. Thus demands became more insistent for a GSP. 
The existence of two large areas of preferences, the 
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Commonwealth and the EEC Association system, influenced the develop-
ment of a GSP in two ways: on the one hand, it spurred those 
developing countries who did not benefit from such a system, such 
as the Latin American countries, to press for a system of prefer-
ences from which they would benefit; on the other hand, those 
countries which benefitted from the existing preferential schemes 
were far more hesitant about a GSP which would reduce the advant-
ages which they received from their membership of the Commonwealth 
or their associate status. 
5) Punta del Este. After the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development of 1964, Latin America began to press the United 
States for preferential treatment of their industrial goods. 
(1) Article XXXVI, 8: The developed Contracting Parties do not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade 
negotiations, to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers 
to the trade of less-developed Contracting Parties. 
The United States had voted against the GSP at the Conference, but 
their position was weakened in 1965 by the preferential agreement 
with Canada for automotive products. (1) The first sign of a 
change in the American attitude was the President's speech in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1967, where he said that his Adminis-
tration was prepared to explore the possibility of a GSP. This 
renewed interest in the scheme, and the Special Group on Trade 
with Developing Countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)- led by France, the United King-
dom, Germany and the United States - presented a report to the 
second session of UNCTAD in New Delhi in 1968. This proposal took 
the form of a summary of points which member countries of the OECD 
agreed should be featured in any GSP, but details were not given. 
Moreover, UNCTAD set up a Special Committee on Preferences. 
6) Second UNCTAD , 1968. The problem of a GSP was discussed at the 
New Delhi conference, but no agreement was reached because it was 
found impossible to set up a single generalized preference scheme, 
and it was left to the developed countries to submit their own 
individual schemes. Moreover, most developed countries made it a 
condition of implementation of their scheme that all developed 
countries would do the same. One important drawback was that the 
United Statep threatened to abandon their scheme if discriminatory 
and reverse preferences were not removed from other schemes.(2) 
7) The GATT waiver. The introduction of generalized preferences 
was finally accepted and sanctioned by the GATT in 1971, in the 
form of a ten-year waiver, under the terms of Article XXV of the 
General Agreement. This allows developed countries to lower tariffs 
(1) See p.144. 
(2) See David Wall, EEC General Preferences, European Community, 
January, 1972, p.22. 
on imports from developing countries, without having to extend this 
to all members of the GATT on a most-favoured-nation basis. The 
waiver was requested by a number of industrialised nations, and 
• 
adopted by the GATT member governments in a postal ballot.(1) 
B. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST GENERALIZED PREFERENCES 
During the twenty year period leading to the approval of 
a GSP, many arguments for and against the scheme were put forward.(2) 
Self-interest led some countries to stress some aspects and neglect 
others. We shall consider the arguments in favour and those against 
the GSP before examining briefly the problem of the GATT rules in 
this matter. 
1) Arguments in favour of the GSP 
(a) The most important argument for the GSP is that develop-
ing countries need help to further their economic development. In 
the last few years, this point has gained emphasis from the fact 
that the latest rounds of the GATT negotiations have not achieved 
a great deal for the specific problems of developing countries. 
Since their economy is far less advanced than the economy of 
industrialised nations, they need extra concessions. 
Underlying this argument is the assumption that the GSP 
will automatically help export industries in developing countries 
and therefore, assist in their economic development. This is 
similar . to the well-known argument for infant industry. Newly-
established industries need protection in the early stages, because 
costs per unit are high until the level of output reduces prices 
to competitive levels. In the same way, industries in developing 
countries need help, not only because most of them are in the infant 
(1) The GATT Press Release 1082, 26th June 1971. 
(2) See inter alia, John Pincus, Trade, aid and development, 
New York, McGraw-Hi ll, 1967, pp. 197 ff. 
stage but also because of existing conditions in developing countries 
generally. In those areas, the level of education and training is 
very low and the infra-structure of the economy is poor or non-
existent. Roads, railways and other services have to be established 
and the new industries usually have to share in these costs. An 
additional burden is the lack of experience of both entrepreneurs 
and workers. If it is accepted that infant industries need help 
in developed areas, they certainly need greater assistance in 
developing countrieB. The question remains, however, as to whether 
tariff preferenc~s are an effective way of helping. 
The point has been made that two conditions must exist 
if tariff preferences are to help developing countries to export 
( 1 ) 
semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. First, the prices 
charged by the developing country must be below those of the domestic 
producers in the developed country giving preferences (the 'donor' 
country), and secondly, the price must also be less than the price 
of competing goods produced in other developed countries plus the 
tariff applicable in each case.(2) In other words, the price of 
developing countries' exports may exceed those of exports from 
other areas, but by an amount smaller than the tariff applicable 
to those goods, assuming no tariff on exports from developing 
countries. Where the preference given is merely a lower tariff, 
this raises the price of developing countries' exports by the same 
amount. 
An absence of tariffs for exports from developing countries 
will place these goods on an equal footing with domestic firms in 
(1) Gardner Patterson, Would tariff preferences help economic 
development?, Lloyds Bank Review, April 1965, no.76, p.25. 
(2) Whether 'nominal' or 'effective' tariff. For discussion on 
this point, see H.G. Johnson, Trade preferences and developing 
countries, Lloyds Bank Review, April 1966, no.80, pp. 13 ff. 
Also John Pincus, Trade, aid and development, •••• pp. 189-190. 
the developed country thus giving them a better chance to increase 
their export earnings. Again, where the preference given by the 
developed country is not a zero tariff, but simply a lower tariff, 
the prices of those exports will have to be below prices of domestic 
goods by the amount of the tariff.(1) 
(b) Other arguments put forward in favour of generalized 
preferences can be mantioned briefly. It has been felt for some 
time that foreign aid given- to developing areas is not sufficient 
for their development and should be supplemented by easier access 
to the markets of developed countries. Besides, tariff preferences 
are more acceptable than direct aid, both from the political and 
psychological viewpoint. The administrative costs of such schemes 
to 'donor' countries would be negligible and by allowing each 
developed country to propose their own scheme, danger of damage 
to their 3conomy would be reduced to a minimum. 
2) Arguments against the GSP 
We have seen that it took a long time for countries to 
accept the principle of generalized preferences. The reasons for 
this reluctance are numerous. Some developed nations, particularly 
the United States, wanted to maintain the principle of non-discrim-
ination in tariff matters. Developing countries which benefitted 
from special treatment were also unwilling to encourage the adoption 
of a GSP which would inevitably reduce their margin of preference. 
Regarding the GSP from a global viewpoint, the following arguments 
were put forward. 
(a) The most serious drawback of generalized preferences is 
that this will reduce the chances of further liberalisation of trade, 
(1) The term 'domestic goods' include goods from countries which 
may be linked in a free trade area or a customs union with 
that particular country and therefore economic integration 
between developed countries tends to reduce the benefits of 
preferences. 
since any further t ariff reduction will tend t o r educe the margin 
of preference granted to developing countries. It is true that the 
GSP may be used as an excuse to maintain tariffs at their present 
level but this argument carries less weight if the principle of 
degressive preferences is accepted. Degressive preferences mean 
that the margin of preference will be gradually decreased. In 
other words, the preferential tariffs will be gradually increased 
until they reach the level of the normal tariff. The rate of in-
crease will depend on each GSP proposal. 
(b) The GSP may perpetuate the economic dependence of poor 
countries on rich countries. This argument may be used against 
any form of aid to developing areas and it is a weak one. It 
must be accepted that developing countries will remain dependent 
on developed areas for a long time and the establishment of the 
GSP will not alter that situation. Moreover, it should be left to 
the developing countries themselves to decide on this matter, and 
those which dislike dependence on rich countries may elect to 
remain out of the scheme. 
(c) It is a l so maintained that the GSP may perpetuate in-
efficiency in the industries of developing countries. This point 
is often stressed in discussions on infant industry protection. It 
is exact that new industries tend to rely on protective tariffs 
once they have been granted, but it is generally accepted that it 
is reasonable to extend these protective tariffs to genuine cases 
of infant industry, in order to assist them during the early stages 
of growth. In the same way, the GSP is meant to help new manu-
, 
facturing or processing industries in developing areas during their 
initial stages of growth. 
Cd) Another argument against the GSP is the danger of dis-
crimination against developing as well as developed countries. 
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When it became evident that a single scheme could not be accepted 
• 
by all countries, the fear was expressed that certain individual 
schemes could be arranged in such a way as to benefit some develop-
ing countries to the detriment of others, for instance, by giving 
better treatment to a product originating principally from a 
specific developing country. This is a valid argument and cannot 
be ignored. From the point of view of developed countries, the 
GSP may lead to an inequitable distribution of the burden of 
preferences,some developed countries 'paying' more than others. 
It is obviously difficult if not impossible to devise a GSP which 
lays an equal burden on all 'donor' countries, but as each developed 
country will plan and implement its own scheme, this problem is 
alleviated to a certain extent. It may be added that any group 
scheme, such as United Nations action programmes or EEC common 
policies, falls more heavily on some countries than others and may 
be regarded as discriminatory by some writers, but this is no 
reason to reject i nternational economic co-operation. 
3) Generalized preferences and the GATT 
A consideration of the GSP in the framework of inter-
national trade should examine whether the acceptance of generalized 
preferences indicates a movement towards trade liberalisation or 
another departure from the GATT principle of non-discrimination. 
It was shown above that the GSP was unacceptable for 
many years by members of the GATT, because it discriminates against 
developed countries. It is only under pressure from developing 
countries that it was legalised by the GATT through the granting 
of a waiver. From the point of view of the third world, the GSP 
is a means of liberalising their trade with developed areas. If 
preferences succeed in increasing this trade, the conclusion can 
be drawn that although a discriminatory measure, the GSP is at the 
same time a step towards trade liberalisation. 
171 
It is difficult to assess, however, whether the GSP will 
result in trade-creation rather than trade-diversion. If the 
developed countries' demand for those manufactured goods which can 
be produced by developing countries - and are subject to the GSP -
is elastic, then it is possible that exports from developing 
countries may expand and benefit those areas. If on the other hand, 
demand is inelast i c, the GSP may cause trade-diversion at the ex-
pense of the producers in other developed countries. It may 
therefore benefit less efficient producers at the expense of more 
efficient produce r s, and for this reason, attract criticism. On 
the other hand, i t can be regarded as a form of aid since it 
involves a transfer of income from one group (in developed areas) 
to another (in developing areas). 
As the GSP are to be established by lowering tariffs for 
some goods and not be raising them against others, these schemes 
may be regarded as being in the spirit of the GATT, in the same 
way as free trade areas and customs unions, which - according to 
Article XXIV of the GATT - must have as their aim an increase in 
trade among the parties concerned and not the erection of barriers 
to the trade of other nations. Discrimination in international 
trade and trade liberalisation are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. 
C. I ,MPLEMENTATION OF GENERALIZED PREFERENCES 
Once the principle of generalized preferences for manu-
factured and semi-manufactured goods from developing countries was 
• 
172 
accepted by most trading nations, a host of problems became apparent 
as details of the schemes had to be worked out. 
The number / of donors and of recipients was the first con-
cern. Obviously the ideal situation would be for all developed 
countries to grant preferences to all developing countries, but 
there could be no question of coercion. Thus developed countries 
were left free to offer preferences. As regards the number of 
recipients, the principle accepted was that of 'self-election'. It 
is impossible to divide all trading nations into developed and 
developing countries as many of them are on the border-line of 
development. It is assumed however, that most of the 'Group of 
77' will ask for preferential treatment.(1) By the device of 
safeguard clauses , developed countries retain ' the right to refuse 
preferences to any developing country for particular reasons, in 
spite of the discriminatory aspect of such exceptions. 
Other problems to be solved were the types of goods which 
should receive preferences, the depth of tariff concessions to be 
made, the duration of the schemes and other provisions such as 
those concerning 'sensitive' products. 
It soon became evident that no agreement would be reached 
on a single scheme of preferences and that the best way to proceed 
was to leave each donor country to propose and implement its own 
scheme. 
An important divergence of opinion among both developed 
and developing countries relate to the special case of 'reverse 
preferendes', that is preferences given by developing countries 
to developed countries as for example, in the Commonwealth prefer-
ential system and the EEC Association system. Although some 
developed countries, such as the United States and Sweden, would 
(1) Group of active developing countries, formed by Raul Prebisch 
within the framework of UNCTAD, and with a present membership' 
of 96. 
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like these reverse preferences to be abolished, the countries 
involved in the scheme are reluctant to do so. In fact, some of 
these developing countries have regarded the GSP as a threat to 
their own trade, since it would automatically reduce the margin 
of preference given to their goods in certain markets, such as 
the EEC or the Commonwealth. These developing countries finally 
accepted GSP because they hoped that what would be lost in 'trad-
itional' markets would be gained by preferential ent~y into new 
markets. 
It was hoped at some stage that the least advanced among 
developing nations could receive special treatment in a GSP, al-
though the earlier plans were to have a completely non-discriminatory 
system. The first point obviously contradicts the second. Never-
theless, the hope was expressed that 'special preferences could be 
granted to the less advanced developing countries' and at the same 
time, 'the ultimate objective should be to adapt existing preferen-
tial arrangements to the new system of preferences in such a way 
that there is no discrimination among developing countries, and 
so that developing countries presently obtaining such preferences 
should continue receiving benefits under the new system at least 
. 1 t t th th . ,( 1 ) Th t ' . 1 t' . equ1va en 0 ose ey now enJoy • e erm equ1va en 1S 
ambiguous, as those countries enjoying preferences prior to the 
establishment of GSP may stand to lose if all developing countries 
are granted preferences in the same markets. It must be accepted 
that either the GSP is non-discriminatory, that is, applied equally 
to all developing countries, or exceptions are made (a) for the 
least developed areas, and (b) for those who were receiving special 
treatment before the establishment of the GSP. 
(1) John A. Pincus, (ed.), Reshaping the world economy: Rich 
countries and poor, (Towards a new trade policy for develop-
ment, Raul Prebisch) ,New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1968, p.122. 
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This particular aspect lost its importance when it became 
obvious that no single system would be acceptable to all developed 
countries. Each donor country was left free to submit its own 
scheme and several decided on selective preferences, that is, not 
all manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, but a selection of 
these, would receive preferential treatment. 
The special benefits received by some developing countries 
were not cancelled but were automatically reduced by preferences 
given to others. This aspect caused some misgivings and the Eighteen 
African countries associated with the Common Market said that the 
offer of the EEC to establish a GSP 'causes us some anxiety because 
it is too liberal and might dilute our own advantages,.(1) 
Developing countries which had not previously ~eceived 
preferential treatment welcomed the general acceptance of GSP but 
some of them felt that the number of goods covered and the depth 
of the tariff cuts were insufficient. These points were raised 
at an UNCTAD meeting in 1970, and a speaker for the EEC replied 
that the proposals were the result of 'enormous effort and that 
it was the maximum possible at this stage'. 
(2) 
From the point of view of the donor countries, the draw-
backs of the GSP include administrative costs and increased com-
petition for domestic goods as well as competition in other developed 
countries' markets. Certain aspects of the scheme, as for example 
the selection of the goods to benefit from preferences, may cause 
a certain amount of political fricti Qn among both donors and 
recipients. The fear has been expressed that the United States, 
in particular, might be tempted to embark on a protec t ionist policy, 
if Cungress agrees to grant generalized preferences.(3) 
(1) UNCTAD Press Release, TAD/INF/ 459(PREF), 23rd September 1970. 
(2) UNCTAD Press Release, ibid. 
(3) See Gardner Patterson, Would tariff preferences help economic 
development?, Lloyds Bank Review, April 1965, no.76, p.30. 
This view has been rejected by H.J. Johnson in Trade prefer-




Attitudes of developed countries vary: the EEC and the 
United Kingdom regard the GSP as an extension of their present 
system of preferences to some developing countries, whilst the 
United States consider preferences as a deviation from their normal 
policy of non-discrimination and thus have only recently and some-
what reluctantly accepted the principle of the GSP. 
Since the GATT waiver of 1971, several developed countries 
grant generalized preferences to manufactured goods from developing 
countries. 
'Preferential schemes under the GSP have been imple-
mented by the European Economic Community, Japan, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and Austria. Two countries, the 
United States and Canada, have not yet put into effect 
their schemes of generalized preferences. Australia has 
been granting tariff preferences to developing countries 
since 1966. 
Of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have introduced 
preferential schemes of generalized preferences. The 
USSR has provided duty-free entry for imports of goods 
from developing countries since 1965.,(1) 
(2) 
The schemes vary. Most of them have been established 
for a period of ten years and all of them (except Japan's) incor-
porate an escape clause' 'which allows the preferences to be modi-
fied in the event of a claim of injury to domestic prod~cers or 
proven disruption of markets'. (3) In addition, the EEC scheme 
offers preferences only up to a certain ceiling, and the EEC, Britain 
and the United States exclude most textiles from their schemes. 
(1) UNCTAD Monthly Bulletin No.Bo, April 1973. 
(2) See Annex E for the EEC and the United States proposals. 
(3) David Wall, EEC general preferences: How effective will they 
be? European Community, January 1972, p.22. 
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The United Kingdom scheme was more advantageous than the EEC's, 
since it offered preferences without ceilings. However, the en-
largement of the Community will require the harmonization of the 
GSP of the EEC, Britain, Ireland and Denmark. 
Although all developing countries may, in principle, 
apply to become recipients of generalized preferences, there are 
exceptions, such as in the case of the United States which auto-
mati cally excludes 'countries which do not receive the benefit of 
the most-favoured-nation clause or those which grant preferential 
advantages to other developed countries, unless they have under-
taken to cease doing so by 1976,.(1) This last clause is aimed at the 
EEC associates or countries having concluded preferential agree-
ments with the Community. 
D. EFFECTS OF GENERALIZED PREFERENCES ON DONOR COUNTRY 
The impact of generalized preferences on the production 
and consumption of the developed donor country is illustrated in 
Figure 14. These effects depend on several assumptions, the most 
important of which is the interchangeability of the goods from 
developed and developing exporting countries. Other assumptions 
include the absence of transport costs and constant-cost curves 
for imports. 
(1) Jean Royer, The United States trade reform bill: back round 
note, International Chamber of Commerce, Document 102 10 , 
Paris, 1973. (Economic and financial policy, Commission on 
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Figure 14: Effects of GSP on Donor Country 
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D and S are t~e demand and supply curves of the domestic 
developed country. AB and CD are the supply curves for goods from 
another developed country, and from the developing country ('recip-
ient' country) respectively. Before GSP,. the domestic country im-
poses tariff AE on all imports. She will consume OQ3' of which 
OQ2 is produced loc~lly and Q2 Q3 is imported from the developed 
country (assume d to be lower-cost than the developing country). 
The domestic country now applies the GSP to imports 
from the developing country, that is, tariffs on those imports are 
eliminated, but they are still applied to imports from the developed 
areas. The domestic country will now consume O~. Domestic pro~ 
duction has been reduced to OQ1 but / imports have increased to Q
1
Q4 
and they all come from the developing country. 
J 
From a comparison between Figure 14 and Johnson's 
illustration of trade-creation and trade-diversion (see pages 
46-47, Figures 10 and 11 ) , it is evident that the effects of the 
GSP are similar to those of a customs union, where AB could be the 
supply curve of an outside country and CD the supply curve of the 
union partner. 
In Figure 14, areas ~ and ~ illustrate trade-creation 
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(production and consumption effect). Tariff revenue (b + d) falls - -
away: ~ may be considered as a transfer so that it is neither a 
gain nor a loss to the domestic country, but area i represents trade-
diversion (from low-cost developed producer to high-cost developing 
producer) and must be weighed against trade-creation, to find out 
the net loss or gain. 
The system of generalized preferences and economic inte-
gration both contain elements of free trade and discrimination, but 
they differ in two important aspects:-
1) Tariffs concessions are not reciprocal. 
2) Concessions are partial since they apply only to manufactured 
and semi-manufactured products from developing countries. 
E. ASSESSMENT 
From the above discussion the following conclusions may 
be drawn. After about twenty years, the GSP was finally accepted 
by the trading nations of the world for two main reasons. Its 
purpose is the economic development of the third world and it is 
regarded as non-discriminatory because it is meant to apply to 
al~ developing countries. This second point explains why the GSP 
has not attracted the same criticism as the EEC Association system, 
in spite of the fact that in practice, the GSP involves some dis-
crimination among developing countries. 
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Every effort should be made to bridge the gap between the 
rich and poor countries, but it is doubtful whether generalized 
preferences will result in industrialisation in developing areas. 
We have seen that free entry into the European Community has not 
had a great effec t upon the trade results of associated countries 
and it will probably be the same for the GSP. Moreover, industrial 
tariffs being generally low, preferential rates applied to exports 
from developing countries will have a minimal effect on their economy. 
Problems of development are considerable and cannot be solved by a 
few tariff concessions. 
On the other hand, as generalized preferences are urgently 
requested by developing countries, implementation of this scheme 
by a large number of developed nations may have a salutory psycho-
logical effect on the relationship between the poor and rich 
countries, and should therefore be carried out. It can be added 
that the chances of effectiveness of the GSP might be increased 
if the terms of the schemes were more generous - for instance, 
applying zero tariffs to textile exports from developing ~reas -
but developed countries are not prepared to go this far. It must 
also be remembered that the GSP is barely two yea rs old and that 
a longer period of time is needed to assess more accurately its 
possible effects on developing countries.(1) 
From the global point of view, the GSP discriminates against 
developed countries and is an i mportant departure from the principle 
of non-discrimination. However, the GSP is not the only deviation 
from the GATT rule of equality of treatment in trade matters. The 
following chapter will consider several other factors which have, 
in our opinion, contributed to the failure of the principle of non-
discrimination. 
(1) See T. Murray, How helpful is the generalized system of 
preferences to developing countries?, The Economic Journal, 
vnl _ R~_ 11n_ ~~n_ .Tll11<> 1Q'7'7, ,....,.... 1.d.I.Q_Ut:;t:; 
CHAPTER I X 
THE FAILURE OF THE RULE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
OF THE GATT 
Exceptions to Article I - Article XXIV - Article XIV -
Article XXXV - new chapter on developing countries -
generalized preferences - preferential agreements - EFTA -
basic reasons for the failure of the principle of non-
discrimination. 
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was 
signed in 1947, the Contracting Parties agreed to two main prin-
ciples. The first was that member countries should grant each 
other the same favourable treatment in trade matters as they grant 
any other member country. This is commonly called the most-
favoured-nation clause and has long been a feature 9f commercial 
treaties; in the context of the GATT it is usually described as 
the principle of non-discrimination. The second principle is that 
protection should be given only by means of tariffs and that these 
180 
should be progressively reduced in order to liberalise international 
trade. 
A consideration of the achievements of the GATT over the 
last twenty-five years leads to the conclusion that the principle 
of non-discriminat ion has been a failure, whereas the principle of 
tariff reduction has been successfully applied. The purpose of 
this, chapter is to draw attention to the causes of the failure of 
the first principle of the GATT, and the part played by the Assoc-
iation system of the EEC. 
Several factors have weakened the principle of non-
discrimination but the fundamental cause of this failure lies 
in the unrealistic expectation of equality of treatment on a world-
wide scale, as was envisaged by the founders of the GATT. Trade 
interests have forced certain countries to enter into discrimina-
tory arrangements with others, and this was made possible by the 
early acceptance of exceptions to the rule, which vitiated the 
principla of non-discrimination from the beginning. 
A. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS 
The factors which contributed to the failure of the most-
favoured-nation principle are as follows:-
1) Article I excludes a number of established preferences of long 
standing from the most-favoured-nation principle. 
2) Article XXIV allows customs unions, free trade areas and 
interim arrangements, opening the way to 'legal' discrimination. 
3) Article XIV permits the discriminatory application of quantita-
tive import restrictions to protect the balance of payments in 
special circumstances. 
4) Article XXXV permits the non-application of the GATT 'rules 
between certain Contracting Parties. 
5) Part IV of the GATT introduced in 1965, exempts developing 
countries from several of the GATT rules. 
6) The recently-established Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
allows discrimination in favour of developing countries in the 
application of tariffs for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. 
7) Finally, the GATT is unable to prevent an increasing number of 
preferential arrangements which do not quite conform to the rules 
laid down in the General Agreement. 
We shall consider each of these points. 
1) Article I 
The first article of the GATT illustrates t~e compromise 
between those Contracting Parties which upheld non-discrimination 
as the main rule, and those who were not prepared to give up their 
T · . h b d' d b (1) existing system of preferences. hlS pOlnt as een 1scusse a ove. 
Thus, the GATT insisted that the most-favoured-nation treatment 
should be applied between members, but allowed existing preferences 
to remain, such as those applied in the British Commonwealth, the 
French Union and others. It was obviously a weakness to draw a 
distinction between existing preferences and new preferences, and 
consequently several new preferences have been accepted by the GATT 
members, either ' by the grant of a waiver or tacitly. Although it 
was first hoped that existing preferences would be progressively 
abolished, the practical outcome was that the margin of preference 
would not be increased. Thus, Article I introduced a weakness into 
the main GATT rule from the beginning. 
2) Article XXIV 
This article specifically allows free trade areas, customs 
unions and interim agreements leading to the formation of either 
kind of economic integration, provided that certain conditions are 
met: first, the tariffs of the customs union must not be higher 
than those of the member countries prior to union, and secondly 
the arrangements must involve 'substantially all the trade' between 
the parties. This article has been invoked several times since 
the signing of the GATT, due to the growth of regional integration. 
From the point of view of international trade, customs unions and 
free trade areas illustrate the duality of non-discrimination 
within the customs union, and discrimination towards non-members. 
(1) See pp. 140- 1 . 
This makes it difficult to decide whether regional integration is 
a step towards trade liberalisation or a step away from it. If 
this trend is regarded as the creation of larger customs territories, 
then the abolition of tariff barriers between the countries forming 
the customs union indicates a liberalisation of trade, even if this 
is not extended to all Contracting Parties of the GATT, in other 
words, even if it is discriminatory. Furthermore, the loose 
wording of Article XXIV has led to a wide interpretation of the 
expression 'interim agreements' and 'substantially all the trade', 
as shown in the EEC Association and trade agreements and in the 
Stockholm Convent ion of 1960, establishing the European Free Trade 
Association. Thus certain agreements are regarded by some as con-
forming to Article XXIV of the GATT, and by others as preferential 
agreements (see pp. l45-l50)~ 
3) Article XIV 
Exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination, as regards 
quantitative restrictions are contained in Article XIV. Although 
these restrictions are generally forbidden by the GATT, they are 
allowed in cases of balance-of-payments difficulties, as long as 
they are applied non-discriminately (Article XIII). However, 
Article XIV contains provisions which authorise the discriminatory 
application of quantitative restrictions in special cases. Several 
Contracting Parties have evoked this article in support of their 
import control policies, among them the Republic of South Africa. 
4) Article XXXV 
The General Agreement includes other 'escape clauses' 
such as Article XXXV, which gives any Contracting Party the possi-
bility of not applying the GATT rules to another Party. This was 
the last article of the original Agreement. The non-application 
may occur (a) if the two parties have not entered into tariff 
184 
negotiations with each other, and (b) if either party, at the time 
one of them becomes a member of the GATT, does not consent to such 
application. 
This article has been invoked by South Africa against 
Japan, and by India against South Africa, the first for economic 
reasons, and the second for political reasons. It has also been 
invoked in other cases, but the most striking example was that con-
cerning the accession of Japan to the GATT. When this country 
finally became a Contracting Party in 1955 its membership had 
been deferred for many years for a variety of reasons - fourteen 
countries representing about 40 per cent of the foreign trade of 
the GATT's members, invoked Article XXXV against Japan. This 
article has been called 'the great loophole' because it opened the 
door to widespread discriminatory practices for protective purposes.(1) 
The factors mentioned so far were all part of the General 
Agreement when it was signed in 1947. They indicate the unwilling-
ness of the Contracting Parties to commit themselves unconditionally 
to the principle of non-discrimination. This led to the inclusion 
of these exceptions which covered most likely problems, but on the 
other hand, these exceptions vitiate the main principle to a con-
siderable extent and may be construed as an example of bad faith 
on the part of the original signatories. The principle of equality 
of treatment was upheld as the main principle of the GATT, but 
provision was made for ways to avoid it when trade interests are 
in danger. However, several countries might have refused to par-
ticipate in the GATT if these escape clauses had been absent. 
(1) See Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in international trade, 
the policy issues, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1966, P .19. 
5) Part IV of the GATT 
In 1965, a new chapter was added to the General Agree-
ment to dea~ with the special problems of developing countries, 
although Article XVIII dealt with the conditions under which 
countries may deviate from the rules of the GATT in order to en-
courage their economic development. The new section, Articles 
XXXVI to XXXVIII, deals with such exceptions in greater detail, 
and lays down the commitments of developed countries in this respect. 
The most explicit departure from the principle of non-discrimination 
is Section 8 of Article XXXVI which reads: 'Developed Contracting 
Parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations, to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers 
to the trade of less developed Contracting Parties'. The new 
chapter aims at assisting the trade of developing countries, but 
it also stresses disparities between developed and developing 
areas. 
6) Generalized preferences 
The establishment of a Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
for manufactured goods from developing countries is legalised under 
the GATT, by the granting of a waiver from the rule of non-dis-
crimination to the developed countries who request it. This is a 
major deviation from the first principle of the GATT, as was shown 
in Chapter VII, especially since the GSP is not equally applied 
to all developing countries and individual schemes lead to a 
variety of treatment of goods and countries. 
Points 5) and 6) concern developing countries. These 
devfations from the main principle of the GATT are explained by 
the fact that although the original Agreement was signed by only 
23 countries in 1947, many nations acquired independence during the 
following years, and by 1965, a large number of the new Contracting 
Parties were developing nations and differed in many ways from the 
original signatories to the General Agreement. It soon became 
evident that the rules framed for developed countries were inade-
quate for the needs of developing countries, and therefore, 
further exceptions were made to the principle of non-discrimination. 
7) Preferential agreements 
We have seen that several preferential agreements were 
condoned by the GATT through the granting of waivers.(1) In 
addition, even though some of the agreements of the EEC Association 
system do not quite conform to the rules of the GATT, divided opin-
ions have increased the possibility of a de facto acceptance of these 
agreements, especially where they concern developing countries. 
Finally, the recent formation of the European free trade zone of 
16 nations illustrate yet another contravention of the GATT's 
Article I. As these EEC-EFTA arrangemel1ts concern developed 
countries and have aroused criticism from the United States, it is 
worthwhile considering these agreements in some detail. 
The European Free Trade Association was formed in 1960 
by seven countries when Great Britain, Portugal, Austria, Switzer-
land and the three Scandinavian countries signed the Stockholm 
Convention. The later accession of Finland and Iceland brought 
the total to nine . In 1972, the entry of two EFTA members, Britain 
and Denmark, into the European Community necessitated new arrange-
ments between the remaining seven members of EFTA and the enlarged 
EEC, in order to prevent new trade barriers from arising between 
Britain and Denmark, on the one hand, and EFTA countries on the 
other. 
(1) See pp. 142-4. 
The Stockholm Convention did not include trade in agri-
cultural goods and therefore, it may be said that the free trade 
area of EFTA did not include 'substantially all the trade', as 
laid down by Article XXIV of the GATT. However, EFTA did not 
receive a waiver to legalize this exception. Instead,a Working 
Party of the GATT examined the terms of the Convention and reported 
on it, concluding that 'there remain some legal and practical 
issues which would not be fruitfully discussed further at this 
stage. Accordingly, the Contracting Parties do not find it appro-
priate to make recommendations to the parties ••• ,(1) Thus, al-
though the GATT found that the Stockholm Convention did not quite 
conform to the provisions of Article XXIV, it was considered not 
important enough to make recommendations and demand mOdifications. 
The agreements between the EEC and EFTA countries also 
exclude agricultural products, and it is reasonable to assume that 
the same attitude will prevail in the GATT. As the EFTA members 
have no common external tariff, sev~n separate agreements were 
negotiated with the EEC. 
It is interesting to note that some EFTA members such as 
Switzerland and Sweden, which were outspoken supporters of the 
principle of non-discrimination and critical of preferential arrange-
ments, urged the EEC to come to terms with EFTA and to abolish 
tariffs between them. It appears that most nations do not dia-
approve of discrimination as a matter of principle, but object 
when discrimination threatens their own interests. 
'The Scandinavians, who had led the critics of the 
Coal and Steel Community, apparently raised but few ob-
jections to the EEC proposals. From the outset, they 
thought they would sooner or later get inside the prefer-
ential walls, first as part of the original European-wide 
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments 
and Selected Documents, Ninth Supplement, Geneva. 1961. n.20. 
area scheme, and, later, in the melding of the European 
Free Trade Association with the Common Market. 
' ( 1 ) 
It should be mentioned here, that a wide free trade zone 
in Europe is not a new idea. In 1955, Britain, who did not want 
to commit herself to the closer integration planned by the Six, 
suggested the formation of a free trade area among the countries 
(2) 
belonging to the OEEC. This was rejected by the Six, but when 
the Common Market showed signs of success, the idea of linking 
the EEC with EFTA was promoted once again and has now become a 
reality. 
B. EVALUATION 
The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that 
the principle of non-discrimination of the GATT has be~n a failure, 
since it is evident that discrimination in international trade 
cannot be eliminated. The numerous exceptions to Article I have 
weakened the main principle of the General Agreement and in 
addition, subsequent developments such as the GSP and the Assoc-
iation system have all contributed to the ineffectiveness of the 
main principle of the GATT. 
The underlying cause of this failure lies in the differ-
ence between the Contracting Parties of the GATT. Not only are 
there wide differences in their level of economic development, but 
also in the pattern and evolution of their external trade. Differ-
ences in economic development account for recent changes in the 
GATT rules, such as the GSP, whilst differences in trade patterns 
have led to regional arrangements of various forms, such as free 
, 
trade areas and customs unions, with their inherent discrimination 
(1) Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade •••. , 
p. 156, footnote 60. 
(2) Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, which became 
th~ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 
against non-membe r s. It is understandable that this trend is viewed 
with alarm by those who regard equality in international trade as 
essential. 
Dispari t ies between countries and between trade patterns 
lead to differences in outlook and objectives. Some look for 
economic development, others for self-efficiency, others still for 
a global efficiency in international trade. Thus their aims differ, 
and their policies follow. Consequently, countries consider dis-
crimination differently. Some see it as a real and dangerous 
barrier to international trade, whilst others consider discrimina-
tory measures as necessary to promote their own external trade. 
These differences of .opinion explain the continuing 
tensions in multilateral trade negotiations such as the forth-
coming GATT talks. In the next chapter, we shall examine in more 
detail these sources on conflict in international trade. 
CHAPTER X 
SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Trade talks - divergence of objectives - stage of 
economic development - size of internal market - patterns 
of trade - efficiency - tariff structure - social and 
political considerations - the 'common' interest. 
At the end of 1973, a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations will be carried out under the auspices of the GATT. 
The talks are expected to last two years and will consider a 
variety of problems, including non-tariff as well as tariff 
barriers, trade in industrial and agricultural products, and the 
special needs of developing countries. A special invitation has 
been extended to developing countries, including non-meOloers of 
the GATT.(1) 
It is probable that some GATT rules will be altered as 
a result of these negotiations. Pressure will be brought to bear 
on developed countries to improve their GSP schemes or to help 
developing countries in other ways. Reverse preferences and 
various regional arrangements will be under attack as well as the 
principle of non-discrimination. Efforts will be made to contain 
the increase in protectionism which began soon after the Kennedy 
Round of the GATT ended in 1967. 
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It will not be a simple task for so many nations to agree 
on solutions to such varied problems. The Kennedy round lasted 
three years and the Six members of the Community took five years 
(1) See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Press Release, 
The 1973 multilateral trade negotiations: the crucial choices 
ahead. Address by Mr. Olivier Long, Director-General, GATT, 
to Polytechnic Association, Oslo, 3rd May 1973. GATT/1122. 
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to agree on the details of the common agricultural policy of the 
EEC. The difficulty lies not so much in the fact that time is 
needed to examine a large number of problems but rather in the 
probability that different viewpoints are bound to lead to conflict. 
'Constantly changing circumstances would not present such 
a challenge to the GATT if all the Contracting Parties 
shared a common view of their precise objectives. Then 
common policies and programs might be thrashed out. But 
the fact is t hat Contracting Parties have differing 
views of the function of international trade.,(1) 
Some countries feel that trade between nations should be carried 
out with a view to greater economic efficiency; others stress 
economic development and industrialization; yet others aim at 
self-sufficiency and seek to protect infant industries. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the causes under-
lying these differences which lead to conflict in international 
trade and are likely to handicap the search for the common interest 
of all trading nations. 
The problem is complicated by clashes of sectoral inter-
ests within a particular nation; moreover, where negotiations take 
place with groups such as the EEC, a new dimension is added. Thus 
besides clashes between sectors of the economy and between sectors 
and the nation as a whole, there may be conflicts of interests be-
tween the members of the group and finally between the group and 
other negotiating nations. In this maze of diverse interests, 
negotiators have to look for the common interest without losing 
sight of their own nation. It is therefore, understandable that 
sometimes they confuse the two in order to facilitate the task! 
In multilateral negotiations, efforts are made towards 
an ideal framework of international trade, but the elements of this 
(1) Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT law and international economic 
organisation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970, 
p. 6. 
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framework vary according to characteristics of negotiating countries. 
More specifically, the attitudes of nations are influenced by the 
stage of development of their economy, the size of their internal 
market, existing patterns of trade, the efficiency of their export 
industries, and sociaL and political considerations, whilst pro-
cedures of negotiations are complicated by differences in tariff 
structures and other customs regulations. 
An examination of each of these aspects will being out 
the causes underlying conflicts in international trade. 
1. Stage of development 
Wide differences of opinion exist between developed and 
developing countries as to the aims of international trade. 
Developed nations tend to stress efficiency in international trade 
with elimination of trade barriers. Developing countries on the 
other hand seek mainly an improvement in their economies and es-
pecially industrialization. Concessions are requested in order 
to encourage exports of semi-manufactured goods as well as primary 
products and preferential treatment in the markets of developed 
countries are sought. The third world is not impressed by the 
argument that international trade should be non-discriminatory. 
If the GSP offers some hope of improving terms of trade of develop-
ing countries, they favour it even if it discriminates against 
developed countries. Where possible, some developing countries go 
further and enter into special arrangements, such as association 
or tra~e agreements with the EEC. If necessary they are prepared 
to give reverse .preferences to form free trade areas or other forms 
of economic integration in the hope of encouraging development. 
Moreover, the issues are complicated by the fact that 
attitudes of developing countries towards the GSP and reverse 
preferences vary according to whether they have already formed 
close associations with developed countries or not. The former 
accept the principle of reverse preferences ( 1) whilst others agree 
that they are an 'archaic and pernicious hangover from another 
age., ( 2 ) We have seen (Chapter VIII) that some developing 
countries welcome the GSP but others fear that this new scheme 
will reduce the preferences which they have hitherto enjoyed in 
the markets of some developed countries. 
Although certain developed countries stress the aim 
of trade liberalisation and non-discrimination, many of them 
endeavour to see the viewpoint of the third world. In view of 
the general acceptance of the needs of developing nations, ex-
ceptions have been made regarding certain GATT rules and a 
number of industrialized nations have offered generalized 
preferences to developing countries. 
2. Size of internal market 
This aspect influences attitudes on economic inte-
gration. A country with a small internal market looks upon inte-
gration as a means of expanding the market and encouraging large-
scale production and specialization. Thus a nation may decide to 
form a free trade area or an economic union and to ignore argu-
ments against this form of discrimination. On the other hand, a 
country with a large internal market and wide scope for large-
scale production has no need for such integration and stresses 
the discriminatory aspects of regional integration as well as the 
need for equality of treatment for all trading nations. Members 
of the EEC, associates and others favour free trade areas and 
(1) See Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market, London, Longmans, 
1967, p.130. 
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(2) W. Michael Blumenthal, A world of preferences, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 48, no.3, April 1970, p.554. 
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and similar arrangements whilst the United States with their large 
internal market generally favour non-discrimination on a world-
wide scale. This does not mean that all countries with small in-
ternal markets wish to integrate with others. Japan, for example, 
has been able to expand her markets abroad and to compensate for 
the shortcomings of her local market. Britain on the other hand, 
found that world-wide trade links were no longer adequate and 
sought integration with the Six in order to increase the scope of 
her industries. 
3. Patterns of trade 
Past and present trade patterns affect the position of 
trading nations on certain aspects of international trade. Countries 
which have for many years exported to certain markets, tend to 
consider that they have a prior claim to those outlets, whilst 
others seek to increase exports and look forward to getting a 
foothold in new markets. Thus some nations prefer the status guo 
and others look for change. A striking example is the case of 
the United States and Canada which have been described as the 
'traditional' or 'established' exporters of farm products, espec-
ially to the EEC and view apprehensively the increase in agri-
It 1 d t . d b th . It 1 1· ( 1 ) cu ura pro uc lon cause y e common agrlcu ura po lCY. 
On the other hand , New Zealand has had to seek other markets for 
dairy products in view of Britain's entry into the Common Market 
and has recently increased exports to Asian countries, while 
Japan has increased sales to the United States to such a degree 
that she has been asked to organize 'voluntary' export ' control 
for certain products. 
In another context, efforts are made to alter the 
(1) Hugh Corbet (ed.), Trade Strategy and the Asian-Pacific region, 
London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1970, p.21. 
traditional pattern of trade whereby developed countries export 
manufactured goods to developing countr i e s and import primary 
products from them. This trend is still apparent in the trade 
of some developed countries and their ex-dependencies, notably 
in Africa. Countries which benefit from these links are pre-
pared to maintain them, but others - both among developed and 
developing countries - attack these patterns of trade as relics 
of the colonial era or as neo-colonialism, and favour their 
elimination. 
4. Efficiency 
The degree of efficiency of a country's industries 
affects multilateral trade talks. A country with sevelal low-
cost producers tends to support measures which stress efficiency 
in international trade and to condemn methods likel y to dt &tort 
free competition. World-wide removal of barriers tv multilateral 
trade will the refore be favoured. On the other hand, countries 
with high-cost industries try to improve their position and pro-
tect their local industries with both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, disregarding arguments that the more efficient producers 
should provide the goods. The dividing line does not necessarily 
separate developed and developing countries. Among developed 
nations too, some are more concerned about efficiency in inter-
national trade, wh i lst others may be willing to protect a new 
industry or some other sector of the economy. For example, agri-
cultural production in parts of the European Community is less 
efficient than in the United States yet both maintain agricultural 
protectionism. There may be a variety of reasons for this: 




5. Social and political factors 
These may also alter the bargaining position of negotiat-
ing countries. They give rise to 'sensitive' areas of trade policy. 
Most developed countries sympathize with demands by developing 
countries for outlets for their growing industries but at the same 
time, industrialized nations are obliged to consider depressed or 
under-developed areas within their borders. Understandably, these 
areas have a prior claim. This is the reason for the exclusion of 
textiles from the GSP offer by the United States. Although it is 
generally accepted that the problem of under-development would be 
helped by encouragement of labour-intensive industries such as 
textiles, the United States wishes to protect the textile sector 
of the economy from low-cost competitors, because the low-income 
group of her population depends on this form of employment. 
Agriculture is another 'sensitive' area in trade policy, 
and perhaps the most important one. The Kennedy Round of the GATT , 
did not achieve a great deal in this sector. 
'It would be difficult to conclude that the GATT's 
record in the sphere of temperate agricultural commodities 
is other than one of failure. Not only is effective pro-
tection in all likelihood higher on average than in any 
other sector of the international economy, but there are 
many indications that the rate of effective protection is 
. ., ( 1 ) 
lncreaslng. 
Most countries in the Western world protect agriculture and this 
is also the case for Japan. There is no plan to liberalise 
Japanese agriculture in spite of difficulties due to labour short-
ages and other aspects. As in the EEC, a large proportion of the 
farmers are elderly and the typical farm is small. Yet measures 
such as exposure to foreign competition, which would cause dis-
(1) Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT law •....•.•.••. , p.257. 
satisfaction among the peasants, are avoided for political reasons. 
During a discussion between ~he Japanese and American governments 
on trade liberalisation in 1968, 
'whereas Japan offered no resistance in principle to the 
proposals for the liberalisation of several classes of 
industrial products, including electronic goods, they 
refused the American request to remove restrictions on 




In the EEC, the Common Agricultural Policy has been 
framed for the purpose of improving the standard of living of the 
farming community , by protecting them from low-priced imports, 
improving the structure and efficiency of farms and other measures. 
In the same way as it is felt that the third world needs help, so 
the Community is prepared to support and assist farmers which con-
stitute a depressed sector in t h e Common Market. Thus social and 
political considerations add complexity to differences of opinion 
in international negotiations. 
6. Tariff structures 
Conflict becomes apparent in trade negotiations with 
regard to the methods used in reducing tariffs, because nations 
have different tariff structures. This was evident at the beginn-
ing of the Kennedy Round. The United States with a large number 
of high tariffs were in favour of linear cuts, i.e. reduce all 
tariffs by 50% or some other acceptable percentage, whereas the 
EEC preferred the objective of tariff harmonization, the reduction 
of high tariffs to lower levels. The Common Market, with a 
relatively low common external tariff for industrial goods, 
suggested the procedure of 'ecretement, (2 ) to reduce high tariffs, 
but this was rejected in favour of reciprocal linear cuts. 
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(1) Hugh Corbet (ed.), Trade strategy and the Asian-Pacific region, 
(G.C. Allen, Japan's place in trade strategy), •••••• p.97n. 
(2) Literally, 'taking the peaks off'. 
Non-tariff barriers are also controversial and countries 
will no doubt attack those barriers used by others but try to pre-
serve those which form part of their customs regulations and form-
alities. The GATT has compiled a catalogue of some 800 non-tariff 
barriers classified in 27 categories.(1) 'Subsequently, it was 
agreed that the Committee should focus on a few specific non-
tariff barriers that appeared least controversial and thus most 
likely to be amenable to multilateral negotiations.' (2) 
Sources of conflict in international trade have been 
examined separately but they often overlap and this aspect com-
plicates issues further. Moreover, nations will not necessarily 
find themselves on the same side for the duration of negotiations 
for they may agree on some points and disagree on others~ 
This review of differences in attitudes, opinions and 
objectives among trading nations may lead to a pessimistic view 
of the forthcoming trade talks. Is there a 'common' interest or 
simply a number of national and sectoral interests which are bound 
to clash? One may find some reassurance in the evolution of the 
EEC: after the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, 
it may have seemed that a united Europe was doomed. Yet the 
Messina conference of 1955 led to the Rome Treaty two years later. 
Once the objective of an economic union Was agreed upon, solutions 
were found to conflicts of national interests. Difficulties will 
be far greater however, in multilateral talks including a large 
number of nations of such diversity. The only hope lies in an 
increase of the international - as opposed to national - outlook 
which might be assisted by some form of supranational thinking in 
international trade. 
(1) For example, escape clauses, anti-dumping practices, customs 
valuations, government procurement policies, state trading, 
mixing regulations. See H.G. Johnson (ed.), New Trade Strategy 
for the World Economy, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, p.36n. 
(2) International Monetary Fund, IMF survey, August 27th, 1973, p.244. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Association system of the European Economic Community 
has inaugurated a new trend in international trade. The network of 
associatlon and trade agreements has redu~ed trade barriers and 
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given financ ial and technical assistance to many developing countries. 
It is a manifestation of the growing tendency towards economic inte-
gration and therefore, both liberates trade between some countries 
and discriminates against others. 
The main impact of the Association has been on Africa, 
since t wenty-five African states have entered into agreements with 
the Commun" ty and there is a strong possibility that others will 
join, following Britain's entry into the Common Market. The entry 
of Commonwealth countries into the Association is eroding the old 
division between francophone and anglophone Africa and i s changing 
the attitude of many developing countries towards these arrange-
ments. 
The analysis of trade figures between the associates and 
the EEC showed little change in their pattern over a period of 
eleven years, but it would be imprudent to conclude that the 
Association has had no effect on the associates as a whole. 
The theory of customs unions demonstrates the effects of 
integration on the levels of production and consumption of member 
countries and the impact of this change on trade with outside 
countries. It fails to generallse on whether the overall effect 
is favourable or not, because it concentrates on only a few of the 
many variables in the economies concerned. The value of the more 
recent literature on integration is that it enlarges the field of 
investigation and demonstrat e s that the socia-political aspects of 
customs unions and economic uni ons are inextricably linked with the 
economic factors. This i s why empirical studies of the effects of 
integration are inevitably l i mit ed to a particular sector of the 
communities concerned, and canno t claim to illustrate the over-all 
effect of economic integrat ion. 
200 
Even if detailed statistics on growth and investment in 
associ a ted countrie s we r e ava i la~ le, it cannot be proved that changes 
in these fi elds are the result of economic integration with the EEC. 
The present state of theory does not allow us to isolate changes 
which are due to i ntegration and those which are the res~lt of other 
causes. The field is wide open to speculation. 
There is no evidence that the Association has damaged the 
trade of non-associates, and on the positive side, it has led to a 
diversification of the trade of associates amongst members of the EEC, 
and the enlargement of the Community from Six to Nine will no doubt 
amplify this deve l opment. 
South Africa's trade with Britain will be affected by 
Britain's entry into the EEC but it is difficult to give an 
accurate estimate of this change. By the time the common external 
tariff is fully implemented i n 1977, progress in marketing practices 
and export promotion on the part of South African exporters may 
offset the loss of preference in the British market. Although it 
is doubtful whether Sout h Africa can ever become an associate of 
the EEC, due to her level of economic development and political 
factors, a trade agreement with the Community is a possibility. 
The South African Customs Union may have to be re-examined if the 
Commonwealth members of the Union, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, 
become associates of the EEC. 
Differences of opinion persist as to the nature of 
association and trade agreements. The Community presents them as 
free trade areas and non-preferential agreements, and therefore 
within the rules of the GATT, but some Contracting Parties main-
tain that the agreements are preferential in character and against 
the spirit of the GATT. This c9ntroversy is subsiding for reasons 
which are set out below. 
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The principle of non-discrimination of the GATT received 
asevere blow when most trading nations agreed to the principle of 
Generalized Preferences. This provides easier entry for manufactured 
goods from developing countries into the markets of developed areas, 
and thereby assist in the economic development of the third world. 
The Association system of the EEC contributed to the GSP by spurring 
non-associates to demand preferences similar to those given by the 
EEC to their associates. 
In spite of Article I o~ the GATT stressing the need for 
equality in trade matters, there is evidence of substantial dis-
crimination in international trade, partly due to the impossibility 
of a strict application of the principle and partly due to the 
growing trend towards economic integration. A revision of the GATT 
rules on this point is indicated and it is possible that this will 
be discussed during the forthcoming multilateral trade talks. The 
success of these talks will depend on the recognition of the various 
positions which may be taken regarding the purpose of international 
trade and on the amount of tolerance shown towards different view-
points. 
Problems of developing countries will feature prominent-
ly in the discussions. The EEC is currently formulating a develop-
ment policy. The Treaty of Rome does not mention the Community's 
position vis-a-vis developing countries because in 1957 it was 
primarily concerned with the establishment of an economic union in 
Europe, and only provided for the relationship between the Six and 
their dependencies. In 1972 however, the Summit Conference of the 
EEC called upon the member states to implement a comprehensive 
policy of world-wide development co-operation, without losing sight 
of the vital importance of the maintenance and development of the 
Association.(1) Thus the Association will influence future deal-
ings between the enlarged EEC and developing countries as a whole. 
Although acceptance of regional arrangements is increas-
ing, they remain a controversial matter. It is generally accepted 
202 
that developing countries need some form of discrimination in their 
favour - although some writers would prefer a rigid adherence to 
the principle of non-discrimination - but many advocate universal 
arrangements such as the Generalized Scheme of Preferences rather 
than regional ones. On the other hand, regional agreements have 
their supporters. 
'Contrary to what many seem to believe, the goal of a 
development policy should not be complete liberalisatjon 
of trade. Only a limited number of countries would profit 
(1) _ See Commission of the European Communities. Memorandum of the 
Commission to the Council on the future relations between the 
Community, the present AASM states and the countries in 
Africa •••• COM(73) 500/fin. Luxembourg, 1973. 
from such measures. That is why ' I am in favour of assoc-
iations and preferential trade agreements, as long as the 
picture of an underdeveloped world of ·identical nations 
is wrong.' 
( 1 ) 
The controversy which has surrounded the Association 
system since its inception is showing signs of abatement. Several 
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reasons account for this. First, the Association has been extended 
to an increasing number of developing countries, always at the 
request of these nations. Secondly, the free trade arrangements 
between the enlarged Community and the remaining members of the 
European Free Trade Association have led to a more tolerant inter-
pretation of Article XXIV of the GATT. Thirdly, forty-four out of 
the eighty-three members of the GATT are now either members of 
the EEC, associates, or countries which have signed a trade agree-
ment with the Community, and this has reduced the effectiveness 
of criticism of the Association as a whole. Finally, the attention 
of the trading nations of the world is focussed less on tariff 
matters and more on problems such as currency and mobility of 
factors of production. 
'Commodity trade has ceased to be the all-important 
element in foreign economic relations. Capital move-
ments, movements of workers, exchange of know-how, travel, 
and other services play a fast-growing role and will con-
tinue to do so; and, correspondingly, the importance of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to commodity trade is 
decreasing in the overall picture.,(2) 
(1) Ph. P. Everts (ed.), The European Community in the world, 
(R. Cohen, Europe and the developing countries, summary of 
the discussions), Rotterdam, University Press, 1972, p.194. 
(2) ' Pierre Uri (ed.), Trade and investment, policies for the 
Seventies, new challen es for the Atlantic area and Ja an, 
GUnther Harkort, Response to G. Curzon's paper, New York, 
Praeger, 1971, p.69. This view is at variance with the 
general opinion regarding the importance of non-tariff 
barriers. 
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In the framework of international trade policy, the 
Association system of the EEC has had an impact which extends far 
beyond the countries involved. Developing countries in particular 
are tempted to join the Association or enter into trade agreements 
with the Community, to obtain benefits similar to those which the 
associates already enjoy. Alternatively, these countries may press 
for trade assistance from other developed areas. The third world 
as a whole will be affected since the EEC development policy will 
take into account the Association system. The probability of a 
change in the rules of the GATT or of a de facto acceptance of 
the Association by the GATT members will increase, due to the 
growing number of agreements between the EEC and countries which 
are Contracting Parties to the GATT. Finally, the Association 
system has contributed to the trend towards economic integration 
which is liberalising trade between a large number of nations. 
ANNEX A. 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF ROME, 1957. 
Part Four. 
The Association of Overseas Countries and Territories 
ARTICLE 131 
The Member States hereby agree to bring into association 
with the Community the non-European countries and territories 
which have special relations with Belgium, France, It~ly and 
the Netherlands. These countries and territories, hereinafter 
referred to as "the countries and territories", are listed in 
Annex IV to this Treaty. 
The purpose of this association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories 
and to establish close economic relations between them and the 
Community as a whole. 
In conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble 
to this Treaty, this association shall in the first place per-
mit the furthering of the interests and prosperity of the in-
habitants of these countries and territories in such a manner 
as to lead them to the economic, social and cultura~ develop-
ment which they expect. 
ARTICLE 132 
Such association shall have the following objects: 
1. Member States shall, in their commercial exchanges with 
the countries and territories, apply the same rules which they 
~pply among themselves pursuant to this Treaty. 
2. Each country or territory shall apply to its commercial 
exchanges with Member States and with the other countries and 
territories the same rules which it applies in respect of the 
European State wi t h which it has special relations. 
3· Member States shall contribute to the investments required 
by the progressive development of these countries and territories. 
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4. As regards investments financed by the Community, 
participation in tenders and supplies shall be ,open, on equal 
terms, to all natural and legal persons being nationals of 
Member States or of the countries and territories. 
5. In relations between Member States and the countries 
and territories, the right of establishment of nationals and 
companies shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions, 
and by application of the procedures, referred to in the Chapter 
relating to the right of establishment and on a non-discrimin-
atory basis, subject to the special provisions made pursuant to 
Article 136. 
ARTICLE 133 
1. Imports originating in the countries or territories 
shall, on their entry into Member States, benefit by th~ total 
abolition of customs duties which shall take place progressively 
between Member States iri confomity with the provisions of this 
Treaty. 
2. Customs duties imposed on imports from Member States 
and from countries or territories shall, on the entry of such 
imports into any of the other countries or territories, be pro-
gressively abolished in conformity with the provisions of 
Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17. 
3. The countries and territories may, however, lfvy customs 
duties which correspond to the needs of their development and 
to the requirements of their industrialisation or which, being 
of a fiscal nature, have the object of contributing to their 
budgets. 
The duties referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph 
shall be progressively reduced to the level of those imposed on 
imports of products coming from the Member State with which each 
country or territory has special relations. The percentages and 
the timing of the reductions provided for under this Treaty shall 
appLy to the difference between the duty imposed, on entry into 
the importing country or territory, on a product coming from the 
Member State which has special relations with the country or 
territory concerned and the duty imposed on the same product 
coming from the Community. 
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4. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to countries and territories 
which, by reason of the special international obligations by which 
they are bound, already apply a non-discriminatory customs tariff 
at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. 
5. The establishment or amendment of customs duties imposed 
on goods imported into the countries and territories shall not, 
either de jure or de facto, give rise to any direct or indirect 
discrimination between imports coming from the various Member 
States. 
ARTICLE 134 
If the level of the duties applicable to goods coming 
from a third country on entry into a country or territory is 
likely, having regard to the application of the provisions of 
Article 133, paragraph 1, to cause diversions of commercial traffic 
to the detriment of any Member State, the latter may request the 
Commission to propose to the other Member States the measures 
necessary to remedy the situation. 
ARTICLE 135 
Subject t o the provisions relating to public health, 
public safety and public order, the freedom of movement in Member 
States of '· orkers from the countries and territories, and in the 
countries and territories of workers from Member States shall be 
governed by subsequent conventions which shall require unanimous 
agreement of Member States. 
ARTICLE 136 
For a first period of five years as from the date of the 
entry into force of this Treaty, an Implementing Convention an-
nexed to this Treaty shall determine the particulars and proced-
ure concerning the association of the countries and territories 
with the Community. 
Before the expiry of the Convention provided for in the 
preceding sub-paragraph, the Council, acting by means of a unani-
mous vote, shall, proceeding from the results achieved and on the 
basis of the principles set out in this Treaty, determine the pro-
visions to be made for a further period. 
Part Six 
General and Final Provisions 
ARTICLE 238 
The Community may conclude with a third country, a union 
of States or an international organisation agreements creating an 
association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint 
actions and special procedures. 
Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting 
by means of a unanimous vote and after consulting the Assembly. 
Where such agreements involve amendments to this Treaty, 
such amendments shall be subject to prior adoption in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 2 36. 
Source: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
and connected documents, Secretariat of the Interim 




LIST OF ASSOCIATES UNDER PART IV OF THE TREATY OF ROME 
French West Africa including: Senegal, the Sudan, Guinea, 
the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauretania, the Niger and the Upper 
Volta; 
French Equatorial Africa including: the Middle Congo, 
Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gaboon; 
St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoro Archipelago, Madagas-
car and dependencies, the French Somali Coast, New Caledonia and 
dependencies, the French Settlements in Oceania, the Southern and 
Antarctic Territories; 
The Autonomous Republic of Togoland; 
The French Trusteeship Territory in the Cameroons; 
The Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi; 
The Italian Trusteeship Territory in Somaliland; and 
Netherlands New Guinea. 
So~rce: As for Annex A. 
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ANNEX C 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION OF ASSOCIATION 




With a view to promoting an increase of trade between the 
Associated States and the Member States, strengthening their econ-
omic relations and the economic independence of the Associated 
States and thereby contributing to the development of international 
trade, the High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following 
provisions which shall regulate their mutual trade relations. 
ARTICLE 2 
1. Goods originating in Associated States, shall, when im-
ported into Member States, benefit from the progressive abolition 
of customs duties and charges having an effect equivalent to such 
duties, resulting between Member States under the provisions of 
Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 of the Treaty and the decisions 
which have been or may be adopted to accelerate the rate of achiev-
ing the aims of the Treaty. 
2. Nevertheless, upon the entry into force of the Convention, 
Member States shall abolish the customs duties and charges having 
an effect equivalent to such duties which they apply to the goods 
originating in Associated States which are listed in the Annex to 
this Convention. 
At the same time Member States shall apply the common 
customs tariff duties of the Community to imports of these goods 
from third countries. 
3. Imports from third countries of unroasted coffee into the 
Benelux countries on the one hand, and of bananas into the Federal 
R~public of Germany on the other hand, shall be subject to the 
terms set out respectively, as to unroasted coffee, in the Proto-
co~this day concluded between the Member States and, as to 
bananas, in the Protocol concluded on 25 March 1957 between the 
Member States and in the Declaration annexed to this Convention. 
4. Application of the provisions of this Article shall not 
predetermine the treatment to be applied to certain agricultural 
products under the provisions of Article 11 of this Convention. 
5. At the request of an Associated State, there shall be 
consultations within the Association Council regarding the con-
ditions of application of this Article. 
ARTICLE 3 
1. Each Associated State shall accord identical tariff 
treatment to goods originating in any of the Member States; 
Associated States not applying this rule on the entry into force 
of this Convention shall do so within the following six months. 
2. In each Associated State goods originating in ~ember 
States shall benefit, under the terms set out in Protocol No.1 
annexed to this Convention, from the progressive abolition of 
customs duties and charges having au effect equivalent to such 
duties which that Associated State applies to imports of these 
goods into its territory. 
Provided always that, each Associated State may retain 
or introduce customs duties and charges having an effect equiva-
lent to such duties which correspond to its development needs or 
its industrialization requirements or which are intended to con-
tribute to its budget. 
The customs duties and chaT~es having an effect equiva-
lent to such duties levied by Associated States in accordance 
with the foregoing sub-paragraph, as also any alteration which 
they may make in these duties and charges under the provisions 
of Protocol No.1, may not either de jure or de facto give rise 
to any direct or indirect discrimination between Member States. 
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3. At the request of the Community and in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in ProtocoL ~0.1, there shall be consultatiOns 
within the AS l1ociation Council r~garding the conditions of appli-
cat10n of this Article. 
ARTICLE 4 
1. Insofar as an Associated State levies export duties on 
exports of its products to Member States, these duties may not 
give rise, de jure or de facto, to any direct or indirect dis-
crimination between Member States and may not be granted than 
those applied to products exported to the most favoured third 
country. 
2. Without prejudice to the application of Article 13, 
paragraph 2 of this Convention, the Association Council shall 
take suitable measures if the application of such duties leads 
to serious disturbances in the conditions of competition. 
ARTICLE 5 
1. With regard to the abolition of quantitative restrictions, 
Member States shall apply to imports of goods originating in the 
Associated States the relevant provisions of the Treaty, and of 
the decisions which have been or may be adopted to accelerate the 
rate of achieving the aims of the Treaty, which they apply ~n 
their relations with each other. 
2. At the request of an Associated State, there shall be 
consultations within the Association Council regarding the con-
ditions of application of this Article. 
ARTICLE 6 
1. Associated States shall, not later than four years after 
the entry into force of the Convention, abolish all quantitative 
restrictions on imports of goods originating in Member States 
and all measures having equivalent effect. This abolition shall 
be carried out progressively under the conditions set out in Pro-
tocol No.2 annexed to this Convention. 
2. Associated States shall refrain from introducing any new 
quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect 
on imports of goods originating in Member States. 
21 2 
3. Should the measures provided for in Article 3 prove 
insufficient to meet their development needs and their indus-
trialization requirements, or in the event of difficulties in 
their balance of payments, or, where agricultural products are 
concerned, in connection with the requirements arising from 
existing regional market organizations, Associated States may, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the two foregoing paragraphs 
and subject to the terms of Protocol No.2, retain or introduce 
quantitative restrictions on imports of goods originating in 
Member States. 
4. Associated States in which imports come within the 
province of a State trading monopoly or of any body which, de 
jure or de facto, either directly or indirectly limits , controls, 
directs or influences them, shall take any steps necessary to 
attain the objectives defined in this Title and to abolish pro-
gressively any discrimination in conditions of supply and market-
ing of goods. 
Without prejudice to the application of Article 7 below, 
foreign trade plans drawn up by the Associated States shall not 
contain or bring about, de jure or de facto, any direct or in-
direct discrimination between Member States. 
The Associated States concerned shall inform the Assoc-
iation Council of the steps taken to implement the provisions of 
this paragraph. 
5. At the request of the Community, there shall be consult-
ations within the Association Council regarding the conditions 
of application of this Article. 
ARTICLE 7 
Without prejudice to the special provisions for border 
trade, the treatment that the Associated States apply by virtue 
of this Title to goods originating in Member States shall in no 
case be less favourable than that applied to goods originating in 
the ' most favoured third country. 
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ARTICLE 8 
This Convention shall not preclude the maintenance or 
establishment of customs unions or free-trade areas among Assoc-
iated States. 
ARTICLE 9 
This Convention shall not preclude the maintenance or 
establishment of customs unions or free-trade areas between one 
or more Associated States and one or more third countries inso-
far as they neither are nor prove to be incompatible with the 
principles and provisions of the said Convention. 
ARTICLE 10 
The provi sions of the foregoing Articles 3, 4 and 6 
shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public mor-
ality, public pol icy, public security, the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, 
or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Pro-
vided always that such prohibitions or restrictions shall not be 
used as a means of arbitrary discrimination nor as a disguised 
restriction on trade. 
ARTICLE 11 
When drawing up its common agricultural policy, the 
Community shall take the interests of the Associated States into 
consideration as regards products similar to and competitive with 
Europe~n products. The Community and the Associated States con-
cerned shall consult together for this purpose. 
The treatment applicable to imports into the Community 
of these products, if they have originated in the Associated States, 
shall be determined by the Community in the course of defining its 
common agricultural policy, after consultation within the Assoc-
iation Council. 
ARTICLE 12 
1 • On matters of commercial policy, the Contracting Parties 
agree to keep each other informed and, should one of them so 
request, to consult together for the purpose of giving good effect 
to this Convention. 
2. Such consultation shall bear on measures concerning trade 
with third countries if these measures are likely to harm the 
interests of one or more Contracting Parties, with particular 
reference to: 
(a) the suspension, alteration or abolition of customs 
duties, 
(b) the granting of tariff quotas at reduced or zero 
duties, other than the quotas referred to in 
Article 2, paragraph 3, above, 
(c) the introduction, reduction or abolition of qua~­
titative restrictions, without prejudice to the 
obligations incumbent upon certain Contracting 
Parties by reason of their membership of G.A.T.T. 
3. Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the Assoc-
iation Council shall define the procedure for consultation and 




1. If serious disturbances occur in one sector of the economy 
of an Associated State or jeopardize its external financial abil-
ity, that State may take the necessary protective measures, not-
withstanding the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 
1 and Article 6, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4. 
These measures and the methods of applying them shall be 
notified immediately to the Association Council. 
2. If serious disturbances occur in one sector of the economy 
of the Community or of one or more Member States, or jeopardize 
their external financial stability, and if difficulties arise which 
may result in a region sUffering grave economic hardship, the 
Community may take, or may authorize the Member State or States 
concerned to take such measures as may prove necessary in their 
relations with the Associated States, notwithstanding the provisions 
of Articles 2 and 5. 
These measures and the methods of applying them shall be 
notified immediately to the Association Council. 
3. For the purpose of implementing paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this Article, priority shall be given to such measures as will 
least disturb the functioning of the Association. These measures 
shall not exceed the limits strictly necessary to remedy the diff-
iculties that have arisen. 
4. There shall be consultations within the Association Coun-
cil regarding the measures taken under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article. 
Such consultations shall be held at the request of the 
Community in respect of measures under paragraph 1 and at the 




The Institutions of the Association shall be: 
the Association Council assisted by the Association Committee, 
the Parliamentary Conference of the Association, 
the Court of Arbitration of the Association. 
ARTICLE 40 
The Association Council shall be composed, on the one 
hand, of the members of the Council of the European Economic Com-
munity and members of the Commission of the European Economic 
Community and, on the other hand, of one member of the Government 
of each Associated State. 
Any member of the Association Council prevented from 
attending may be represented. The representative shall exercise 
all the rights of the accredited member. 
Proceedings of the Association Council shall only be 
valjd if half the members of the Council of the Community, one 
member of the Commission and half the accredited members represent-
ing the Governments of the Associated States are present. 
ARTICLE 41 
The office of the President of the Association Council 
shall be exercised alternately by a member of the Council of the 
European Economic Community and a member of the Government of an 
Associated State. 
ARTICLE 42 
Meetings of the Association Council shall be called 
once a year by the President. 
Furthermore it shall meet whenever necessary, in 




The Association Council shall express itseJfby mutual 
agreement between the Community on the one hand and the Associated 
States on the other. 
The Community on the one hand and the Associated States 
on the other shall each by means of an internal Protocol determine 
their procedure for arriving at their respective positions. 
ARTICLE 51 
1 • Disputes concerning the interpretation or the applic-
ation of the present Convention which might arise between one 
Member State, several Member States or the Community on the one 
hand and one or more Associated States on the other, shall be sub-
mitted by one of the parties to the dispute to the Association 
Council which shall seek an amicable settlement at its next meeting. 
If this cannot be achieved and if the parties to the dispute fail 
to agree upon an appropriate solution, the dispute shall, at the 
request of the earliest petitioner, be submitted to the Court of 
Arbitration of the Association. 
2. The Court of Arbitration shall be composed of five 
members: a President who shall be appointed by the Association 
Council and four judges chosen from among persons whose independ-
ence and competence can be fully guaranteed. The judges shall be 
appointed by the Association Council within three months after 
the entry into force of the Convention and for the duration 
thereof. Two of the judges shall be appointed by the Council of 
the European Economic Community and the other two by the Assoc-
iated States. For each judge, following the same procedure, the 
Association Council shall appoint a deputy who shall ~et in the 
event of the accredited judge being unable to do so. 
3. 
4. 
The Court of Arbitration shall act by majority vote. 
The decisions of the Court of Arbitration shall be 
binding on the parties to the dispute who shall be under the 
obligation to take all necessary measures to carry them out. 
5. Within three months after the judges are appointed, 
the Association Council shall lay down the Statute of the Court 
of Arbitration, on a proposal of that Court. 
6. The Court of Arbitration shall adopt its rules of 
procedure within the same period. 
ARTICLE 52 
The Association Council may make any useful recom-
mendation for the purpose of facilitating contacts between the 
Community and the representatives of the various trades and pro-
fessions of the Associated States. 
General. 
ARTICLE 58 
1. The Association Council shall be informed of any 
request made by a State for accession to or association with the 
Community. 
2. There shall be consultations within the Association 
Council on any request for association with the Community made 
by a State which has an economic structure and production compar-
able to those of the Associated States if the Community, after 
examining the said request, has laid it before the Association 
Council. 
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3. The agreement of association between the Community and 
any State covered by the previous paragraph may provide for the 
accession of that State to the present Convention. That State shall 
then enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same obligations 
as the Associated States. Provided always that the agreement which 
associates it with the Community may determine the date on which 
certain of these rights and obligations shall become applicable 
to it. 
Such accession shall not adversely affect the advant-
ages accruing to the Associated States which are signatories to 
this Convention f rom the provisions relating to financial and 
technical co-operation. 
ARTICLE 59 
This Convention shall be concluded for a period of 
five years from the date of its entry into force. 
Source: E.E.C. and the African Associated States: The 
Convention of Association, distributed for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1963. 
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ANNEX D 
RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE, 1947 
ARTICLE I 
General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind 
imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or 
imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties 
and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with i mportation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred tu in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, 
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territ-
ories of all other contracting parties. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not 
require the elimination of any preferences in respect of import 
duties or charges which do not exceed the levels provided for in 
paragraph 4 of this Article and which fall within the following 
descriptions: 
(a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or 
more of the territories listed in Annex A, subject 
to the conditions set forth therein; 
(b) Preferences in force exclusively between two or 
more territories which on July 1, 1939, were 
connected by common sovereignty or relations of 
protection or suzerainty and which are listed in 
Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions 
set forth therein; 
(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Cuba; 
(d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring 
countries listed in Annexes E and F.(1) 
(1) The GATT Annexes referred to in Article I list Commonwealth 
countries, members of the French Union, and other countries 
benefitting from a preferential system in 1947. 
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3· The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to pref-
erences between the countries formerly a part of the Ottoman 
Empire and detached from it on July 24, 1923, provided such pref-
erences are approved under paragraph 5 of Article XXV, which shall 
be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph 1 of Article 
XXIX. 
4. The margin of preference on any product in respect of 
which a preference is permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article 
but is not specifically set forth as a maximum margin of prefer-
ence in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall 
not exceed: 
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product 
described in such Schedule, the difference between 
the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates 
provided for therein; if no preferential rate is 
provided for, the preferential rate shall for the 
purposes of this paragraph be taken to be that in 
force on April 10, 1947, and, if no most-favoured-
nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not 
exceed the difference between the most-favoured-
nation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 
1947; 
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not 
described in the appropriate Schedule, the differ-
ence between the most-favoured-nation and prefer-
ential rates existing on April 10, 1947. 
In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date 
of April 10, 1947, referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
this paragraph shall be replaced by the respective dates set 
forth in that Annex. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
Territorial Application - Frontier Traffic _ 
Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas 
4. ' The contracting parties recognize the desirability of 
increasing freedom of trade by 'che development, through voluntary 
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agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the 
countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that 
the purpose of a customs union 9r of a free-trade area should be 
to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not 
to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with 
such territories. 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not 
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adopt-
ion of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a cus-
toms union or of a free-trade area; Provided that: 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agree-
ment leading to the formation of a customs union, the 
duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at 
the institution of any such union or interim agree-
ment" in respect of trade with contracting parties 
not parties to such union or agreement shall not on 
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the constituent territories 
prior to the formation of such union or the adopt-
ion of such interim agreement, as the case may be; 
(b) with respect to a f r ee-trade area, or an interim 
agreement leading to the formation of a free-trade 
area, the duties and other regUlations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories 
and applicable a t the formation of such free-trade 
area or the adop t ion of such interim agreement to 
the trade of contracting parties" not included in such 
area or not parties to such agreement shall not be 
higher or more restrictive than the corresponding 
duties and other regUlations of commerce existing in 
the same constituent territories prior to the form-
ation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement, 
as the case may be; and 
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(c) any interim agreement referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the 
formation of such a customs union or of such a free-
trade a r ea within a reasonable length of time. 
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6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5(a), 
a contracting part y proposes to increase any rate of duty incon-
sistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set 
forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory 
adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already 
afforded by the reductions brought about in the corresponding duty 
of the other constituents of the union. 
7. ( a ) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs 
union or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such inform-
ation regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to 
make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as 
they made deem appropriate. 
( b ) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included 
in an interim agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation 
with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the 
information made available in accordance with the provisions of 
sub-paragraph ( a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agree-
ment is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union 
or of a free-trade area wi t hin the period contemplated by the 
parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable 
one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the 
parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put 
into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not pre-
pared to "modify it in accordance with these recommendations. 
(c ) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred 
to in paragraph 5(c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties concerned to 
con§ult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay 
unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade 
area. 
8. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
A customs union shall be understood to mean the sub-
stitution of a single customs territory for two or 
more customs territories, so that 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those per-
mitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV 
and XX) are eliminated with respect to substan-
tially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect 
to substantially all the trade in products orig-
inating in such territories, and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, sub-
stantially the same duties and other regulations 
of commerce are applied by each of the members 
of the union to the trade of territories not in-
cluded in the union; 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of 
two or more customs territories in which the duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, 
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories. 
ARTICLE XXXV 
Non-application of the Agreement between 
particular Contracting Parties 
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1. This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agree-
ment, shall not apply as between any contracting party and any other 
contracting party if: 
(a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff 
negotiations with each other, and 
(b) either of the contracting parties, at the time either 
becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such 
application. 
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may review the operation of 
this Ariicle in particular cases at the request of any contract-
ing party and make appropriate recommendations. 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
ARTICLE XXXVI 
Principles and Objectives 
8. The developed contracting parties do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations 
to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of 
less-developed contracting parties. 
Source: Text of the General Agreement, as in force on 1 March 
1969, reprinted from - Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT Law and 
International Economic Organization, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1970. pp. 390 - 444 passim. 
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ANNEX E 
GENERALIZED SCHEME OF PREFERENCES 
Tariff Preferences in favour of Developing Countries. 
1. Submission by the European Economic Community. 
In transmitting to the UNCTAD the attached revised 
offer concerning generalized preferences, the European Economic 
Community wishes to confirm that the offer is made on the assump-
tion that all the main industrialized countries of the O.E.C.D. 
will take part in the system of preferences and will make com-
parable efforts. 
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It is also confirmed that the Community's offer is 
subject to possible modifications following the consultations which 
the Community is obliged to hold with some of its Associated 
countries, in accordance with the provisions of the Association 
agreements. 
I. - MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES (Chapters 25 to 99) 
A 
As a general rule (1) preferential treatment will be given 
to all industrial manufactures and semi- manufactures in 
Chapters 25 to 99 of the Brussels Nomenclature originating 
in the developing countries; 
- preference will take the form of exemption from Customs 
duties; 
- preferential imports will be effected up to ceilings in 
value terms to be calculated for each product on a basis 
common to all products; 
- in order to limit the preferences granted to the more 
competitive developing country or countries and to 
reserve a substantial share for the less competitive 
preferential imports of a given product from a single 
developing country should not as a general rule exceed 
50 per cent of the ceiling fixed for that product. 
(1) The phrase "as a general rule" imnlies that a very limited 
number of exceptions might be introduced in the light of 
consultations to be held with the O.E.C.D. Member countries. 
Annual ceilings will normally be calculated in accord-
ance with the following formula: c.i.f. value of imports for 
1968 from beneficiaries under the system (basic quota) plus 5 per 
cent of the c.i.f. value of imports from other sources (supple-
mentary quota). 
Subject to improvements in the basis of calculation 
after several years of operation, the basic quota will be a fixed 
amount corresponding to imports in a reference year. The supple-
mentary quota will be variable and recalculated annually on the 
basis of the latest available figures without, however, result-
ing in a reduction in the ceiling. 
B 
For cotton textiles covered by the long-term Agreement, 
preferences in the form of ceilings for duty-free imports cal-
culated according to the formula under A above will be granted to 
countries which are beneficiaries under the. system of generalised 
preferences and signatories to the long-term Agreement, for the 
duration of that Agreement. 
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Preferences may also, however, be granted for the same 
period, in accordance with terms and procedures to be agreed 
bilaterally, to countries which are beneficiaries under the system 
of generalised preferences but not signatories to the long-term . 
Agreement, which give similar undertakings vis-a-vis the Community 
to those given in the long-term Agreement. 
C 
For coir and jute products, Customs exemption is also 
envisaged under specific measures to be arranged with the ex-
porting developing countries. 
II. - PROCESSED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
The E.E.C. will grant tariff preferences for the pro-
cessed agricultural products in the list transmitted to the UNCTAD 
on 15th November, 1969 and for the products in the list annexed 
hereto. The preferential rate for each product is indicated in 
the list. 
III. - SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS AND ESCAPE CLAUSE. 
For industrial manufactures and semi-manufactures, the 
safeguard mechanism is the direct result of the system chosen by 
the Community (predetermined import ceilings). On the other hand, 
for processed agricultural products, an escape clause will apply. 
2. Submission by the United States. 
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The U.S. is prepared to participate, subject to Congress-
ional approval, in a system of tariff preferences for developing 
countries, which should be liberal and should confer the maximum 
range of benefits on the developing countries. We consider that 
all the major developed countries must participate in the system 
and implement preference schemes which are harmonized as much as 
possible and can be expected to yield comparable results. 
The U.S. proposal contains the following elements: 
1. Preferential duties set at zero. 
2. Preferences granted on: 
(a) manufactured and semi-manufactured products 
in BTN Chapters 25 - 99, excepting only textiles, shoes, 
and petroleum products. (A list of the exceptions by 
TSUS - Tariff Schedules of the United States - item 
numbers is attached as Annex I.) 
(b) a selective list of primary products in BTN 
Chapters 25 - 99. (A list by TSUS number of products 
which the U.S. considers to be primary products is 
attached as Annex II. A positive list of the primary 
products to be granted preferences is attached as 
Annex III.) 
(c) a selective list of agriculture and fishery 
products in BTN Chapters 1 - 24. (A positive list of 
such products is attached as Annex IV). 
3. A simple scheme, without ceilings on preferential 
imports, relying on the standar~ escape clause and adjustment 
assistance as safeguards for domestic industry. 
4. A temporary scheme, i.e. not more than ten years, 
which would not constitute a binding commitment and would not 
impede future tariff reductions on a most-favoured-nation basis. 
5. Developing countries which receive special pre-
ferences in developed country markets for products covered by 
the scheme would be excluded from preferences. However, if 
adequate assurances are provided that these special preferenc~s 
would be phased out within a reasonable period of time, the 
developing countries concerned could be granted preferences from 
the outset. 
6. Developing countries which grant reverse prefer-
ences to developed countries would be excluded from preferences. 
However, if such developing countries provide adequate assurances 
that the reverse preferences would be phased out within a reason-
able period of time, they could be granted preferences from the 
outset. 
Source: UNCTAD, TD/B/AC5/34. 
EEC: Add 1. 19 September 1970. 
USA: Add 5/Rev.1. 24 September 1970. 
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